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ex-ante policies. The model explains the empirically-observed differences in how companies
with and without PE-ownership invest, pay dividends, and issue debt. In particular, the
model quantitatively explains the difference in leverage of companies with and without
PE-ownership. The model shows that greater tax-shield benefits and superior growth of
PE-backed companies can explain 6.4% of the abnormal return of PE firms. The conclusion
that follows from the paper, however, is that abnormal returns of PE firms cannot be
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CHAPTER 1 : Leverage and Financing in Distress
1.1. Introduction
Interest rates to issue debt are high for firms that already have a lot of debt. This makes
debt financing expensive for highly-levered firms. One would assume that firms should,
therefore, substitute debt financing with equity financing when leverage becomes higher.
Yet, as Figure 3 shows, highly-levered firms issue debt rather than equity.1 This implies
that equity financing costs increase with firm’s leverage even faster that debt financing costs
- or otherwise firms would not increase their already high leverage. This paper shows that
the fact that highly levered firms are effectively cut out from equity capital markets, can
explain many capital structure patterns.
First, a model that assumes that equity issuance costs are unaffected by leverage will lead
to significant counterfactual implications. To show this, the paper solves a model similar to
Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001), in which 1) firms in distress can always issue equity, and
2) costs of issuing equity do not change with leverage (either zero or proportional to the
amount). In a simulated steady-state cross section, 57% of firms optimally choose to be in
distress, having so much debt that their cash flow is not sufficient to pay interest expenses
(and so they issue equity). This is wrong both quantitatively and qualitatively:2 firms that
issue equity in the data are low-levered, and the absolute majority of firms produce enough
cash to pay interest expenses. A number of other known capital structure puzzles arise:
for instance, the average leverage in the model is too high (58% in the model vs. 36% in
the data), or default probabilities are understated (a firm that has 20% default probability
within 10 years has 50% leverage in the data and 75% in the model).3
1
Empirical literature on equity issuance strongly supports this: Senber and Senber (1995) report complete
absence of equity issuance by firms in distress, while Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2007) find that most equity
issuances take a form of payments in mergers or employee stock compensations, and that equity issuances in
which firms raise cash for business operations are rare. See Literature Review subsection A and Appendix
A for a more detailed analysis of empirical research on equity issuance by firms in distress.
2
This is not the result of inadequate calibration of parameters: I took parameter values from Hennessy
and Whited (2012) paper, in which they consider the same model. A similar result appears in other papers;
for instance, in Bharma, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2011) firms that optimally choose their leverage at time
zero issue so much debt that they immediately put themselves in distress, with interest expenses exceeding
their cash flow.
3
This again happens because firms will operate too long before defaulting by issuing equity and paying
interests to debtholders

1

Figure 1: Amount of new equity and debt (scaled by assets) issued by a median firm across
firms with different leverage
Issuance of new debt
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New debt (new equity) is the amount of long-term debt (equity) issued by a firm in a given year, scaled by
the book value of asset. Median rather than average values are reported because distributions of debt and
equity issuances are skewed, and more so for firms with high values of leverage. Formal regression of new
debt (new equity) on firm’s leverage results in the coefficient 0.35 (-0.16), both statistically significant at
1% level. Data is taken from Compustat for the period 1987-2017; see Section 3.2 for the details of data
analysis. Leverage is the ratio of firm’s debt (sum of long-term and short-term) to the book value of assets.

While the above-mentioned results are based on the framework of Goldstein, Ju, and Leland
(1994), it is important to emphasize that the results are not specific to this particular
framework, but come from the assumption that highly-levered firms have a cheap way of
external financing (equity in this case). For instance, Hennessy and Whited (2005) use a
different model to study firm’s capital structure, but assume that equity issuance incurs
only flotation costs. They also find that in their model ”equity issuers are the most highly
indebted”. In short, the assumption that highly-levered firms firms can easily issue equity
1) is not supported by the data or empirical literature, and 2) leads to wrong implications,
both quantitatively and qualitatively.
As the next step, this paper modifies the model by assuming that firms in distress cannot
issue equity, and have to issue more debt every time they do not have enough cash to
pay interest expenses. Here is what happens then: when firm’s cash flow falls below the
level of interest expenses, firm’s leverage is already high; by issuing more debt to cover
the gap, the firm increases its leverage further, and moves closer to default. Moreover,
2

0%
>90%

Figure 2: Cummulative distribution function (cdf) of leverage distribution in the data and
in the model
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For each value of leverage on the horizontal axis, the bars show what is the fraction of firms in the data and
in the model with leverage that does not exceed this value. Panel A shows results for the model in which
firms can always issue equity, and Panel B shows results for the model in which firms whose profits are not
sufficient to pay interest expenses on their debt have to issue more debt to cover the gap. Data is taken from
Compustat for the period 1987-2017 for firms that have access to public bond markets (proxied by whether
a firm in a given year has S&P long-term credit rating). The model is solved for the benchmark parameter
values shown in Table 9. See Section 3 for details of data analysis and model simulations.

as debt is fairly priced, interest rates to issue new debt grow exponentially for firms that
are deep in distress. In essence, a firm in distress risks falling in a continuous debt spiral,
when interest expenses grow faster than the cash flow, and it has to continuously issue new
debt to cover payments on previously issued debt. Such mechanism makes distress very
costly, and affects expectations of firms that are outside of distress. Even healthy firms now
choose significantly smaller leverage ex-ante, even if bankruptcy costs are low and tax-shield
benefits are high.
The modified model has much better quantitative results. Firms that fall in distress either
quickly recover or quickly default. As the result, only 14% of firms are in distress (have
interest expenses that exceed their cash flow), and default probabilities match empirically
observed numbers. Expectations about distress reduce firm’s target leverage by 20 percentage points (compared to the case when firms could issue equity in distress), and so
the model correctly matches the average leverage among all firms in the data, and also the
average leverage in subsets of firms grouped by their credit ratings. Moreover, the model
3

closely matches every quantile of leverage distribution between 35% and 100%, as shown
on Figure 2 Panel B.
This last result illustrated by Figure 2 that the model correctly matches the whole right-tail
distribution of leverage is particularly important for this paper. Firms in the model make
capital structure choices based on what they expect will happen to them in distress. While
it is impossible to directly test firms’ expectations, it is possible to study what actually
happens to firms in distress vs. what the model says the expectations are. Because the
match between the model-predicted and empirically-observed distributions of leverage of
firms in distress is so close, it provides a strong support for the theoretical mechanism used
in the model. This is the main contribution of the paper: it uncovers the mechanism that
both explains the distribution of leverage of highly-leveraged firms and shows how it affects
firm’s initial capital structure choice. It is also the first paper that examines this channel
and shows its importance.
One of the main advantages of Leland-type models is that they are easy to solve and results
are generally available in a closed form. The modification of the model that says that firms
in distress cannot issue equity does not come at the cost of tractability. Tractability is
preserved in the model that this paper derives, and some results become even simpler, as
is the case with, for instance, the default boundary.
The paper shows that large bankruptcy costs are not necessary to match the average value
of leverage in a cross-section. In the benchmark calibration, the value of bankruptcy costs is
only 10%. Even with this value, the cross-sectional leverage is only 38% for the environment
in which firms in distress finance the gap between the cash flow and interest expenses
by issuing debt. In contrast, to match the average leverage in a cross-section within the
framework in which firms in distress can also issue equity, bankruptcy costs should be at
least 60%, and even higher to match other moments.
In the model, firm’s default probability depends on its current leverage, and also on how
this firm will finance its interest payments in distress. Naturally, keeping firm’s leverage
constant, default probability is higher if in distress the firm will have to issue debt at

4

exponentially increasing rates, as opposed to cheap equity. A striking result, though, is
that the overall default rate is higher in the model in which firms in distress can issue
equity. The reason why this happens is because firms in both models endogenously choose
how much debt to issue, and in the model, in which firms in distress can only issue debt,
they are much more conservative in their leverage policy ex-ante, and so default less often
ex-post.
Literature review
A. Equity issuance by firms in distress
The underlying assumption of the model in this paper is that firms in distress do not issue
equity and instead finance the shortfall between the cash flow and interest expenses by
issuing more debt. This is a strong assumption that is imposed to achieve a closed-form
solution for the function that connects firm’s leverage and external financing costs; similar
results would hold in the model if distressed firms could issue equity, but equity issuance
costs increased with leverage.
Empirical evidence on equity issuance by distressed firms is scant, but also mixed. Below
is a review of papers that consider this question. The overall conclusion that follows is that
most firms issue equity when their leverage is low; there are instances of equity issuances
by financially distressed firms, but the costs are high, and such firms use equity financing
because they cannot raise debt.
The first group of papers argues that most firms issue equity when their performance is
good. For instance, Senber and Senber (1995) report a complete absence of equity issuance
by distressed firms. Fama and French (2005) show that equity issuances are frequent, but
most firms issue equity when their leverage is low. Similarly, Mikkelson and Partch (1986)
and Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2007) find that equity issuances for cash are rare - both
in absolute level and relative to public debt issuances. Some other studies provide indirect
evidence that firms in distress do not issue equity. Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonal (1990)
find that firm’s leverage does not increase significantly two years before an SEO; should
firms issue equity to make required debt payments when internally generated cash flow is
5

Figure 3: Stock price discount following equity issuance announcement
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Data is based on SDC/Platinum database that tracks equity issuances, and shows the average stock price
reaction following an equity issuance announcement. Each bar represents the average discount for a group
of companies with a given leverage; for instance, among companies, whose leverage was between 30% and
40% at the time when they announced an equity issuance, the stock price fell by 3.59% on average. Negative
4.32% (red line) is the average stock price reaction following an equity issuance announcement.

insufficient, one would observe an increase in leverage prior to an SEO. DeAngelo, DeAngelo
and Stulz (2008) find that the average leverage of a firm before an SEO is only 27%. Denis
and McKeon (2012) show that firms, whose leverage is above the target, tend to cover
financial deficit by issuing new debt and increasing leverage further.
Other authors argue in contrary that a sizable number of distressed firms issue equity, but
they sell new shares at a large discount, and do so because debt financing is unavailable.
Park (2017) finds that public equity offerings decrease for firms in distress, but private
placements increase. Walker and Wu (2017) find that a third of all SEOs are conducted by
financially distressed firms. Both of these papers, however, use the distress measure from
Campbell, Hilsher, and Szilagyi (2008), which is only partially related to firm’s leverage.
Indeed, the average leverage in the subsample of distressed firms in Walker and Wu is 32%,
which implies that these firms are in distress for reasons other than their indebtedness, and
they likely have very limited access to debt financing. This conclusion is further reinforced
by Lim and Schwert (2017) who study all private placement of equity (PIPEs) by U.S. firms.
They find that most firms issuing PIPEs are small distressed firms without access to debt
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markets: the median leverage of firms issuing PIPEs is only 7.2%, and 93% of all firms do
not have credit rating. When such firms issue PIPEs, they offer shares to the market at a
large discount.
Appendix A provides further empirical analysis of the correlation between the frequency of
equity issuance and firm’s leverage based on Thomson Reuters data. Results show that the
amount of equity issuance decreases with firm’s leverage, and the discount at which newly
issued shares are offered to investors increases with leverage; this conclusion holds for all
firms and also for the subsample of firms that have access to public debt markets. Similar
conclusion follows from Figure 3 which is based on Compustat data.

4

The model derived in this paper assumes that firms always have access to debt capital
markets.5 Therefore, the assumption that such firms do not issue equity to pay required
debt payments in distress is consistent with empirical evidence discussed above.
The question why costs to issue equity grow for firms in distress is beyond the scope of this
paper. To theoretically microfound this assumption, Belyakov (2018) considers a model
similar6 to the one used in this paper, but adds information asymmetry between firm’s
manager and outside shareholders. He shows that leverage amplifies information asymmetry,
and that costs to issue equity escalate with leverage as the result. Capital structure-wise, he
obtains results that quantitatively similar to those in this paper, but the model itself is less
tractable. Appendix B provides a simplified two-period version of that model that shows
how presence of leverage amplifies information asymmetry. Such explanation is consistent
with empirical findings of Hertzel and Smith (1993) and Lim and Schwer (2017) who argue
that distressed firms are characterized by severe information asymmetry.
4

The paper does not combine the two databases because they use different definitions of equity issuance.
In particular, Thomson Reuters mostly considers SEOs, while Compustat partially considers private placements as well. Assuming that Compustat data is internally consistent, Figure 3 shows the relative scale of
debt and equity issuance as firms leverage increases, which would not necessarily be consistent if Compustat
and Thomson Reuters data for equity issuance is pooled. On the other hand, Thomson Reuters has data
for the discount/premium paid for newly issued shares, which is not available in Compustat
5
The empirical sample of firms that the paper quantitatively explains also consists of firms with access
to debt capital markets (firms with S&P long-term credit rating).
6
In fact, an identical model
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B. Underleverage puzzle
This paper is related to the line of literature that discusses the underleverage puzzle. Miller
(1977) shows that present value of expected default losses seems disproportionally small
compared to tax benefits of debt, implying that firms consistently issue less debt than what
would be optimal to maximize the value of their shareholders. Graham (2000) estimates
that tax benefits of debt add up to 5% of firm value, and also concludes that firms are on
average underlevered from the point of view of a trade-off theory.
Faulkender and Petersen (2006) show that at least part of the underleverage puzzle is
explained by the fact that not all firms have access to debt capital markets. They find that
the difference in average leverage between firms that do and do not have S&P long-term
credit rating is almost 20 percentage points. This paper assumes that all firms have access
to debt capital markets; nevertheless, the underleverage puzzle remains in the model in
which firms can always issue equity.
Chen (2012) provides an alternative explanation to the underleverage puzzle: he focuses on
a model in which bankruptcy costs rise in bad states of the economy. He shows that firm’s
target leverage at refinancing points is significantly smaller relative to a model in which
bankruptcy costs do not vary with states of the economy. Nevertheless, when he simulates
a cohort of firms, the average simulated leverage exceeds 40%, which is greater than the
average leverage observed in the data.
Morellec, Nikolov, and Schuroff (2012) provide an alternative explanation to the underleverage puzzle that relies on the presence of a conflict of interests between shareholders
and managers.7 They use the Goldstein-Ju-Leland framework in which firms in distress
can always issue equity, but they assume that firm’s manager can divert a small fraction
of the cash flow and, therefore, has incentives to keep the firm alive for longer. They show
that small agency costs help resolve the underleverage puzzle. Their paper, however, only
addresses the mean and median values of leverage distribution and, as authors acknowledge,
the “model is statistically rejected for higher-order leverage moments and dispersion mea7

See also Jensen and Meckling (1975)
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sures”. Indeed, kurtosis of the simulated leverage distribution in their model is much greater
than in the data, implying that the simulated leverage distribution is centered around the
mean value. The higher-order moments of leverage distribution, in particular the right-tail
distribution of leverage, is the main focus of this paper.
Papers that resolve the underleverage puzzle often assume high values of bankruptcy costs;
this increases ex-ante costs of debt issuance and reduces firm’s incentives to issue debt. For
instance, among the two papers mentioned above, Chen (2010) assumes bankruptcy costs
between 40% and 80%, and Morellec, Nikolov, and Schurhoff (2012) assume bankruptcy
costs of 50%8 . These values are substantially greater than empirically observed among
defaulted firms (between 1% and 30%).9 Glover (2016) points that there is a selection
bias among firms that default; specifically, firms with low bankruptcy costs choose leverage
values that are high, thus, defaulting more often and creating a bias in empirical estimates
of bankruptcy costs. He uses a structural estimation approach and finds average default
costs of around 40%. While Glover’s argument is valid, the underlying assumption of his
structural model is that firms in distress issue equity, which, as noted earlier, is not the case
in the data. This paper shows that expectations about increasing costs of external financing
in distress affect firm’s initial leverage choice significantly even if actual bankruptcy costs
are small.
The explanation to the underleverage puzzle provided in this paper has one advantage
compared to alternative explanations: it is almost trivial. In essence, the logic follows from
the backward induction: once a firm knows that tomorrow it will only be able to refinance
its debt at a high rate, it wants to have less debt today. This explanation can’t be ignored
simply because it relies on an assumption that does not have a solid theoretical foundation
- that all forms of external financing - including equity - become more expensive as firm’s
leverage increases. It is particularly important given that empirical evidence confirms that
highly levered firms either only issue debt or issue equity at a high discount, as the previous
subsection shows.
8
It should be noted that Morellec, Nikolov, and Schurhoff assume that default may lead to renegotiation
rather than liquidation with substantially lower costs
9
See, for instance, Gruber and Warner (1977), Andrade and Kaplan (1998), Hennessy and Whited (2007),
Davydenko, Srebulaev, and Zhao (2012), or Reindel, Stoughton, and Zechner (2017)
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C. Goldstein-Ju-Leland framework
This paper has an important theoretical contribution to the class of dynamic capital structure models similar to Leland (1994), Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001), or Strebulaev10
(2007): it derives in a closed form the optimal default boundary for a firm that finances
the gap between the cash flow and interest expenses by issuing debt. In the seminal 1994
paper, Leland shows how to derive the optimal default boundary for the case when the firm
can always issue equity. The author introduces the smooth-pasting condition for the firm’s
optimal default boundary: at the time when the firm optimally defaults, both the value
of equity and its derivative with respect to the value of cash flow are zero. In this paper,
firms in distress issue new debt. Issuance of debt increases firm’s interest expenses going
forward, and default happens when no further debt issuances are possible. This is achieved
by imposing the smooth-pasting condition on the value of debt: the derivative of the value
of debt with respect to the coupon payment is zero at the time when default happens. It
follows from the model, however, that the smooth-pasting condition for the value of equity
at default is preserved.
Tractability of the Goldstein-Ju-Leland framework is one of the main reasons why it is often
used in structural estimations literature. Nevertheless, this paper shows that quantitative
results of a model that assumes that firms in distress can always issue equity are unrealistic.
This can be a significant concern for structural estimation papers, for which the plausibility
of the underlying model is of the first-order importance. Modification of the original framework that this paper derives maintains all the tractability features of the original model,
but produces much better fit to the data. This suggests that the modified framework can
contribute to future structural estimation papers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents mathematical formulation
of the model. Section 3 presents model calibration and quantitative results. Section 4
concludes.
10

Bhamra, Kuehn, Strebulaev (2009, 2010), Chen (2010), and Glover (2016) consider more recent versions of this framework that allow for switching macroeconomic regimes. While this paper assumes that
macroeconomic conditions are stable, the debt refinancing mechanism that this paper develops can be easily
implemented in those models.
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1.2. Model
I derive a model of firm’s optimal capital structure in two different environments, to which
I refer as D-type and E-type. The ultimate goal is to compare firm’s predicted capital
structure in these two environments against each other and the data. E-type and D-type
environments are different by the assumption of how firms in distress finance required
interest payments, with distress defined as the situation, in which firm’s time-t cash flow
being lower than the required interest payment that this firm has to make at time t. In the
E-type environment, firms in distress issue equity to finance the difference between the cash
flow and the interest payment (therefore, ”E” in the name of the model). In the D-type
model, firms in distress issue new debt (therefore, ”D” in the name).
For both E-type and D-type environments, I consider two versions of the model; versions
are different by the assumption of how many times firms in the economy can issue debt
to exploit benefits of tax-shield. Version one maintains the set-up of Leland 1994 paper,
where it is assumed that debt can only be issued at t0 11 . Version two has assumptions of
Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001). In this version, firms are allowed to issue debt at t0 , and
increase its amount subsequently if the financial performance is good.
I start with the description of the economy that is the same for both versions of the model,
and define objective functions of agents in each version in the following subsections.
1.2.1. The economy
I consider a partial-equilibrium model of an economy with a constant risk-free rate r. Firms
in the economy are endowed with assets that produce an exogenous stream of cash flows
{X}t . Evolution of Xt under the risk-neutral probability measure Q follows Geometric
Brownian motion:

dXt
= µdt + σdWtQ
Xt

(1.1)

11
Note that D-type version one will have many debt issuances, but only the first will be done to exploit
benefits of tax shield, and all other debt issuances will happen when the firm does not generate enough
money to make required interest payments

11

where µ is the risk-neutral drift, and σ is the volatility of firm’s cash flows.
Profits in the economy are taxed at the corporate tax-rate τ . I define the value of assets as
the expected value of future discounted profits that these assets will produce:

U

Z

E (Xt ) = E

∞

e

−r(s−t)


(1 − τ )Xs ds = (1 − τ )

t

Xt
r−µ

(1.2)

Firms in the economy can issue debt, and interest payments on debt are tax-deductible.
Debt in the model takes the form of a perpetuity that pays a constant coupon rate c per
unit of time. At each point in time, a firm produces cash flow Xt and has to pay ct to
its debtholders. (Xt − ct ) is the taxable base of the firm; for simplicity, and similar to
other authors, I assume that if firm’s taxable base is negative, the firm pays negative taxes,
meaning that it receives money from the government. By taking greater amount of debt,
firms can reduce the amount of taxes they pay. On the other hand, high amount of debt
increases the probability that the firm will not be able to service its debt obligations. When
making a decision about timing and amount of debt to issue, firms trade off these benefits
of debt (lower tax-payments to the government) against costs of debt (higher chances of
default). Firms act in the interest of equityholders, and, therefore, I use words ”firms” and
”equityhodlers” interchangeably later in the text.
Equityholders
A firm in the economy is fully characterized by its current cash flow level Xt , and the coupon
payment it has to make ct ; for simplicity, I drop subscripts t in what follows.
In case X ≥ c, the firm produces enough money to service its debt obligations, and immediate dividends to equityholders are (1 − τ )(X − c). The HJB equation for this case then
takes the form12 :

rE(X, c) = (1 − τ )(X − c) + µXEx0 +
12

σ 2 X 2 00
Exx ,
2

if

X≥c

This equation is the same for both versions of the model in both E- and D-type environments

12

(1.3)

where E = E(X, c) is the value of firm’s equity.
If a firm experiences a series of negative shocks, its cash flow may become insufficient to
make required debt payments c. In this case, the firm has to finance the shortfall by raising
money externally. In the E-type environment, the firm raises equity, and mathematically it
is equivalent to negative dividends. Therefore, the HJB equation for the E-type environment
for the case X < c is the same as (3).
Equity issuances are not allowed for firms in distress in the D-type environment, and so
additional debt issuance is the only source of external financing. It is assumed that there
are no transaction costs of debt issuance, and newly issued debt has the same seniority level
as the old debt. Denote D(X, c) the value of firm’s debt, and dD the value of newly issued
debt. The following formula then connects changes in promised future coupon payments
with the required newly debt issuances:



c − X + (c − X)τ



dt = (c − X)(1 − τ )dt = dD = dc

∂D
∂c

(1.4)

The very left-hand side of equation (4) is the difference between the required coupon payment c, and the amount of money the firm has on hands - its profits X, and tax return
from the government τ (c − X). This difference is the shortfall that equityholders must but
can not pay to debtholders; this difference should equal to change in debt value dD, which
is in turn achieved by promising a higher coupon payment in the future. It is clear from
equation (4) that it is only possible to issue new debt if

∂D
∂c

> 0, that is, if value of debt

increases when the firm promises to pay more in the future. For now, consider the case
when this condition is satisfied.
Equation (4) allows to derive the dynamics of dc for the case when X < c:

dc =

(c − X)(1 − τ )
∂D
∂c

dt

(1.5)

HJB equation for the equity value on the region X < c in the D-type environment should
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take into account that both X and c change:
rE(X, c) =

(c − X)(1 − τ )
∂D
∂c

Ec0 + µXEx0 +

σ 2 X 2 00
Exx ,
2

if

X<c

(1.6)

Boundary conditions for the equity value will differ between versions one and two of the
model, and are discussed them in the corresponding sections of the paper.
Debtholders
HJB equation for debtholders will differ from the HJB equation for equityholders by only
the part that catches instantaneous profit. In the E-type environment, instantaneous profit
to debtholders is always cdt. In the D-type environment, it is cdt on the interval X ≥ c,

and (X + (c − X)τ )dt + dD on the interval X < c. Note, however, that it follows from
equation (4) that

(X + (c − X)τ )dt + dD = (X + (c − X)τ )dt + c − X + (c − X)τ



dt = cdt

(1.7)

Therefore, instantaneous profit to debtholders on both intervals is cdt in both E-type and
D-type environments. This result should not come as a surprise: the way changes in debt
were modeled in equation (4), debtholders should always get the required payment cdt either in a form of money (on the interval of X ≥ c) or a combination of money and
promises of greater future payments (on the interval of X < c). Hence, there is one single
HJB equation for debtholders on both intervals X ≥ c and X < c for both E- and D-type
environments:

rD(X, c) = c + µXDx0 +

σ 2 X 2 00
Dxx
2

Boundary conditions will depend on the version one or two of the model.
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(1.8)

Default
I assume that at default assets are liquidated at their price (defined in equation (2)), but a
fraction α is lost during the liquidation process. All proceeds from assets liquidation go to
debtholders, and equityholders receive nothing. Define Xdef (c) as the default boundary of
a firm:

Xdef (c) = {X : firm in state (Xt , c) defaults if and only if Xt = X}

(1.9)

Values of debt and equity of a firm at default then take the following form:


(1 − τ )(1 − α)
D Xdef (c), c = Xdef (c)
r−µ

E Xdef (c), c = 0

(1.10)
(1.11)

Equations (10) and (11) hold for both E- and D-type environments. However, conditions
that determine default are going to be different between the two. In the E-type environment, timing of default is chosen by equityholders and is determined by the smooth-pasting
condition for the equity value at default:


∂E
Xdef (c), c = 0
∂X

(1.12)

Economic intuition for equation (12) is as follows. When firm’s performance is weak, the
firm continuously raises equity to finance coupon payments, meaning that immediate dividends to equityholders are negative. Equityholders agree to receive negative dividends
with the hope that financial performance of the firm improves in the future, and dividends
become positive. The future discounted value of dividends (both positive and negative)
is summarized by firm’s market capitalization E(X, c), and equityholders want to choose
the default boundary Xdef (c) as low as possible so that E(X, c) always remains positive;
therefore, equation (12)
15

In the D-type environment, equity issuances are not allowed, and, therefore, dividends to
equityholders are always non-negative (positive on the interval X > c and zero on the
interval X ≤ c). Hence, equityholders will never voluntarily choose to default the firm.
However, even though equityholders do not want to default the firm, the firm may be
in a situation, when internally generated cash is not sufficient to make required coupon
payments, and further debt issuances are not possible because debtholders do not believe
that the firm will manage to service its debt obligations. As equation (4) shows, the firm
is able to issue at least some amount of new debt as long as

∂D
∂c

> 0. Hence, the following

equation determines default in the D-type model:


∂D
Xdef (c), c = 0
∂c

(1.13)

Figure 4 visualizes default in the D-type environment. The green curve on the graph shows
how the value of firm’s debt changes when the firm offers a higher coupon payment to its
debtholders; the blue curve shows the marginal interest rates, at which the next dollar of
debt can be raised. Firm with no debt (c = 0) can issue the first dollar of debt at r = 5%,
which is used as the risk-free rate to solve the model. Marginal interest rates stay low and
close to the risk-free rate for firms that have sufficiently low interest payments. However, as
the coupon payment becomes very high, the green curve becomes flatter, which means that
the firm has to promise to increase future interest payments by a lot to raise an additional
dollar of debt. As coupon-to-cash flow ratio approaches its default value, the green curve
becomes completely flat, which means that future promises of higher coupon payments do
not increase debt value, or, equivalently, next unit of debt can only be issued at the infinite
rate. At that point, the firm can not issue new debt, and can not pay interests on its debt
out of the operating cash flow either, and so default happens.
Importantly, as Figure 4 shows, the model does not produce unrealistically high marginal
interest rates for new debt. While it is true that interest rates for new debt exponentially
increase up to infinity with firm’s leverage, quantitatively the mt interest rates exceed 20%
only when firm’s leverage is above 80%, and interest rates exceed 40% when firm’s leverage
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Figure 4: Value of debt and marginal interest rates for a firm with current productivity
X = 1 and varying coupon payments
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The graph shows the value of firm’s debt (green curve, right axis), and marginal interest rates at which next
unit of debt can be raised (blue curve, left axis). When coupon-to-cash flow ratio attains the value 2.27,
the firm can’t issue new debt, and default happens. Model was solved for the benchmark set of parameters
shown in Table 9.

is above 96%. These numbers are empirically-plausible.
Note one very important observation: at the time of default in the D-type environment,
−1
is the term that multiplies Ec0 in equation
equation (13) holds. However, the term ∂D
∂c
(6), which is the HJB equation for the equity value in the D-type environment on the region
X < c. Because LHS of equation (6) is finite, this implies that the term that multiplies


∂D −1
must approach zero as (X, c) approaches (Xdef (c), c), and so Ec0 Xdef (c), c = 0.
∂c
Furthermore, note that
0=

 ∂E
 ∂cdef (X)
∂E
Xdef (c), c =
Xdef (c), c
∂c
∂X
∂X

(1.14)

where cdef (X) is the inverse function of Xdef (c)13 . Equation (14) implies that as long as

cdef (X) is not a constant, Ex0 Xdef (c), c = 0, which is exactly the same as equation (12).
Hence, D-type model also features smooth-pasting condition for the value of equity, even
13
As will be clear from the closed-form solution derived below, Xdef (c) is indeed a function, and the
inverse always exists
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though in this model it is a consequence rather than the assumption.
1.2.2. Version one
In version one of the model, equityholders choose how much debt to issue at t0 ; after t0 ,
firms in the E-type environment are not allowed to issue anymore debt, and firms in the
D-type environment can only issue debt when they are in distress (X < c). After debt is
issued at t0 , proceeds are distributed to equityholders in a form of immediate dividends.
Equityholders choose the initial coupon payment to maximize the value of proceeds from
debt issuance plus the value of equity after debt is issued.
D-type
Mathematically, firms in the D-type environment solve the following problem at t0 :



max D(X0 , c0 ) + E(X0 , c0 )
c0

(1.15)

where D(X, c) is the function that satisfies equation (8) on the interval {X, c : X ≥ Xdef (c)},
and has specific boundary conditions discussed below; E(X, c) is the function that satisfies
equation (3) on the interval {X, c : X ≥ c} and satisfies equation (6) on the interval
{X, c : c > X ≥ Xdef (c)}, is continuous and smooth (derivative is continuous) along the
line X = c, and has specific boundary conditions discussed below. Because D(X, c) and
E(X, c) satisfy second-order PDEs, two conditions for each should be imposed to have the
unique solution.
Note that equation (8) has a closed form solution of the following form:
D(X, c) =

c
+ BX β c1−β + B2 X β2 c1−β2
r

(1.16)

where B and B2 are constants to be determined, and β and β2 are respectively the negative
and the positive roots of the quadratic growth equation (17)
σ2 2 
σ2 
β + µ−
β−r =0
2
2
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(1.17)

The first term in equation (16) is the value of the risk-free bond with constant coupon
payment c. The second term converges to −∞ as X converges to 0. Economically, this
term catches the effect of an increasing probability of default (and associated default losses),
when firm’s performance deteriorates. The value of debt at default is known and is given
by equation (10), which is one of the two boundary conditions for the value of debt. The
third term in equation (16) converges to ∞ as X converges to ∞. Normally, value of a
risky debt can not exceed the value of a riskless debt, and so B2 = 0. It then follows from
equations (10) and (13) that solutions for B and Xdef (c) take the following form14 :
Xdef (c) = −c

β r−µ
1
1 − β r (1 − τ )(1 − α)

(1.18)


β
1
c
B=−
r(1 − β) Xdef (c)
Equations (18) and (19) have two important implications. First,

(1.19)

c
Xdef (c)

is a constant, and

so B is also a constant, which verifies the conjecture for the debt value. Second, B 6= 0,
which means that default part of equation (16) is not zero. Therefore, debt is not risk-free
in the D-type environment, even though debtholders can trigger the default of a firm quite
early.
The HJB equation for the value of equity on the interval X > c (equation (3)), also has a
closed-form solution:
E X≥c (X, c) =

X(1 − τ ) c(1 − τ )
−
+ AX β c1−β + A2 X β2 c1−β2
r−µ
r

(1.20)

Note that the third term in equation (20) converges to ∞ at a very high rate as X grows
to infinity15 . Assuming that there are no speculative bubbles on the market, A2 = 0, which
14
Note that for sufficiently large bankruptcy costs α, RHS of equation (18) may become larger than c,
implying that default happens when X > c (when the firm is not in distress). Of course, the firm can’t be
forced to liquidate its assets as long as it is able to make required coupon payments. Essentially, Xdef (c)
should be the minimum between c and RHS of (18), but for a reasonable set of parameters (i.e. α < 70%)
(18) will be the
 solution. Note also that (18) is always positive because β is negative
15

limX→∞

X β2 c1−β2
X

=∞
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gives one of the boundary conditions for the value of equity.
Equation (6) does not have a closed-form solution, and should be solved numerically. Denote
E X<c (X, c) the solution to equation (6). In order for it to be the solution for the value of
equity on the interval X < c, it must satisfy the following conditions16 :



1−τ
1−τ
X
−
+A
r−µ
r



= E X<c (X, X)

(1.21)

1−τ
∂E X<c
+ (1 − β)A = −
(X, X)
r
∂c

(1.22)


E X<c Xdef (c), c = 0

(1.23)

where equations (21) and (22) are the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions along
the line X = c, and equation (23) is the value of equity at default, which is the second
boundary condition for the value of equity.
E-type
Firms in the E-type environment solve the same problem as firms in the D-type environment
at t0 :


max D(X0 , c0 ) + E(X0 , c0 )
c0

(1.24)

where D(X, c) is the function that satisfies equation (8) on the interval {X, c : X ≥ Xdef (c)},
and has specific boundary conditions discussed below; E(X, c) is the function that satisfies
equation (3) on the interval {X, c : X ≥ Xdef (c)}, and also has specific boundary conditions
discussed below. In addition to that, firms in the E-type environment choose the timing of
default, which is defined by equation (12). Conditions at the boundaries for values of both
debt and equity are the same as in the D-type environment.
16

Equation (21) can be written as the equality of partial derivatives with respect to X instead - the idea
is that the derivatives from the left and from the right with respect to each variable should be continuous
along the line X = c
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First, note that both D(X, c) and E(X, c) have closed form solutions:

c
+ BX β c1−β + B2 X β2 c1−β2
r

(1.25)

X(1 − τ ) (1 − τ )c
−
+ AX β c1−β + A2 X β2 c1−β2
r
r

(1.26)

D(X, c) =
E(X, c) =

From the boundary conditions at X >> c, it can be concluded that B2 = 0 (because value
of debt should converge to the value of risk-free debt), and A2 = 0 (to exclude speculative
bubbles as X → ∞). The remaining boundary conditions are the values of debt and equity
when the firm defaults, and are given by equations (10) and (11). These equations allow to
explicitly solve for values of A and B (see Appendix B), and Xdef (c):
Xdef (c) = −c

β r−µ
1−β r

(1.27)

Note how default rules are different for firms in the E-type and D-type environments (equations (27) and (18) respectively). Because the timing of default is affected by decisions of
debtholders in the D-type environment, bankruptcy costs α appear explicitly in the equation, as opposed to the solution for the default rule for firms in the E-type environment,
where bankruptcy costs are only implicitly internalized by equityholders through interest
rates at which debt is issued at t0 . However, even though for each value of c the default
boundary Xdef (c) in the E-type environment is lower than the default boundary in the Dtype environment (by the factor (1 − α)(1 − τ )), firms in the D-type environment do not
necessarily default earlier than firms in the E-type environment, and the reverse is most
likely true.17 It is explained by the fact that firms in the D-type environment choose a
more conservative debt policy: they realize that marginal interest rates to issue new debt
in distress grow quickly, and so ex-ante choose a much lower leverage. In contrast, firms
in the E-type environment can choose a greater leverage without a fear of going bankrupt
soon.
Figure 24 shows the value of debt and equity for a firm with current productivity X = 1
17

This depends on the values of the parameters, but this is usually the case as Table 5 in Section 3 shows
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Figure 5: Value of debt and equity in version one of the model for a firm with X = 1
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These two graphs show the value of equity and debt in D-type and E-type environments for a firm with
current productivity X = 1 and different coupon payments c. At t0 , the firm that starts with X0 = 1 chooses
c0 that maximizes the value of the blue curve, which is the sum of proceeds from debt issuance (green curve
on the graphs) plus the value of equity after debt is issued (red curve on the graphs). Model was solved for
the benchmark set of parameters shown in Table 9.

and different values of coupon payment in the D-type and E-type environments. For the
chosen calibration of parameters, firms in the D-type environment default when coupon-tocash flow ratio exceeds the value 2.27, at which point the value of equity (red curve) falls
to zero, and no further debt issuances are possible (green curve is flat). For the same set
of parameters, firms in the E-type environment avoid bankruptcy for longer because they
can raise external finance at a much cheaper rate (the default coupon-to-cash flow ratio is
3.23). In both environments, firms that start with X0 = 1 choose the initial coupon level
c0 to maximize the value of the blue curve, which is the sum of the value of equity after
debt is issued plus proceeds from debt issuance; the vertical line denotes the optimal initial
coupon value. Note that firms in the E-type environment choose to issue debt with coupon
payment that significantly exceeds their cash flow.
1.2.3. Version two
Version two of the model is different from version one of the model by the assumption
that firms with strong financial performance can issue new debt after t0 to further exploit
benefits of tax shield. These debt issuances are modeled differently from debt issuances by
firms in distress in the D-type environment, and I discuss implications of the difference later
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in the text. Debt issuances by firms in distress in the D-type environment do not change
and are still characterized by equation (5) (firms in the E-type environment do not issue
debt in distress at all).
Debt issuances outside of distress are modeled the same way as in Goldstein, Ju, and Leland
(2001). To issue new debt to better exploit benefits of tax shield, a firm has to redeem all
its debt outstanding first, and then issue new debt with a greater coupon payment. These
issuances are costly, and costs are proportional to the amount of new debt issued: for each
$1 of new debt raised, the firm only gets $(1 − q). If firm’s current cash flow level is X,
and it pays coupon c on its current debt, and the firm decides to issue new debt with the


coupon level cnew , proceeds from debt issuance equal to (1 − q)D(X, cnew ) − D(X, c) ;
these proceeds are distributed to equityholders as dividends. Every time the firm issues
new debt, it chooses cnew to maximize the amount of proceeds from debt issuance plus the
value of equity after debt is issued. Equation below connects the value of equity before and
after debt is issued:


E(X, c) = max (1 − q)D(X, cnew ) − D(X, c) + E(X, cnew ))
cnew

(1.28)

The LHS of equation (28) shows the value of equity right before debt is issued, and the
RHS of equation (28) shows the value of equity right after debt is issued. LHS and RHS
are equal because equity value function is continuous; economically, equityholders have
rational expectations about when the firm issues debt, and the share price of the firm
adjusts accordingly.
The scaling property of the model allows to solve for cnew in equation (28) easily. To
understand the intuition of the scaling property, consider two firms at t0 with X01 = 1
and X02 = 2, that is, the second firm is two times larger than the first firm. Because the
model features constant return to scale, the coupon payment that the second firm chooses
optimally should be two times greater than the coupon payment that the first firm chooses.
As the result, values of debt and equity of the second firm should be two times greater than
values of debt and equity of the first firm. Effectively, in this set-up the second firm is a
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greater replica of the first firm, and so all values are proportional. Now consider just one
firm but at the time when it chooses to restructure its debt upward. At the short moment
when it has repurchased its outstanding debt but before it issued new debt, it has zero
debt outstanding, and it is similar to a larger replica of itself at t0 . Hence, the new coupon
payment, and the values of debt and equity of this firm after debt is issued should increase
by the factor

Xt
X0

relative to values of coupon payment, debt and equity at t0 . Let Xres (c)

be the optimally chosen restructuring boundary of a firm:
Xres (c) = {X > c : firm in state (Xt , c) issues new debt if and only if Xt = X}

(1.29)

The assumption that costs to issue new debt q are greater than zero guarantees that firms
do not adjust their capital structure continuously. Denote c0 the coupon payment that a
firm chooses at t0 , when its cash flow is X0 . Equation (28) can then be rewritten in the
following form:


 Xres (c)
Xres (c)
E Xres (c), c = (1 − q)
D(X0 , c0 ) − D Xres (c), c +
E(X0 , c0 )
X0
X0

(1.30)

It only remains to show how firms choose the restructuring boundary Xres (c). Using the
constant return to scale argument as before, it can be shown that Xres (c) is proportional
to c; denote Ares =

Xres
c .

I assume that firms choose Ares to maximize the value of equity

and proceeds from debt issuance at t0 .
D-type
Note that the assumption about costly debt issuance creates some internal inconsistency in
the model. Effectively, the model assumes that whenever debt is issued by a firm in distress,
debt issuance is costless; however, when new debt is issued by a strongly performing firm
to further exploit benefits of tax-shield, debt issuance is costly. It should be noted that the
assumption of costly debt issuance was introduced by Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001) and
is shared by most papers in this class of literature. The assumption guarantees that firms
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do not adjust their capital structure continuously. By maintaining this assumption, I can
better compare results of E-type and D-type models, and also preserve the feature that debt
value is not adjusted continuously (debt changes in distress are not done to better exploit
benefits of tax-shield, but rather to avoid bankruptcy).
Firms in the D-type environment solve the following problem at t0 :

V (X0 ) = max

Ares ,c0




E(X0 , c0 ; Ares ) + (1 − q)D(X0 , c0 )

(1.31)

where D(X, c) is the function that satisfies equation (8) on the interval {X, c : X ≥ Xdef (c)};
E(X, c; Ares ) is the function that satisfies equation (3) on the interval {X, c : X ≥ c} and
satisfies equation (6) on the interval {X, c : c > X ≥ Xdef (c)}, is continuous and smooth
(derivative is continuous) along the line X = c. As before, two boundary conditions for
both D(X, c) and E(X, c) need to be imposed to have the unique solution.
Boundary conditions for debt value do not change from version one of the model: value of
debt at default is still characterized by equation (10), and another boundary condition is
equation B2 = 0, which implies that the value of debt can not exceed the value of risk-free
debt at any time. Because neither the HJB equation for debt value, nor boundary conditions
have changed, the solution to the debt value function is still the same. Moreover, because
default rule in the D-type environment is fully characterized by the debt value function,
Xdef (c) is also the same:
D(X, c) =
Xdef (c) = −c

c
+ BX β c1−β
r

β r−µ
1
1 − β r (1 − τ )(1 − α)

(1.32)
(1.33)

As for the equity value function E(X, c), equations (21) and (22) should hold to guarantee
that the function is continuous and smooth along the line X = c. Furthermore, the value
of equity at default is zero, as equityholders receive nothing when the firm defaults. The
remaining boundary condition is the value of equity when the firm restructures its debt
upward, and is given by the recursive equation (30). There is no closed-form solution for
this function, and I use numerical methods to compute its value.
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Figure 6: Dynamic of a typical firm in the D-type environment in version two of the model
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The firm takes no action as long as its cash flow (blue curve) stays above its coupon payment (green curve)
and below the upward restructuring boundary Xres (upper red curve). When cash flow level reaches the
upward restructuring boundary, the firm issues more debt, and future coupon payments increase. When
firm’s cash flow is lower than its coupon payment but above the default boundary Xdef (bottom red curve),
the firm slowly raises new debt to cover the shortfall between the cash flow and required coupon payments.
The firm defaults when cash flow level reaches the default boundary. Values on the graph are in logs.

Figure 6 visualizes the behavior of a typical firm in the D-type environment in version two
of the model. On the graph, firm’s cash flow grows steadily in the beginning, and at time
t = 167 the firm issues more debt to further exploit benefits of tax-shield. The firm enters
distress for the first time at t = 311, and it starts issuing debt to cover the gap between the
cash flow and required interest payments. As the result, the coupon payment keeps growing
all the way before firm’s performance improves sufficiently at t = 362; because coupon
payment grows, the default boundary and the upward restructuring boundary (which are
linear in c) also grow. The firm enters distress for the second time at t = 375, and, with
the exception of a short moment at t = 394, stays in distress until it eventually defaults.
Note that the rate at which coupon payment grows increases as firm’s cash flow approaches
the default boundary. This is because debt issuances are endogenously more expensive for
firms that are close to default.
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E-type
Formulation of the problem for the E-type environment is the same as in the D-type environment with two exceptions: 1) equity value function E(X, c) satisfies equation (3) on
both intervals X ≥ c and X < c, and 2) default rule is determined by equation (11).
Figure 7 shows the value of debt and equity in the version two of the model for a firm with
current productivity X = 1 and different values of coupon payment.
Figure 7: Value of debt and equity in version two of the model for a firm with X = 1
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These two graphs show the value of equity and debt in version two of the model in D-type and E-type
environments for a firm with current productivity X = 1 and different coupon payments c. At t0 , the firm
chooses c0 that maximizes the value of the blue curve, which is the sum of proceeds from debt issuance
(green curve on the graphs) plus the value of equity after debt is issued (red curve on the graphs). Every
time firm’s coupon level is too low relative to its cash flow level, the firm issues more debt. The grey dotted
lines on each graph denote the values of c at which the firm issues more debt (the left dotted line) and the
value of c that it chooses every time it issues more debt (the right dotted line). Model was solved for the
benchmark set of parameters shown in Table 9.

1.3. Model solution
1.3.1. Parameter values
Table 9 shows parameter values that are used to solve the model. These values are taken
from Strebulaev and Whited (2012) who provide the review of literature on dynamic capital
structure and simulate a number of models similar to the E-type model discussed in this
paper. Most parameters are hard to estimate directly in the data; moreover, there is a
substantial cross-sectional heterogeneity. Therefore, some assumptions should be made.
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Table 1: Benchmark parameter values used to solve the model
Variable
risk-free rate
growth rate of the cash flow process
volatility of the cash flow process
effective corporate tax rate
bankruptcy costs
risk premium
debt issuance costs

Value
r
µ
σ
τ
α
rp
q

5%
2%
25%
20%
10%
5%
1%

Specifically mentioned, estimates of bankruptcy costs α, which in this paper is assumed to
be 10%, vary from very low to very high. For example, Gruber and Warner (1977) finds that
direct bankruptcy costs are about 1% of the assets value, and Andrade and Kaplan (1998)
report the value of about 20%. Some authors used a structural estimation approach to infer
the bankruptcy costs from firms’ observed decisions. In particular, Davydenko, Strebulaev
and Zhao (2012) find that default costs are in the range of 10% and 30%, Hennessy and
Whited (2007) report values between 8.4% and 15.1%, and Glover (2016) finds the value
of about 45%. Glover’s estimates are well-above estimates of other authors, but as argued
by Reindl, Stoughton, and Zechner (2017), it is because Glover assumes that all firms
follow optimal leverage policy, while it is not necessarily the case in the data. The authors
estimate a similar model without imposing optimal capital structure and using firms stock
prices instead, and find substantially lower values of bankruptcy costs (20%).
Cash flow volatility parameter σ also does not have a precise estimate in the literature.
Faulkender and Petersen (2005) report that the average implied asset volatility of firms
that have access to public debt is 19%, and Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008) find 23% (also
among firms that issue bonds); Reindl, Stoughton, and Zechner (2017) take a structural
estimation approach with Leland-type environment and find asset volatility between 25%
and 42%.
The effective corporate tax-rate τ that this paper uses implicitly aggregates the effect of
corporate and personal taxes on dividends and interest payments; the resulting value τ =
20% is based on the estimates of Graham (2000). In a model, similar to mine, Chen (2010)
considers different taxes explicitly, and the resulting effective corporate tax rate in his model
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Table 2: Results of the model solution
Benchmark

µ = 3.5%

σ = 15%

σ = 35%

α = 50%

q=0

D-type, version 1
Initial coupon
0.77
1.32
0.80
0.80
0.19
Default
0.44
0.24
0.60
0.32
0.78
Leverage, t0
46.44%
42.60%
53.05%
42.17%
13.40%
E-type, version 1
Initial coupon
1.36
2.65
1.28
1.58
0.84
Default
0.31
0.17
0.43
0.23
0.31
Leverage, t0
69.72%
70.86%
75.29%
66.95%
48.48%
D-type, version 2
Initial coupon
0.54
0.80
0.65
0.50
0.14
0.43
Upward restructuring
3.56
2.44
2.52
4.38
13.56
Default
0.44
0.24
0.60
0.32
0.78
0.44
Leverage, t0
33.56%
25.15%
42.44%
27.89%
10.03%
26.68%
E-type, version 2
Initial coupon
1.03
1.94
1.09
1.07
0.65
0.81
Upward restructuring
1.86
0.99
1.50
2.00
2.97
Default
0.30
0.14
0.41
0.22
0.30
0.29
Leverage, t0
53.99%
48.49%
63.39%
48.26%
37.86%
43.94%
This table shows optimal decisions that firms make in the model. Column 2 reports model solutions for
the benchmark set of parameters (Table 9); columns 3-7 report solutions of the model, in which all but one
parameters are as in the benchmark set. Initial coupon refers the value c0 that firms with X0 = 1 optimally
choose at t0 . Default is the ratio Xdef (c)/c, and shows the cash flow level X at which firms with c = 1
default. Upward restructuring is the ratio Xres (c)/c, and shows the cash flow level X at which firms with
c = 1 optimally choose to issue more debt to further exploit benefits of tax-shield; these additional debt
issuances are not allowed in version one of the model, and so upward restructuring is not reported for version
one of the model. Leverage, t0 is leverage that firms in the model have right after they issue debt at t0

is around 18%.
While the model is solved under the risk neutral probability measure Q, actual shock realizations happen under the physical probability measure P. Therefore, in the simulation
procedures discussed below, risk-premium rp = 5% is added to the risk-neutral growth rate
µ.
Table 10 presents results of the model for the benchmark set of parameters, and for some
variation of the parameters. As expected, firms in the E-type environment start with a
greater coupon payment, operate longer before defaulting for the same value of coupon
payment, and restructure their debt upward earlier, also for the same value of coupon
payment. As discussed in the previous Section, even though the default boundary is lower
for firms in the E-type environment, firms in the D-type environment do not necessarily
default earlier because they choose lower coupon payment at t0 . Note also that firms in the
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E-type environment often choose initial coupon payment that is greater than the cash flow
level. This partially illustrates the problem that arises when equity financing is always freely
available: firms optimally prefer to be in distress every time they readjust their leverage.
As Table 10 suggests, firms always issue more debt at t0 , and restructure debt upward more
often when the expected growth rate of the log cash flow, which is µ −

σ2
2 ,

is higher. Firms

also operate longer before bankruptcy when µ is high: high expected growth rate increases
the value of firm’s assets. Interestingly, even though high value of σ lowers the expected
growth rate of log cash flows, firms with greater value of σ postpone the default decision.
High value of σ increases firm’s profits in good states, and losses in bad states are bounded
(value of equity is always non-negative). Therefore, even though high value of σ reduces the
value of equity when the firm is far from distress, it increases the value of the firm for firms
deep in distress, and so firms wait longer before defaulting. This logic is straight for firms
in the E-type environment (because firms in the E-type environment choose the timing of
default), and goes through formulas implicitly in the D-type environment.18
Note that consistent with equation (27), default boundary in the E-type environment is
independent of bankruptcy costs α. This is because equityholders do not consider interests
of debtholders when they choose the timing of default. Bankruptcy costs are only implicitly internalized by equityholders in the E-type environment through interest rates at which
they issue debt at t0 , and that is why initial coupon payments vary with α. In contrast, debholders affect the timing of default in the D-type environment, and so the default boundary
is greater when α is high in the D-type environment.
An important observation follows from Table 10: firm’s leverage in the model is not a
perfect indicator of its indebtedness. For example, once firm’s growth rate increases from
µ = 2% to µ = 3.5%, firms optimally choose to issue significantly more debt (as indicated
by a much higher initial coupon), but leverage falls. This happens because an increase in µ
has three effects: 1) value of firm’s equity increases, 2) the firm wants to issue debt with a
higher coupon payment to better exploit benefits of tax-shield, and 3) value of firm’s debt
increase because coupon payments are higher, and probability of default is lower. Due to the
18

Specifically, it affects the value of β so that the default boundary becomes lower
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second effect, firm’s chosen coupon payment unambiguously increases; however, the effect on
leverage is not clear, as both value of debt and equity go up. Changes in other parameters,
even if they are small, may have a similar effect. This means that a model may correctly
explain empirically observed leverage values because it provides a good representation of the
data, or because the parameter values that it uses are estimated with an error. Therefore,
in assessing the quality of a model, it is important to examine how well the model matches
both market-based as well as non-market based indicators.
1.3.2. Default probabilities
As Table 10 implies, among two firms that have the same coupon payments c, the firm
that operates in the D-type environment will default earlier than the firm that operates in
the E-type environment. This happens for two reasons: 1) default threshold is higher, and
2) interest expenses grow exponentially for firms in distress in the model with the D-type
environment. On the other hand, firms in the model with the D-type environment choose
lower initial leverage. Therefore, it is not straightforward which model produces a higher
default probability.
To answer this question, the paper uses pairwise simulations19 . For each version of the
model (version one and version two), I generate two firms that are exposes to the same
realization of shocks. The first firm behaves as if it lives in the E-type environment (it
can issue both debt and equity), and the second firm behaves as if it lives in the D-type
environment (in distress it can only issue debt); both firms make their financing decisions
optimally. Each simulation is performed on the monthly basis and continues unless both
firms default. Note, however, that firms in version one of the model grow on average, but
they issue debt only once, and so their leverage continuously attenuates if they experience
a series of positive shocks. Therefore, many simulations of version one of the model should
result in no default. For this reason, simulations are additionally terminated after 60000
periods in version one of the model if at least one firm has survived this long.
19
Not formally reported here, I also estimate the annual default rate in the steady-state cross-section of
firms in both types of economies in version two of the model. The default rate is higher in the E-type economy
than in the D-type economy (1.25% vs. 1.19%). However, the 90% confidence intervals overlap, which does
not allow to formally conclude that E-type economy has a higher default rate. Pairwise comparisons avoid
this problem. Section 3.3 describes details of the simulation of a steady-state cross-section
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Table 3: Default probabilities and firm lifetime in the model
Version one

Version two

firm in E-type economy defaults earlier
76.8%
68.0%
firm in D-type economy defaults earlier
14.3%
24.3%
firms in both economies default simultaneously
8.9%
7.7%
average lifetime of a firm in E-type economy (months)
275.4
967.1
median lifetime of a firm in E-type economy (months)
151
705
average lifetime of a firm in D-type economy (months)
284.7
1030.3
median lifetime of a firm in d-type economy (months)
163
760
Numbers are estimated using simulations. Simulations are run on a monthly basis independently for each
version of the model. Each simulation has two firms with one behaving as if it operates in the E-type
environment, and one as if it operates in the D-type environment; firms in E-type model can always issue
equity, and firms in distress in D-type model have to issue debt to cover the gap between interest expenses
and the cash flow. Both firms in each simulation are exposed to the same realization of shocks. Simulations
are continued as long as at least one firm has not defaulted. Firms in version one of the model grow on
average, and their leverage attenuates, and so some simulations should result in no default; for this reason,
simulations for version one are terminated after 60000 periods if at least one firm has survived. Simulations
are repeated 10000 times, and numbers in columns 2 and 3 are averaged among all simulations (version two)
or simulations in which both firms defaulted before t = 60000 (version one). Rows 1 − 3 report the fraction
of simulations in which one firm defaults before the other or both firms default in the same period. Rows
5 − 7 report the average and median number of periods that the firm in each environment operated before
default

Simulations are repeated 10000 times for each version of the model, and Table 3 reports
the fraction of simulations, in which the firm in the E-type environment defaults before the
firm in the D-type environment or vice versa. As follows from the table, there are paths
of shock realizations such that each firm can outlive the other or that both firms default
in the same period. Nevertheless, for the majority of cases the firm that operates in the
D-type environment operates longer than the firm that operates in the E-type environment,
and the difference in average lifetime is one year for version one of the model and five years
for version two of the model. Even thought it is harder to pay interest expenses for firms
in distress in the model with the D-type environment, they are more conservative in their
initial leverage policy, and so the resulting default rate is higher in the E-type economy.
1.3.3. Leverage distribution
I first collect data on firms’ profits, interest expenses, and leverage. The sample of firms
comes from Compustat for years 1981-2017.20 Firms in the financial sector (6000s SICs)
and the public sector (9000s SICs) are excluded from the analysis; observations with the
20

1981 is the first year that has data on S&P long-term credit ratings
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book value of assets that is less than $1 million are also excluded.
As Faulkender and Petersen (2005) find, firm’s capital structure depends a lot on whether
the firm has access to public bond markets. The assumption that firms can issue debt
easily is crucial in this model, and for this reason, the paper only consider firms that have
S&P long-term credit rating, which is used as a proxy for whether the firm can issue public
debt. Data on the S&P long-term ratings is available on monthly basis, but financial data
is annual. To match the datasets, it is assumed that a firm has S&P long-term rating in a
given year if it has S&P long-term rating in at least one month of that year. Data on S&P
long-term ratings is available between years 1981 and 2017, and there is, on average, 1500
observations in each year. However, years 1981-1984 have only five observations combined,
and year 2017 has only 146 observations.
In what follows, leverage is measured as the ratio of firm’s total debt (sum of long-term and
short-term debt) to the the book value of assets. Some observations have leverage value
that exceeds one, and these observations are excluded from the analysis.
This paper also considers the distribution of inverse coverage ratios (ratio of firm’s interest
expenses to cash flow). There are two main reasons why the inverse coverage ratio and not
the coverage ratio is chosen as a target moment. First, some firms in the data have either
no debt, or very small values of debt, and, therefore, interest expenses of these firms are
small compared to their cash flow. These observations significantly affect the average value
of coverage ratios in the data and make it sensitive to how they are treated. For instance,
unwisorized average coverage ratio among firms with positive interest expenses is 9.8; it is
7.1 if coverage ratios are additionally winsorized at 0.1-99.9 percentiles, 5.8 if winsorized at
1-99 percentiles, and 5.1 if winsorized at 3-97 percentiles. The inverse coverage ratio avoids
the problem of division by zero because all firms in the data have non-zero cash flow, and is,
therefore, less sensitive to how outliers are treated: unwinsorized average inverse coverage
ratio in a cross-section is 0.21; it is 0.38 if observations are winsorized at 0.1-99.9 percentiles,
0.36 if winsorized at 1-99 percentiles, and 0.36 if winsorized at 3-97 percentiles. Second,
the inverse coverage ratio is a more natural parameter for the model discussed in this paper
(both in E-type and D-type environments). As argued in Section 3.2, the model features
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scaling property, and so firm’s equity value can be rewritten21 as E(X, c) = Xe( Xc ), which
is correctly specified for all values of X and c.22 At the same time, writing E(X, c) = cẽ( Xc )
would be inconsistent (and can not be easily extended) for firms with c = 0.23
The paper measures inverse coverage ratio as the ratio of firm’s total interest expenses to
the value of its EBIT; values are winsorized at the 0.1% and 99.9% levels. While inverse
coverage ratio has advantages over the coverage ratio, it also has one drawback: observations
with negative inverse coverage ratios are somewhat misleading: these observations drive
the average value of the inverse coverage ratio down, thus, creating an impression that the
average inverse coverage ratio is low. Low positive inverse coverage ratio usually implies
that firms in the population earn significantly more profits than they spend to pay interest
expenses, which is not the case for firms with negative EBIT. There are 8.6% of observations
with negative inverse coverage ratios. To account for this problem, the paper separately
computes the truncated inverse coverage ratio, and the censored inverse coverage ratio. To
compute the censored inverse coverage ratio, values of inverse coverage ratio are reset to
zero for observations that have negative inverse coverage ratio. To compute the truncated
inverse coverage ratio, observations with negative inverse coverage ratio are excluded.
Table 4 presents the summary statistics for the whole period of data, and separately for
the first and second halves. The average value of leverage is 36.6%, and it does not change
much before and after 2000. The average values of truncated and censored inverse coverage
ratios are similar (0.69 and 0.63), implying that its value is close to zero for most firms
with negative inverse coverage ratios. Figure 15 additionally shows the whole distribution
of leverage and inverse coverage ratios in the data.
The next step is to study how well the model addresses the moments of distribution of
leverage and inverse coverage ratios. While static results reported in Table 10 indicate that
the version two of the model with the D-type environment comes close to matching empirical
values (optimal leverage is 33.56%, and inverse coverage ratio is 0.56), it is misleading to
21

Note that debt value can also be rewritten this way
Note that because Xt follows Geometric Brownian motion, it is always positive
23
It is true that all firms in the model optimally have positive values of c; nevertheless, to solve the model,
it is necessary to correctly specify the equity value function for all values of c
22
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Table 4: Numbers in the data
Period
all years

1981-2000

2001-2017

36.6%
37.6%
35.8%
leverage
# of observations
46 648
21 237
25 411
0.38
0.41
0.36
inverse coverage ratio
# of observations
45 723
20 535
25 188
0.69
0.78
0.61
inverse coverage ratio, truncated
# of observations
41 778
18 639
23 139
0.63
0.70
0.56
inverse coverage ratio, censored
# of observations
45 723
20 535
25 188
fraction of firms in distress, all firms
among all firms
18.5%
20.9%
16.5%
among firms with inverse coverage ratio ≥ 0
10.8%
12.9%
9.1%
This table reports summary statistics on firms’ leverage and inverse coverage ratios; only firms that have
access to the public debt markets are considered, and the access is proxied by whether a firm has S&P longterm credit rating in a particular year. Average values are reported (except for the number of observations).
Leverage is the ratio of total debt (sum of short-term and long-term debt) to the book value of assets.
Inverse coverage ratio is the ratio of firm’s interest payment to the value of its EBIT. Inverse coverage ratio
is winsorized at 0.1% and 99.9% values. The inverse coverage ratio is not always positive; therefore, the
average values of truncated and censored inverse coverage ratios are separately considered. The average
truncated inverse coverage ratio ignores firm-year observations with negative inverse coverage ratios; to
compute the average censored inverse coverage ratio, value of the inverse coverage ratio is reset to zero for
firm-year observations with negative inverse coverage ratio. Fraction of firms in distress refers to the fraction
of firms with inverse coverage ratio negative or greater than one among all firms (second-to-last row) or the
fraction of firms with inverse coverage ratio greater than one among firms with positive inverse coverage
ratio (last row).

study static results that firms optimally choose. As argued by Strebulaev (2007), average
values in a cross-section may differ significantly from what firms optimally choose at t0 .
Therefore, before claiming success of the model, it is necessary to generate a steady-state
cross-section of firms and examine its average values. The cross-sectional values are only
meaningful for version two of the model: in version one, firms are not allowed to increase
their leverage after t0 ; because on average firms grow, the economy has a single trivial
steady-state, in which all firms have zero leverage. Therefore, version one of the model
(with both types of environments) has a trivial steady-state distribution, in which all firms
have zero leverage and zero inverse coverage ratios.
Simulation approach is used to generate a cross-section of firms in version two of the model.
For each type of the environment (E- and D-), I generate an economy populated by N = 3000
firms that operate for T = 3600 months (300 years). Firms start at t0 with X0 = 1 and
make financing decisions optimally; if a firm defaults, it is replaced by another firm with

35

Table 5: Empirical and simulated moments of cross-sectional distribution
E-type, version 2

D-type, version 2

Data

57.9%
13.9%
18.5%
fraction of firms in distress
1.20
0.66
0.69
inverse coverage ratio (truncated in the data)
58.26%
38.44%
36.64%
average leverage
55.89%
35.11%
34.20%
median leverage
fraction of firms with
leverage ≥ 30%
99.87%
67.27%
61.04%
leverage ≥ 40%
89.47%
35.70%
36.00%
leverage ≥ 50%
64.90%
19.30%
20.68%
leverage ≥ 60%
39.60%
10.90%
12.00%
leverage ≥ 70%
22.47%
6.70%
6.45%
leverage ≥ 80%
11.40%
2.90%
3.01%
leverage ≥ 90%
4.13%
1.10%
1.09%
This table reports the fraction of firms in distress (firms whose interest expenses exceed the cash flow), the
average inverse coverage (ratio of interest expenses to cash flow), and moments of leverage distribution in a
simulated cross-section of firms and in the data. Firms in E-type model can always issue equity, and firms
in distress in D-type model have to issue debt to cover the gap between interest expenses and the cash flow.
Data is taken from Compustat for the period 1981-2017, and only firms with access to public debt markets
are considered, which is proxied by having S&P long-term credit rating. To compute values in the model, a
balanced panel of N = 3000 firms was simulated over T = 3600 months, and numbers were averaged over
the last period of the simulation.

X = 1, thus, maintaining a balanced panel. At the end of the period t = 3600, the
following simulated moments are computed: the fraction of firms in distress (firms whose
interest expenses c are higher than the cash flow X), average inverse coverage ratio among
all firms (ratio of interest expenses to the cash flow c/X), average and median leverage
values, and the fraction of firms with high leverage (firms whose leverage exceeds certain
values: 30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 70%, 80%, and 90%). Results are reported in Table 5, and
Figure 15 additionally shows the distribution of leverage and inverse coverage ratios.
As simulation results show, model with the D-type environment matches data moments
well. Average value of leverage is only slightly higher than in the data (38.4% vs. 36.6%),
but its 90% confidence interval24 spans between 37.1% and 39.7%, which covers 37.6%
average leverage for the period before 2000 and 37.2% reported by Faulkender and Petersen
(2005)25 . More importantly, the model with the D-type environment correctly explains the
fraction of firms in the right-tail of leverage distribution, independent of how the right tail
is defined. In fact, 90% confidence intervals cover empirical counterparts for almost all
24

To compute 90% confidence interval in the model, simulations were repeated 400 times
While not reported in the table, the average cross-sectional leverage is 35.1% if bankruptcy costs α = 15%
and 30.9% if α = 20%
25
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Figure 8: Distribution of leverage and inverse coverage ratio
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The figure shows distributions of leverage and inverse coverage ratios in a simulated economy of version
two of the model and in the data. Firms in E-type model can always issue equity, and firms in distress in
D-type model have to issue debt to cover the gap between interest expenses and the cash flow. Data is taken
from Compustat for the period 1981-2017, and only firms with access to public debt markets are considered,
which is proxied by having S&P long-term credit rating. To produce a distribution in the model, a balanced
panel of N = 3000 firms was simulated for T = 3600 months . The distribution is shown for the last period
of the simulation. For the distribution of inverse coverage ratios in the data, only firm-year observations
with positive inverse coverage ratio are considered.

threshold values of leverage considered26 . Furthermore, the fraction of firms in distress is
13.9%, and its 90% confidence intervals is between 10.8% and 16.8% - close to values in
the data. The average inverse coverage ratio (0.66) falls in the range between the average
26

The only case that is not covered by 90% confidence interval is when the right tail of the distribution is
defines as firms whose leverage exceeds 30%
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truncated and censored inverse coverage ratio in the data, and its 90% confidence interval
0.63-0.70 covers both values. As Figure 15 shows, the model reproduces the overall shape
of the distribution of inverse coverage ratios in the data, even though quantitatively, its
kurtosis is greater (i.e. the distribution is narrower in the model).
On the other hand, model with the E-type environment does not explain the distribution of
the right tail of firms: cross-sectional leverage is 58%, 57% of firms do not produce enough
cash to service their interest expenses, and almost all firms (99.9%) have leverage value
above 30%.
I further study to what extent the models can explain distribution of leverage among firms
with different credit ratings in the data. Towards this end, firms in the model are matched
with firms in the data according to credit ratings based on their default probabilities.
Data on default probabilities for firms across credit ratings comes from Moody’s report
”Measuring Corporate Default Rates” (2006); 10-year default probabilities adjusted for
issuer rating withdrawal are used. Average leverage values for firms with different credit
rating are calculated using Compustat data. These numbers are shown in the first two
rows of Table 6; for comparison, the table also shows leverage values across credit ratings
reported by Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008) and Huang and Huang (2012). It should be
noted that leverage values that I compute are smaller than those reported by both Schaefer
and Strebulaev and Huang and Huang. The difference is likely caused by the fact that
Huang and Huang’s sample and Schaefer and Strebulaev’s sample end before year 2004,
while my sample goes up to 2017. As Table 4 suggests, leverage values are indeed lower for
firm-year observations after 2003.
I then compute model-implied 10-year default probabilities for firms with different leverage
values. Specifically, for each value of leverage L, I generate a firm that starts with this
leverage at t0 and operates optimally for T = 120 months or until it defaults. The procedure is repeated N = 10000 times, and default probability is measured as the fraction
of simulations, in which the firm does not survive until the last period. Figure 16 shows
results of the simulations. Because firms in version two of the model optimally issue more
debt when their leverage falls to a very low level, there is a lower bound on the leverage
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Figure 9: Leverage and 10-year default probability

This figure shows the implied 10-year default probability for firms with different values of leverage. Grey
dotted lines on each graph show the 10-year default probability of bonds with different credit ratings in the
data: (from bottom to top) Baa, Ba, B, Caa-C. Note that the default probability is not monotone in leverage
for version two of the model: this is because firms with very low leverage issue more debt and increase their
leverage, therefore, increasing their probability of default.

that firms can have.
Note the difference in shapes of the default probability curves in D-type and E-type environments. Default probability as a function of firm’s leverage is concave around L = 1 in
the D-type environment, and is convex in the E-type environment. This result comes from
the difference in the assumption of how firms in E-type and D-type environments finance
the shortfall between required interest payments and the cash flow in distress. A firm in
the D-type environment has to issue more debt, and marginal interest rates are very high
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Table 6: Default rates, and leverage for firms with different credit ratings
Credit rating
Baa

Ba

B

Caa-C

Data
10-year default probability
4.89%
19.86%
46.12%
74.72%
leverage
31.4%
40.5%
55.5%
62.2%
leverage, reported by H&H
43.3%
53.5%
65.7%
leverage, reported by S&S
37%
50%
66%
D-type, version 1
leverage
36.1%
53.5%
70.6%
86.1%
E-type, version 1
leverage
55.0%
75.9%
91.4%
98.7%
D-type, version 2
leverage
33.8%
52.4%
69.8%
85.6%
E-type, version 2
leverage
48.8%
74.8%
90.7%
98.5%
This table shows the average values of default probability and leverage for firms with different credit ratings
in the data (rows 1-4) and in the model (rows 5-8). Leverage in the data is averaged for firm-year observations
with specific S&P long-term credit rating for years 1981-2017. Leverage, reported by H&H is taken from the
paper of Huang and Huang (2012), Table 1. Leverage, reported by S&S is taken from the paper of Schaefer
and Strebulaev (2008), Table 7. Default probabilities in the data are adjusted for issuer rating withdrawal.
To classify firms to specific credit ratings in the model, I match their implied 10-year default probability
with the default rate for each credit rating in the data (row 1) using Figure 16.

for firms with high leverage. Moreover, because a firm with high leverage is already deep
in distress, it will have to issue debt for many periods before it potentially recovers, and so
it needs many consecutive positive shocks to avoid bankruptcy, which is rare. In contrast,
firms in the E-type environment can issue equity cheaply, and even a highly levered firm
that experiences a few positive shocks will recover quickly (its debt value does not grow).
The shape of the default probability curve as a function of leverage is hard to estimate in
the data, especially for values of leverage close to one. Implicit empirical evidence, however,
argues in favor of the predictions of the D-type model; for example, Gilson (1997) shows
that leverage of financially distressed firms remains high before Chapter 11.27
For each credit rating category, I find a firm in the model that has the same 10-year
default probability, and its leverage is reported in the corresponding row of Table 6. It
follows from the table that version two of the model with the D-type environment matches
data well, while the model with the E-type environment significantly overestimates average
leverage values. This result is not surprising: keeping firm’s leverage constant, firms that
27

It should be noted that the author attributes this finding to the transaction costs of the debt reduction,
while this paper explains it by high interest rates on newly issued debt for firms with high leverage
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can only issue debt in distress naturally have greater default probabilities over any finite
time-horizon as compared to firms that can also issue equity. Therefore, to match any given
default probability, a firm in the E-type environment should have a greater leverage value
as opposed to a firm in the D-type environment.
1.3.4. Bankruptcy costs and equity issuance costs
The previous section shows that the model with the E-type environment fails to explain
the right tail of the leverage distribution, and a reasonable question is if it is possible to
modify the model to improve its empirical predictions. This section examines two potential
approaches that may help reconcile the E-type model with the data.
The first approach is to increase initial costs of debt issuance by increasing firm’s bankruptcy
costs. When bankruptcy costs are high, debtholders do not expect to recover a large fraction
of their debt in default, and charge higher rates at the time when debt is issued. This should
incentivize firms to issue less debt. Following this logic, I recompute the model for different
values of bankruptcy costs28 and estimate moments from the previous Section: the average
and median leverage, the average inverse coverage ratio, the fraction of firms in default, and
the fraction of firms with leverage above 75%; results are reported in Table 7 Panel A. To
examine the plausibility of different values of bankruptcy costs, Table 7 additionally shows
debt recovery rates, which are computed as the ratio of debt value at default relative to the
face value of debt.
As follows from the table, if bankruptcy costs are lower than 60%, the fraction of firms
with leverage above 75% is four-to-two times greater than empirically observed (4.5%).
Bankruptcy costs should go as high as α = 60% to match this moment and the average
leverage; however, even then the average inverse coverage ratio is 0.78 vs. 0.63-0.69 in
the data. Moreover, for bankruptcy costs these large, debt recovery rates predicted by the
model are too small. According to Moody’s report ”Moody’s Ultimate Recovery Database”
(2007), average debt recovery rates are 65% for senior secured bonds and 38% for senior
unsecured bonds, and they are less than 20% in the model with bankruptcy costs α = 60%.
28

Other parameter values are the same as in the Table 9
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Table 7: Model with greater bankruptcy costs/costs of equity issuance
Panel A: bankruptcy costs

avg. leverage
med. leverage
avg. invc.
distress
leverage ≥ 75%
recovery rate

α = 5%

α = 10%

α = 15%

α = 20%

α = 30%

α = 40%

α = 60%

α = 70%

60.3%
57.9%
1.26
65.0%
18.5%
37.5%

58.9%
56.4%
1.23
59.2%
18.1%
35.7%

55.5%
52.7%
1.12
48.9%
14.1%
33.9%

54.0%
50.3%
1.08
43.6%
13.1%
32.0%

50.9%
48.2%
1.00
37.2%
9.1%
28.2%

47.3%
43.4%
0.91
28.6%
8.2%
24.3%

40.6%
37.4%
0.78
22.3%
4.6%
16.3%

39.7%
35.3%
0.74
18.9%
4.5%
12.3%

Panel B: equity issuance costs

avg. leverage
med. leverage
avg. invc.
distress
leverage ≥ 75%

λ = 5%

λ = 10%

λ = 15%

λ = 20%

λ = 40%

λ = 60%

λ = 80%

λ = 100%

55.7%
52.0%
1.13
47.2%
15.1%

54.1%
51.3%
1.07
44.1%
13.2%

53.0%
50.0%
1.03
40.8%
11.7%

51.4%
47.9%
0.99
36.3%
10.7%

46.7%
42.6%
0.85
25.6%
7.4%

43.9%
39.4%
0.78
21.3%
7.17%

41.8%
36.6%
0.73
18.2%
6.9%

39.0%
34.3%
0.66
13.7%
3.8%

The table compares results of the version two of the model with E-type environment for different values of
bankruptcy costs α and equity issuance costs λ. When equity issuance costs are present, the firm has to raise
1 + λ dollars of equity to get one dollar. All values are estimated using a simulated steady-state cross-section
of firms. To simulate an economy, a balanced panel of N = 1200 firms is generated over T = 3600 months,
and values are averaged for the final period of simulation. Avg. and med. leverage refers to the average and
median value of leverage (36.6% and 34.2% in the data); avg. invc. is the average ratio of interest expenses
to firm’s cash flow (0.63-0.69 in the data); distress is the fraction of firms whose interest expenses exceed the
cash flow (16.5%-20.9% in the data); leverage ≥ 75% is the fraction of firms whose leverage is above 75%
(4.5% in the data); recovery rate is the value of firm’s debt at default divided by the face value of debt.

While not reported in Table 7, debt recovery rate is 52.3% in the model with the D-type
environment and is independent of bankruptcy costs α. The fact that debt recovery rates
do not vary with bankruptcy costs level may sound counter-intuitive at first, but it happens
because firm’s timing of default is endogenous in the model, and firms that have greater
bankruptcy costs default earlier, when the asset value is higher. Mathematically, it follows
from how the default rule is determined in the model (equations (18) and (19)). This
does not mean, though, that the D-type model predicts that debt recovery rates should
be constant in the data: recovery rates in the model depend on firm’s growth rate µ and
volatility σ, which vary between firms.
The second approach to align the E-type model with the data is to add transaction costs
of equity issuance to the model.The way the model is written, it assumes that firms that
want to issue equity can do it at no cost. Empirical estimates, however, suggest that costs
of equity issuance are positive and significant. For example, Clifford W. Smith Jr. (1977)
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studies all equity issuances registered between 1971 and 1975, and he finds that costs vary
between 2% and 15% of the procceds amount; in a structural estimation paper, Hennessy
and Whited (2007) find marginal costs of equity issuance between 5% and 10%, depending
on firm’s size.
To add equity issuance costs into the model with the E-type environment, it is assumed that
immediate dividends to equityholders are (X − c)(1 − τ )(1 + λ), when X < c in equation
(3). Economically, this means that firms whose cash flow is lower than required interest
expenses have to raise more money than what is necessary to just pay debtholders because
a fraction of proceeds is lost. I compute the model for different values of λ between 5% and
100%, and results are shown in Table 7 Panel B.
As the table shows, equity issuance costs can potentially explain empirically observed moments of the right tail distribution of firms, but they should be very large: only when
λ = 100% the model with the E-type environment matches every moment. However, this
value of λ implies that the firm only gets 50 cents for each value of equity raised. As
discussed above, empirical estimates of equity issuance costs are smaller.
Results of this section suggest that plausible values of costs of debt or equity issuances can
not address the right tail of the distribution of leverage or inverse coverage ratios, if these
costs are uncorrelated with firm’s leverage. In choosing the optimal amount of debt, firms
are less concerned about the absolute value of external financing costs, and are much more
concerned about the relative value of external financing costs in distress, when firms need
external money the most.

1.4. Conclusion
The main insight of this paper is that in order to explain why firms in the data choose
seemingly low values of leverage, a model does not necessarily need to impose large costs
of external financing, but these costs should be relatively higher when firms need money
the most - in distress. Firms are much more conservative in their leverage policy ex-ante if
they know that rates to refinance their debt will grow exponentially after several negative
shocks. To have external financing costs grow endogenously with the leverage, this paper
43

assumes that firms in distress can only issue debt. However, any model in which the cost
of equity grow with firm’s leverage will have similar results. Most importantly, the data
supports this prediction - firms substitute equity financing with debt financing when their
leverage is higher, implying that costs to issue equity grow faster than costs to issue debt.
The Leland-type framework is used extensively in the capital structure literature, but the
assumption that firms have constant costs to issue equity is both inconsistent with the data
and leads to unrealistic predictions about firm’s financing behavior. By deriving the new
optimal default boundary, which establishes that firms in distress issue debt, this paper
shows how both concerns can be addressed while maintaining the tractable framework of
the original paper. A model with similar features can be applied more broadly to study
related issues in corporate finance and asset pricing.
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CHAPTER 2 : Omitted Variable in Capital Structure Regressions
2.1. Introduction
This paper shows how ex-ante differences in the quality of investment opportunities of firms
can 1) translate into ex-post negative relationship between firm’s leverage and profitability,
and 2) explain why cash flows have positive explanatory power in a regression with investments amount even after the market-to-book ratio is controlled for. A simple observation is
at the core of this paper. If a firm has to finance some of its future investments with debt,
then by issuing debt to pay dividends the firm risks not being able to raise debt at acceptable
rates in the future, and will have to forgo many otherwise profitable investments. Moreover,
incentives to delay debt issuance are greater for firms whose investment opportunities will
be the most profitable. In extreme cases, a firm that expects its future investments to be
the most profitable would not be issuing debt that is not dedicated to finance investments
at all. The quality of firm’s investment opportunities is the omitted variable from the title
of this paper.
To formalize the logic of the previous paragraph, this paper derives a model that captures
the trade-off between issuing debt to exploit benefits of tax shield and delaying debt issuance
to finance future investments. In the model, firm’s profits are taxed at the corporate level,
but the firm can shield future profits from taxation by issuing debt. Occasionally, the firm
finds investment opportunities, which require fixed initial investments, and allow the firm
to get an extra flow of profits going forward. The NPV - or the profitability - of investment
opportunities differ between firms, and firms finance these investments with debt. A firm
can always issue debt and pay proceeds as dividends, but doing so increases its future
funding costs and may prevent financing of otherwise profitable investment opportunities.
It is important to note that the model itself contributes to the literature by simultaneously
characterizing firm’s investments, debt issuances, and default decision in a very tractable
manner, with many results available in a closed-form.
Think about the negative correlation between leverage and profitability. In the model, firms
that eventually become the most profitable are those that ex-ante expect to find the best
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Figure 10: Leverage and profitability in two groups of firms
Profitability
Distribution ofLeverage-predicting
profitability
in a simulated
cross-section
regressions,
model

Leverage
Distribution of leverage
in a simulated cross-section
firms that ex-ante expect
higher-quality inv. opp.
firms that ex-ante expect
lower-quality inv. opp.

This figure shows results of a model simulation. Firms in the model are different by the quality of the
investment opportunities they expect, with some firms consistently getting better investment opportunities
than others. As evident from the graph, firms with better investment opportunities on average end up with
smaller leverage and higher profitability.

investment opportunities. Such firms, however, also face the greatest opportunity costs
of issuing debt, and so they issue less (or no at all) debt for tax-shield purposes before
their investments arrive. Furthermore, every time a firm invests, debtholders are willing
to lend money at lower rates if firm’s investment is more profitable. Therefore, firms with
less-profitable investment opportunities issue debt with greater face value at every round
of investment. Importantly, a firm with profitable investments keeps taking its investments
even when its leverage is high, at times when a similar firm with less profitable investments
does not, and so eventually has more debt. This, however, does not happen until after
many rounds of investments, and an econometrician examining 100 years of investments
and debt issuance of a high-profitable and a low-profitable firms will see 95 years, in which
the leverage of the lower-profitable firm is higher, and 5 years, in which it is lower, and will
conclude that leverage and profitability are negatively correlated. Figure 22 illustrates this
logic: after many rounds of investments, distribution of profitability of firms with ex-ante
good investment opportunities is shifted to the right, while the distribution of their leverage
is shifted to the left.
Ex-ante difference in the quality of firms’ investment opportunities also explains why cash
flow is correlated with the investment amount even after controlling for the market-to-book
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ratio. Which firms have the greatest cash flows? Those that invested the most in the
past, and whose investments were the most profitable. Therefore, the ex-ante expected
quality of firm’s investment opportunities naturally creates a spurious correlation over time
between the cash flow and the investment amount. This correlation does not disappear
after controlling for firm’s market-to-book ratio, as the market-to-book ratio depends nonlinearly on both the quality of firm’s investment opportunities, and on firm’s leverage (as
leverage determines how many of those opportunities will actually be financed).
The model has a very good quantitative fit to the data. While firms in the model target
fairly high leverage value, at any point in time there are firms that already invested a lot,
and firms that are still waiting for the arrival of their investments. This way, the average
value of market leverage produced by the model is very close to empirically observed (27%
in the data vs. 25.2% in the model), and, thus, the model explains the underleverage
puzzle. Moreover, the whole distribution of market leverage in the model closely resembles
distribution in the data, and matches its median (22.2% in the data vs. 22.9% in the model),
standard deviation (17.1% and 16.0%), and all quantiles between 5% and 95%. The average
book leverage is also matched well, with its mean being 36.6% in the data and 37.3% in
the model. Furthermore, the model produces a very good fir for the whole distribution of
market-to-book ratios (as Figure 8 in the main part of the paper shows), with mean and
median being 2.31 and 1.78 in the model and 2.42 and 1.85 in the data.
2.1.1. Literature review
The negative relationship between
One of the significant assumptions in the paper is that firms can only finance their investment opportunities with debt. While this assumption is certainly important, especially for
the quantitative part of the paper, results qualitatively would not change even if firms in the
model were allowed to issue equity. Nevertheless, there is some strong evidence suggesting
that indeed firms issue equity infrequently, and that cost to issue equity also grow with
leverage.
Empirical evidence on equity issuance by distressed firms is scant, but also mixed. Below
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is a review of papers that consider this question. The overall conclusion that follows is that
most firms issue equity when their leverage is low; there are instances of equity issuances
by financially distressed firms, but the costs are high, and such firms use equity financing
because they cannot raise debt.
The first group of papers argues that most firms issue equity when their performance is
good. For instance, Senber and Senber (1995) report a complete absence of equity issuance
by distressed firms. Fama and French (2005) show that equity issuances are frequent, but
most firms issue equity when their leverage is low. Similarly, Mikkelson and Partch (1986)
and Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2007) find that equity issuances for cash are rare - both
in absolute level and relative to public debt issuances. Some other studies provide indirect
evidence that firms in distress do not issue equity. Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonal (1990)
find that firm’s leverage does not increase significantly two years before an SEO; should
firms issue equity to make required debt payments when internally generated cash flow is
insufficient, one would observe an increase in leverage prior to an SEO. DeAngelo, DeAngelo
and Stulz (2008) find that the average leverage of a firm before an SEO is only 27%. Denis
and McKeon (2012) show that firms, whose leverage is above the target, tend to cover
financial deficit by issuing new debt and increasing leverage further.
Other authors argue in contrary that a sizable number of distressed firms issue equity, but
they sell new shares at a large discount, and do so because debt financing is unavailable.
Park (2017) finds that public equity offerings decrease for firms in distress, but private
placements increase. Walker and Wu (2017) find that a third of all SEOs are conducted by
financially distressed firms. Both of these papers, however, use the distress measure from
Campbell, Hilsher, and Szilagyi (2008), which is only partially related to firm’s leverage.
Indeed, the average leverage in the subsample of distressed firms in Walker and Wu is 32%,
which implies that these firms are in distress for reasons other than their indebtedness, and
they likely have very limited access to debt financing. This conclusion is further reinforced
by Lim and Schwert (2017) who study all private placement of equity (PIPEs) by U.S. firms.
They find that most firms issuing PIPEs are small distressed firms without access to debt
markets: the median leverage of firms issuing PIPEs is only 7.2%, and 93% of all firms do
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not have credit rating. When such firms issue PIPEs, they offer shares to the market at a
large discount.
Appendix D provides further empirical analysis of the correlation between the frequency of
equity issuance and firm’s leverage based on Thomson Reuters data. Results show that the
amount of equity issuance decreases with firm’s leverage, and the discount at which newly
issued shares are offered to investors increases with leverage; this conclusion holds for all
firms and also for the subsample of firms that have access to public debt markets. Similar
conclusion follows from Figure 3 which is based on Compustat data.

1

The question

why costs to issue equity grow for firms in distress is beyond the scope of this paper,
but Appendix B provides a simple two-period model that shows that presence of leverage
amplifies information asymmetry. Such explanation is consistent with empirical findings of
Hertzel and Smith (1993) and Lim and Schwer (2017) who argue that distressed firms are
characterized by severe information asymmetry.
The model derived in this paper assumes that firms always have access to debt capital
markets.2 Therefore, the assumption that such firms do not issue equity to pay required
debt payments in distress is consistent with empirical evidence discussed above.

2.2. Model
2.2.1. The economy
This paper models an infinite-horizon economy in continuous time. Markets are complete,
and there is a riskless asset that pays a constant rate of interest r per unit of time3 . In
what follows, P denotes the physical probability measure, and Q denotes the risk-neutral
probability measure in this economy.
1

The paper does not combine the two databases because they use different definitions of equity issuance.
In particular, Thomson Reuters mostly considers SEOs, while Compustat partially considers private placements as well. Assuming that Compustat data is internally consistent, Figure 3 shows the relative scale of
debt and equity issuance as firms leverage increases, which would not necessarily be consistent if Compustat
and Thomson Reuters data for equity issuance is pooled. On the other hand, Thomson Reuters has data
for the discount/premium paid for newly issued shares, which is not available in Compustat
2
The empirical sample of firms that the paper quantitatively explains also consists of firms with access
to debt capital markets (firms with S&P long-term credit rating).
3
Here and below “per unit of time” means that investors earn approximately r∆t within a short interval
of time ∆t
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A firm in the economy is characterized by the amount of capital K it has, and capital
productivity Xt . Firm’s production technology has a constant return to scale, and instantaneous profits equal yt = Xt K per unit of time. For simplicity, capital does not depreciate,
and Xt evolves over time as a Geometric Brownian motion:
dXt
= µdt + σdWtQ
Xt

(2.1)

where µ is the risk-neutral drift, σ is volatility of capital productivity, and WtQ is a Brownian
motion under Q.
Government taxes firm’s profits at a constant corporate rate τ , and firm’s after-tax profits
are (1 − τ )Xt K per unit of time. it is assumed that firms cannot save cash, and all profits
have to be paid as dividends to equityholders immediately.
Capital is traded on the outside market, and its price depends on its productivity level:
price of a unit is (1 − τ )XH, where H is a constant. To gain intuition, consider the value of
a firm that operates one unit of capital with current productivity Xt that takes no actions:

Z
V =E
t

∞

−r(s−t)

e


(1 − τ )Xt
(1 − τ )Xs ds =
r−µ

(2.2)

If firms in the economy indeed were not taking actions, and capital markets were competitive, equation (2.2) would give the exact price of capital (from no arbitrage condition).
However, as discussed later in the text, firms can invest and issue debt to exploit benefits
of tax-shield, and therefore price of capital may deviate from what equation (2.2) suggests.
Nevertheless, equation (2.2) shows why price of capital should grow with its productivity
level4 .
4

Notice that price of capital is also proportional to the level (1 − τ ): one way to look at this is to assume
that after firms purchase capital, it is immediately depreciated for accounting purposes. In other words,
firms pay HX for a unit of capital, but the government returns them τ HX back, so the effective price that
firms pay is only (1 − τ )HX. Return from the government may take a form of smaller other taxes that firms
pay.
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2.2.2. Investments
Firms buy new capital when they find investment opportunities. Investment opportunities
arrive at a rate λ per unit of time; informally, probability to find an investment opportunity
within a short period of time ∆t equals λ∆t. An investment opportunity allows a firm
to buy pre-specified amount of capital Knew with low-productivity Xlow and install this
capital within the firm. However, once the capital is installed, it productivity grows up to
Xhigh > Xlow . This is what makes investment opportunities profitable for firms: they pay
for low-productive capital, but install it as high-productive capital. Importantly, investment
opportunities do not change the amount or productivity of firm’s existing capital: by taking
an investment opportunity, the firm gets a new capital stock with its own productivity. A
simple way to think about investment opportunities is that it allows a firm to open a new
plant, which works independently of firm’s other plants. This would imply, however, that a
pair (K, X) does not fully characterize a firm, as it shows firm’s total amount of capital and
productivity, while the firm may have several capital units after a number of investments.
The following assumption guarantees that capital and productivity can be aggregated:
Assumption 1 Consider a firm at time t that has K units of capital with productivity Xt
that finds an investment opportunity, which allows the firm to buy Knew units of capital
with productivity Xlow and install them within the firm with productivity Xhigh . Then:
1. Size of the investment opportunity is proportional to the amount of capital the firm
already has:
Knew = δK

2. Productivity of capital that the firm buys is the same as the productivity of capital that
the firm already has:
Xlow = Xt

3. Productivity of capital once it is installed is proportional to the productivity of capital
the firm buys:
Xhigh = (1 + γ)Xt
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4. After new capital is installed, its productivity will evolve according to the same equation
(2.1) as the productivity of firm’s old capital; in other words, there are no additional
idiosyncratic shocks to the productivity of new capital
Assumption (4) guarantees that firm’s different capital units can be aggregated into one:
there is only one process Xt that characterizes productivity of all capital units, and production technology is constant return to scale. Appendix 1 formally proves that capital can
be aggregated.
Note how firm’s profits change when the firm takes an investment opportunity:

Xt K → Xt K + δK(1 + γ)Xt = 1 + δ(1 + γ) Xt K

yt → 1 + δ(1 + γ) yt

(2.3)

Note also that the price that the firm pays to take an investment opportunity (1−τ )HXt δK =
(1−τ )δHyt - is proportional to firm’s profits. Therefore, yt alone is a sufficient state variable
to describe the firm. Evolution of yt over time then can be computed using Ito’s lemma:
dyt
= µdt + σdWt + I{firm invests}(1 + δ(1 + γ))dNt
yt

(2.4)

where dNt is a Poisson process with intensity λ, and I{firm invests} is the indicator function
that shows whether the firm invests when it gets an investment opportunity.
By construction, investment opportunities are profitable for firms: firms buy cheap lowproductive capital, but install it as high-productive capital. Nevertheless, firms that have to
finance investments by issuing debt may optimally choose not take investment opportunities.
This is because firms that issued a lot of debt in the past may only be able to raise new
debt at very high rates, which would not justify the investment. Before the discussion of
this case, however, consider the benchmark example, in which equityholders have “deep
pockets”, meaning that firms can always issue equity to pay for investments.
Benchmark example with equity financing
Let v(y) denote the equity value of a firm whose current profits equal y, and guess that the
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firm always invests when it finds an investment opportunity. v(y) should then satisfy the
following HJB equation:

σ 2 y 2 00
rv(y) = (1 − τ )y+µyv 0 (y) +
v (y)+
2



+ λ v (1 + δ(1 + γ))y − v(y) − (1 − τ )δHy

(2.5)

The last term of equation (2.5) is the probability that the firm finds an investment opportunity (λ) multiplying the change in the value of equity after the investment is taken. Notice
that because in this example investments are financed by issuing equity, there is a negative
outflow of (1 − τ )δHy every time the firm invests.
Guess that equation (2.5) has a linear solution v(y) = H0 y. Then:


rH0 y = (1 − τ )y + µH0 y + λ H0 (1 + δ(1 + γ))y − H0 y − (1 − τ )δHy

H0 =

(1 − τ )(1 − λδH)
r − µ − λδ(1 + γ)

(2.6)

(2.7)

Now consider the case when capital markets are competitive, and price of a unit of capital
exactly equals the value of a firm that operates this unit of capital, implying that H0 = H.
Substitute H0 = H into equation (2.7), and solve for v(y) = H0 y:
v(y) =

(1 − τ )y
r − µ − λδγ

(2.8)

This very simple equation is an analogue of the Gordon growth formula, which shows that
the value of a firm equals to the value of its immediate dividends (1 − τ )y divided by the
difference between the discounting rate r and the expected growth rate (µ + λδγ). The
growth rate in this case is composed of the unconditional growth µ, and the growth coming
from investments λδγ. While y increases by δ(1 + γ) every time the firm invests, the firm
pays for δ part of it, and only δγ is the additional growth.

53

2.2.3. Debt and debtholders
It is assumed that debt is the only source of external financing available to firms. While this
assumption may seem extreme, it has been shown empirically that debt financing dominates
equity financing.
Firms in the model issue debt for three purposes:
1. Interest expenses on debt are tax-deductible, and by issuing debt firms can exploit
benefits of tax-shield.
2. Firms use debt to buy capital to finance investment opportunities.
3. When firm’s cash flow is lower that required interest expenses on previously issued
debt, it has to issue more debt to cover the shortfall.
Note that firms whose cash flow is not sufficient to pay interest expenses face immediate
default, but, as the third bullet says, they may avoid it by issuing more debt. However,
firms cannot increase the amount of outstanding debt infinitely as at some point debtholders
would prefer to default the firm and take its assets rather than roll over its debt and hope
that firm’s financial situation recovers5 .
Debt takes the form of a perpetuity that pays a constant coupon payment c per unit of
time as long as there is no default. Interest expenses are tax-deductible, and, therefore,
firm’s instantaneous profits equal (1 − τ )(y − c)dt. For simplicity, it is assumed that when
(y − c) is negative, the firm pays negative taxes, which means it receives money from the
government.
Debt markets are competetive, and price of debt equals the present value of future payments
that debtholders expect to receive from the firm. Let D(y, c) be the value of all firm’s
outstanding debt. The fact that debt can be aggregated requires that either all of firm’s
debt is held by one creditor, or that different creditors have equal seniority, which is assumed
to be correct. When a firm issues more debt, it increases future coupon payments, and the
5

Default happens endogenously and is discussed later. However, Belyakov (2018) provides a more detailed
analysis and its implications for observed patterns of capital structure
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amount of proceeds that the firm receives equals D(y, cnew ) − D(y, c) - change in the debt
value. This is a departure from the traditional assumption that debt issuances incur nontrivial transaction costs that prevent firms from continuously adjusting their leverage (i.e.
Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001), Strebulaev (2007), Chen (2010), Bhamra, Kuehn, and
Strebulaev (2009, 2010))6 . Instead, the paper assumes that firms are allowed to issue new
debt in any quantities and as often as they want. However, even without the assumption of
costly debt issuances firms in the model do not issue debt continuously: most debt is issued
to finance investment opportunities, which only arrive infrequently.
Consider a firm with current cash flow y and debt that is characterized by coupon payments
c that finds an investment opportunity and decides to take it. To purchase necessary capital,
the firm has to pay (1 − τ )Hδy, and this amount needs to be raised by issuing more debt.
The new coupon payment cnew that the firm has to promise to debtholders is then implicitly
defined through the following equation:

D (1 + δ(1 + γ))y, cnew − D(y, c) = (1 − τ )Hδy

(2.9)

The LHS of equation (2.9) shows how the value of firm’s debt changes when it takes the
investment opportunity: its y increases by the factor (1 + δ(1 + γ)) as in equation (3.2), and
c increases to cnew . As debt markets are competitive, change in debt value is the amount
of proceeds that the firm receives, and this amount should equal to the price that the firm
pays to buy necessary capital; therefore, RHS of equation (2.9).
For now consider the case when firms do not issue debt to exploit benefits of tax-shield
(this feature is added later). Then firms with y > c only issue debt to finance investment
opportunities. The value of debt D(y, c) should satisfy the following HJB equation:
σ 2 y 2 00
Dyy +
2

 (2.10)


λI firm invests D (1 + δ(1 + γ))y, cnew ) − D(y, c) − (1 − τ )Hδy

rD(y, c) = c + µyDy0 +

6

The assumption of small but non-trivial costs of debt issuance proved to be a powerful tool in explaining
many stylized facts - from infrequent debt issuances, to underleverage puzzle and negative relationship
between leverage and profitability (i.e. Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001) or Strebulaev (2007)). This paper
assumes that debt can be issued at no costs, but it provides a different explanation for the above-mentioned
phenomena
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where the last term indicates the probability that a firm finds an investment opportunity (λ) multiplied by whether the firm takes the investment opportunity once it finds it

(I firm invests ), multiplied by how the value of debt changes - both y and c increase,
but debtholders provide funds for the firm to buy capital. Notice, however, that equation
(2.9) shows that this last term of equation (2.10) equals zero. It should not be surprising:
because debt capital markets are competitive, debtholders provide financing at rates which
make them indifferent between whether the firm takes the investment opportunity or not.
Effectively, equityholders capture the whole surplus arising from profitable investments.
Therefore, equation (2.10) can be simplified:
rD(y, c) = c + µyDy0 +

σ 2 y 2 00
Dyy
2

(2.11)

The fact that debt value does not increase when firms take profitable investment opportunities may sound unrealistic at first, as it seemingly implies that firm’s profitability does
not affect debt pricing. It is not the case: as clear from equation (2.9), higher value of γ
unambiguously increases the value of debt, and therefore, cnew is lower to equalize the LHS
and RHS. It means that firms with more profitable investment opportunities can issue debt
at lower rates.
Notice, however, that equation (2.11) holds on the region y > c, where firm’s cash flow is
sufficient to pay required interest expenses. On the region y < c the firm does not have
enough cash to pay required interest expenses, and so it needs to issue more debt to cover
the gap to avoid default. Let dD denote the additional amount of debt that needs to be
issued when y < c, and dc the change in coupon payments. The following formula then
links together dc and dD:


c − y + (c − y)τ



dt = (c − y)(1 − τ )dt = dD = dc

∂D
∂c

(2.12)

The very LHS of equation (2.12) is the difference between required coupon payments c
and the amount of money the firm has on hands - its profits y and tax-return from the
government τ (c − y). This difference is the amount that the firm must but cannot pay
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Figure 11: Debt value and marginal interest rate for an additional unit of debt
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to debtholders; the firm, therefore, raises this amount by issuing new debt, and coupon
payments increase accordingly7 . From equation (2.12), the dynamic of dc on the region
y < c is then:
dc =

(1 − τ )(c − y)
∂D
∂c

(2.13)

dt

HJB equation for the value of debt on the region y < c should account for the fact that
both y and c change8 :
rD(y, c) = (y + τ (c − y)) +

(1 − τ )(c − y)
∂D
∂c

Dc0 + µyDy0 +

σ 2 y 2 00
Dy y
2

(2.14)

which simplifies to the following:
rD(y, c) = c + µyDy0 +

σ 2 y 2 00
Dy y
2

(2.15)

which is again the same as equation (2.11). Equation (2.15) implies that pricing of debt is
not affected by the fact that the firm with y < c cannot pay its interest expenses and has
to issue more debt. This happens because an increase in c means greater future payments
to debtholders, but also that probability of default is higher; because debt markets are
competitive, an increase in c adjusts so that the two effects compensate each other, and the
value of debt stays unchanged.
7

Notice that new debt can only be issued for the case when ∂D
>0
∂c
Of course equation (2.14) should also account for the fact that the firm may find and take an investment
opportunity, but due to the same argument as in equation (2.10), value of debt does not change in this case
8
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Equations (2.11) and (2.15)9 have a closed form solution of the following form:

D(y, c) =

c
+ Bc1−β y β + B2 c1−β2 y β2
r

(2.16)

where B and B2 are constants to be determined from boundary conditions, and β < 0 and
β2 > 0 are the roots of the quadratic growth equation:

σ2 
σ2
r = µ−
β + β2
2
2

(2.17)

Consider the economic interpretation of the terms of equation (2.16): the first term

c
r

denotes the value of the risk-free debt that always pays c. As β is negative, the second
term is large when y is low, but it converges to zero when y increases10 . This term captures
the effect of default (and associated losses): when firm’s cash flow is high, firm’s default
probability is low, and so firm’s debt is almost risk-free; however, if firm’s cash flow is low,
the default probability gets bigger, and market value of debt adjusts downward. The last
term, in contrast, converges to infinity as y increases. Value of risky debt can never exceed
the value of the riskless debt, which implies that B2 = 0.
To uniquely determine D(y, c), one more boundary condition needs to be imposed, which is
the value of debt when the firm defaults. Absolute priority rules apply, and equityholders
receive nothing; firm’s assets are transferred to debtholders, and they sell them at the
market price. A fraction α of assets, however, is lost in the process, and so debtholders only
receive (1 − α) of assets value. Assume that a firm in default has K units of assets with
productivity X. The value of this firm’s debt then equals:
D(y, c) =

c
+ By β c1−β = (1 − τ )(1 − α)XHK = (1 − τ )(1 − α)Hy
r

It only remains to show when firms in the model default.
9
10

which are the same
more formally, as the ratio of

y
c

converges to infinity
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(2.18)

0

Figure 12: Path of a typical firm in the model
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This graph provides an illustration of how firm’s cash flow develops over time; notice that this graph assumes
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0
50 When firm’s cash flow
100is lower than its coupon
150
200
its coupon
payment (green curve).
payment but above the
default boundary ydef (bottom red curve), the firm slowly raises new debt to cover the shortfall between
the cash flow and required coupon payments. The firm defaults when cash flow level reaches the default
boundary. Values on the graph are in logs.

Default
Notice that dividends to equityholders are always non-negative: positive on the interval
y > c and zero on the interval y ≤ c. Therefore, equityholders never wish to voluntarily
default the firm. However, firms that have y < c cannot meet interest payments and,
therefore, continuously issue debt to avoid default. Debt issuances in distress cannot last
infinitely, though. As equation (2.13) implies, more debt can be issued only if

∂D
∂c

> 0.

Therefore, default is determined by the following condition:
∂D
=0
∂c

(2.19)

Notice that because debt in the model is a function of two variables (y and c), default
boundary is a curve ydef (c) rather than a single number. Together, equations (2.18) and
(2.19) allow to solve for B and firm’s default threshold:
ydef (c) =

1
−β
c
1 − β (1 − τ )(1 − α)rH
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(2.20)



ydef (c) −β
1
B=−
r(1 − β)
c

(2.21)

Note that ydef (c) is linear in c, and, therefore, the resulting B is indeed a constant. Moreover, the fact that β < 0 implies that B < 0, which means that value of debt gets smaller
as y decreases and probability of default gets higher.
2.2.4. Equity and equityholders
The closed-form expression for the market value of debt allows to simplify equation (2.9),
which shows how firm’s coupon payments increase when it takes an investment opportunity
and issues debt to finance it:
β 1−β
cnew
c
+ B (1 + δ(1 + γ))y cnew
= + By β c1−β + (1 − τ )Hδy
r
r

(2.22)

Let v(y, c) denote the value of firm’s equity. If y > c the firm produces enough money to
pay required interest expenses, and so it only issues debt infrequently to finance investment
opportunities. Therefore, HJB equation for v(y, c) takes the following form on the interval
y ≥ c:
σ 2 y 2 00
v (y, c)+
2 yy




λI Firm invests v (1 + δ(1 + γ))y, cnew − v(y, c)

rv(y, c) = (y − c)(1 − τ ) + µyvy0 (y, c) +

(2.23)

where the last term shows how the value of equity changes when the firm finds an investment
opportunity, and cnew is implicitly defined in equation (2.22). On the interval y < c the firm
does not produce enough cash to pay required interest expenses, and has to continuously
issue debt to finance the shortfall, and so the HJB equation should account for that. Note
that dc is defined in equation (2.13), and the firm does not pay dividends:
σ 2 y 2 00
(1 − τ )(c − y)
0
0
v
(y,
c)
+
µyv
(y,
c)
+
v (y, c)+
y
β −β c
2 yy
r + (1 − β)By c




λI Firm invests v (1 + δ(1 + γ))y, cnew − v(y, c)

rv(y, c) = 1
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(2.24)

Generally speaking, equations (2.23) and (2.24) describe a second order PDE of a function
of two variables, and so may be hard to solve, even numerically. However, the model satisfies
the scaling feature, meaning that function v(y, c) should be homogeneous of degree one in
y and c. Intuitively, a firm with (2y, 2c) is simply a greater replica of a firm with (y, c),
and, therefore, its equity value should be twice as high. Appendix 2 formally proves the
homogeneity property.
Define a new variable z =

c
y

- firm’s inverse coverage ratio11 . First note how firm’s z changes

when it takes an investment opportunity. For this, divide both sides of equation (2.22) by
y:

z
 z
new
1−β
(1 + δ(1 + γ))
+ Bznew
= + Bz 1−β + (1 − τ )Hδ
r
r
where znew =

cnew
(1+δ(1+γ))y

(2.25)

- firm’s new inverse coverage ratio after an investment is taken.

Importantly, equation (2.25) shows that firm’s inverse coverage ratio znew after an investment is taken is only a function of the prior inverse coverage ratio z and not y and c
separately.
Because v(y, c) is homogeneous of degree one in y and c, there is a function f (z) such that

v(y, c) = yf yc = yf (z). Note that

vy0 (y, c) = yf (z)

0
y

= f (z) − zf 0 (z)

z
z z2
z2
00
vyy
(y, c) = f (z) − zf 0 (z))0y = −f 0 (z) + f 0 (z) + f 00 (z) = f 00 (z)
y
y
y
y

(2.26)
(2.27)

Furthermore, note that equation (2.13) that determines dc on the interval y < c can be
partially rewritten in terms of z:
dc =

1
r

(z − 1)(1 − τ )
(c − y)(1 − τ )
dt = y 1
dt
β
−β
−β
+ (1 − β)By c
r + (1 − β)Bz

11

(2.28)

Notice that the inverse coverage ratio is a more natural parameter in the model than the coverage ratio
By construction y can never be zero, while there will be firms without any debt and, therefore, with
c = 0, and so the coverage ratio for these firms would be undetermined. Furthermore,
if yc was used as

the state variable for the model, equation (2.22) would imply that v(y, c) = cf yc , which would again be
undetermined for firms that have no debt
y
.
c
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Conditions y > c and y ≤ c can be rewritten as z < 1 and z ≥ 1. Plug equations (2.26),
(2.27), and (2.28) into equations (2.22) and (2.23) and divide both sides by y. Then:
if z ≤ 1
σ 2 z 2 00
(r − µ)f (z) = (1−z)(1 − τ ) − µzf 0 (z) +
f (z)+
2



λI Firm invests (1 + δ(1 + γ))f (znew ) − f (z)

(2.29)

if z > 1
(r − µ)f (z) =

!
(z − 1)(1 − τ )
σ 2 z 2 00
0
−
µz
f
(z)
+
f (z)+
1
−β
2
r + (1 − β)Bz
(2.30)



λI Firm invests (1 + δ(1 + γ))f (znew ) − f (z)

A firm will take arriving investment opportunity only if doing so increases its equity value.
Therefore, the following condition determines when a firm with an investment opportunity
is indifferent between investing and not:
v (1 + δ(1 + γ))y, cnew ) = v(y, c)

(2.31)

If LHS of (2.31) is greater than the RHS, firm’s value increases if invests, and so the firm
with an investment opportunity certainly takes it. On the other hand, if LHS of (2.31)
is lower than the RHS, firm’s value decreases if it invests, and so the firm will forgo the
investment opportunity.
Note that equation (2.31) can be rewritten in terms of z:
(1 + δ(1 + γ))f (znew ) = f (zinv )

(2.32)

where zinv denotes the level such that the firm takes arriving investment opportunities if
and only if z ≤ zinv .
It only remains to specify boundary conditions. Equity value should be zero at default, as
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NPV of a project in the model depends on two parameters: the quality of the project (firm’s γ) and firm’s
leverage. Keeping firm’s leverage constant, a higher γ implies a greater-NPV project, which on the Figure
correspond to the blue curve being above the red curve. As leverage increases, the firm can only raise new
debt at a high rate (because bankruptcy risks are high). Therefore, project NPV decreases with leverage, as
Panel A shows. Panel B shows a different interpretation of the same message, specifically putting the rate
to raise new debt on the horizontal axis. A firm will take a project as long as its NPV is positive, which
implies that high γ firms will be investing more than low γ firms.

firm’s assets are liquidated, and all proceeds go to debtholders. Therefore,
f (zdef ) = 0

(2.33)

where value of zdef follows from equation (2.20)
zdef =

1−β
(1 − τ )(1 − α)rH
−β

(2.34)

The second boundary condition is more complicated, and is discussed in the Appendix B
Tax-shield
The discussion so far has been focused on a firm that does not issue debt to exploit benefits
of tax-shield. To add this important feature, consider a firm that is characterized by a
pair of (y, c) that decided to issue more debt and increase its level of c to cres . In doing
so, the firm gets the amount of proceeds D(y, cres ) − D(y, c), but its equity value changes
to v(y, cres ). The firm, therefore, should choose cres to maximize the value of the sum of
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These two graphs show the value of equity and debt for a firm with current productivity X = 1 and different
interest expenses c. At any point in time, a firm is allowed to issue new debt and increase the level of
interest expenses; a firm would only do that if it increases the value of the blue curve, which is the sum
of the red and the green curves. Notice that a firm whose γ is high optimally chooses not to increase its
debt level. However, a firm with a low value of γ does issue debt. This happens because of the trade-off
between the time-value of money and inability to finance future investments with debt: a firm can issue debt
immediately and pay dividends, or can delay the debt issuance decision until an investment opportunity
arrives and finance it later.

proceeds and equity:


max v(y, cres ) + D(y, cres ) − D(y, c)
cres

(2.35)

Take first order conditions with respect to cres and divide both sides by y:
f 0 (zres ) +

Dc0 (y, cres )
=0
y

(2.36)

At last, expand D(y, cres ) using the expression (2.16):
f 0 (zres ) +

1
−β
+ (1 − β)Bzres
=0
r

(2.37)

Note that solution zres to equation (2.35) does not depend on firm’s current z, which means
firm’s policy regarding debt issuances for tax-shield purposes is independent of its current
state. Firms with z < zres will issue enough debt so that z = zres , and firms with z > zres
will be waiting before their y increases sufficiently.
Two important points should be mentioned about the level zres . First of all, it is possible
that there is no value z that satisfies equation (2.37): such firms never issue debt to exploit
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benefits of tax-shield. To understand why this could happen, recall that firms also issue debt
to finance investment opportunities. If firm’s investment opportunities are very profitable
or if they arrive frequently, the firm may optimally choose not to issue any debt for taxshield purposes, and instead wait until it finds an investment opportunity. Second, it may
happen that zinv < zres . This would imply that firm’s investment opportunities are not
profitable enough for the firm to wait until they arrive, and the firm would rather issue debt
immediately and exploit tax-shield benefits right away instead of paying high taxes to the
government in waiting for investment opportunities.

2.3. Model solution
2.3.1. Simulations
To analyze cross-sectional implications of the model, this paper uses simulations approach.
A virtual economy that has N = 40000 firms is simulated over T = 2400 periods with every
period being one month; the next subsection explains why these numbers are chosen. In
every period of the simulation, each firm observes the realization of its idiosyncratic shock
and whether it gets an investment opportunity. If the firm gets an investment opportunity,
it optimally decides whether to take or forgo it. Firms are also free to issue more debt to
better exploit benefits of tax-shield in any period. Firms whose cash flow is below the level
of their interest expenses issue debt to cover the shortfall. A firm defaults if its interest
expenses in a given period exceed its cash flow, and the firm fails to issue more debt to
cover the shortfall.
Firms in the simulation are different by 1) the timing of the arrival of their investment
opportunities, 2) the realization of their idiosyncratic shocks, and 3) the profitability of
their investment opportunities γ. By assuming that firms in a cross-section differ by the
profitability of their investment opportunities, I create an environment, in which firms are
ex-post heterogeneous in their profitability, and this heterogeneity is achieved through the
endogenous choice to invest. All other parameters are identical between firms.
At t = 0, firms start with one unit of capital K = 1 with productivity X = 1 and their
own profitability of future investment opportunities γ. As the economy evolves, some firms
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naturally default, and these firms are replaces by newly-born firms that inherit old firm’s
productivity X, the number of units of capital minus bankruptcy costs (1 − α)K, and the
profitability of investment opportunities γ. There is a concern that this way of replacing
defaulted firms with new firms may affect the relationship between leverage and other
variables. For instance, suppose that the true relationship between leverage and profitability
is positive, and firms with the greatest leverage are also the most profitable. Resetting firm’s
leverage to zero upon default will then mechanically induce the negative correlation between
profitability and leverage because now most profitable firms will have no debt.12 To alleviate
the mechanical effects, the analysis excludes firms that were in a simulation for less than
t = 60 periods (5 years). This approach does not seem restrictive as the target empirical
distribution of firms consists of firms with S&P long-term credit ratings, which are usually
old and mature.
The economy is simulated over T = 2400 periods with every period being one month. As
it takes time for the economy to achieve its steady-state, I only conduct the analysis based
on the last t = 48 periods (4 years) of observations.
2.3.2. Parameters choice
Table 9 shows benchmark values of parameters that are used to solve the model. Most of
the values are taken from Strebulaev and Whited (2012) who provide a review of literature
on dynamic capital structure and choose neutral parameter values to simulate a number of
models similar to the one discussed in this paper. Importantly, the literature does not have
a consensus on the value of most of these parameters or their distribution among firms. In
addressing this issue, where applicable, I discuss estimates of different authors or provide
support based on the data from Compustat.
Specifically mentioned, estimates of bankruptcy costs α, which in this paper is assumed to
be 10%, vary from very low to very high. For example, Gruber and Warner (1977) finds that
direct bankruptcy costs are about 1% of the assets value, and Andrade and Kaplan (1998)
12

Note that another standard approach when defaulted firms are replaced with firms that have K = 1
and X = 1 will create the opposite problem when positive correlation between leverage and profitability is
mechanically induced. This would happen because cross-sectional X on average grows
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Table 8: Benchmark parameter values used to solve the model
Panel A: Economy-wide parameters

r
τ
rp
H

risk-free rate
effective corporate tax rate
risk premium
price of capital∗

This paper

S&W (2012)

5%
20%
5%
30.8

5%
20%
5%

1.5%
25%
10%
1
10%
U [2% − 6%]

2%
25%
10%

Panel B: Firm-specific parameters
µ
σ
α
λ
δ
γ

growth rate of the capital productivity
volatility of the cash flow process
bankruptcy costs
frequency of investment opportunities arrival
size of investment opportunities
profitability of investment opportunities∗∗

This table shows parameter values used to solve the model. S&W (2012) denotes numbers used in Strebulaev
and Whited (2012), where authors review the literature on dynamic capital structure and simulate a number
of models similar to the one used in this paper. ∗ Price of capital is calibrated to match the equity value
of a firm with no leverage and γ = 0 (so that market-to-book ratio for this firm equals one at time zero).
∗∗
Firms in the simulation differ by the profitability of their investment opportunities γ, and γ is distributed
uniformly between 2% and 6%

report the value of about 20%. Some authors used a structural estimation approach to infer
the bankruptcy costs from firms’ observed decisions. In particular, Davydenko, Strebulaev
and Zhao (2012) find that default costs are in the range of 10% and 30%, Hennessy and
Whited (2007) report values between 8.4% and 15.1%, and Glover (2016) finds the value
of about 45%. Glover’s estimates are well-above estimates of other authors, but as argued
by Reindl, Stoughton, and Zechner (2017), it is because Glover assumes that all firms
follow optimal leverage policy, while it is not necessarily the case in the data. The authors
estimate a similar model without imposing optimal capital structure and using firms stock
prices instead, and find substantially lower values of bankruptcy costs (20%).
Cash flow volatility parameter σ also does not have a precise estimate in the literature.
Faulkender and Petersen (2005) report that the average implied asset volatility of firms
that have access to public debt is 19%, and Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008) find 23% (also
among firms that issue bonds); Reindl, Stoughton, and Zechner (2017) take a structural
estimation approach with Leland-type environment and find asset volatility between 25%
and 42%.
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Figure 15:
Distribution of market-to-book ratio
among firms with zero leverage
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This graph shows how the distribution of γ translates into the distribution of market-to-book ratios for firms
with no leverage.

The effective corporate tax-rate τ that this paper uses implicitly aggregates the effect of
corporate and personal taxes on dividends and interest payments; the resulting value τ =
20% is based on the estimates of Graham (2000). In a model, similar to mine, Chen (2010)
considers different taxes explicitly, and the resulting effective corporate tax rate in his model
is around 18%.
Cash flow growth rate µ is 2% in Strebulaev and Whited (2012), but they assume that the
process for cash flow is purely exogenous. In this paper, firm’s cash flow becomes higher
because there is the unconditional growth rate µ, but also because firms invest. Therefore,
the paper assumes a smaller unconditional growth rate value of 1.5%.
While the model is solved under the risk neutral probability measure Q, actual shock realizations happen under the physical probability measure P. Therefore, in the simulation
procedures discussed below, risk-premium rp = 5% is added to the risk-neutral growth rate
µ.
There are three parameters unique to this model (at least for the class of Leland-type
models): size of firm’s investment opportunities δ, frequency of investments arrival λ, and
profitability of these investment opportunities γ. This paper assumes that investment opportunities arrive on average once a year (λ = 1), and size is 10% of firm’s existing capital.
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Results of the model are not very sensitive to variations in δ.
Instead of assuming a single value of γ for all firms, this paper assumes that there is
heterogeneity in γ among firms. Clearly, there is no way to measure γ for firms in the
data directly. This parameter in the model, however, shows how good firm’s investment
opportunities are, and so should be directly linked to the distribution of market-to-book
ratios. With this in mind, the paper assumes that γ is uniformly distributed on the interval
[2%, 6%]. This region was chosen to target the distribution of market-to-book ratios in
the data for firms with zero leverage; firms with zero leverage are chosen because in the
model such firms correspond to newly born firms. Figure 15 shows how this distribution
of γ’s translates into the distribution of market-to-book ratios for firms with zero leverage.
The mean and median values in this distribution is 2.59 and 2.01 vs. 2.89 and 2.50 in the
data for firms with zero leverage. Even though distribution of γ’s is chosen to target the
distribtuion of market-to-book ratios for firms with no leverage, the following subsection
shows that the simulated distribution of market-to-book ratios in the full cross-section (i.e.
for firms with all values of leverage) is also very similar to the data.
To have γ uniformly distributed between 2% and 6% for simulation purposes, I first choose
1000 numbers equally spaced over the interval [2%, 6%]. For each value in the interval,
I create 40 firms that have this value as their γ. This results in N = 40000 firms, and I
simulate these firms over T = 2400 periods, with the length of each period being one month.
Price of capital is a free parameter in the model, and it is normalized so that market-to-book
ratio equals one for a firm with no leverage whose γ = 0.
2.3.3. Leverage and profitability
Table 9 shows results of the leverage predicting regression in the model. Specifications
I, II, III, and IV use a simple model when leverage is regressed on profitability (log(X)),
capital (log(K)), market-to-book ratio (v(y, c)/Ay) in univariate regressions, and then in
one multivariate regression. All three coefficients are significant, and their signs coincide
with the signs found in similar cross-sectional regressions based on Compustat data.
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Table 9: Leverage-predicting regressions in the model
Panel A: LHS is market leverage (value of debt divided by the sum of the values of debt and equity)
I
profitability
capital
market-to-book
γ FE
Firm FE

II

III

IV

V

VI

VII

−0.068∗
No
No

−0.001∗
0.006∗
−0.071∗
No
No

−0.001∗
0.003∗
−0.272∗
Yes
No

−0.160∗
0.278∗
−0.188∗
No
Yes

0.001
0.006∗
−0.525∗
No
No

−0.003∗
−0.023∗
No
No

No
No

Panel B: LHS is book leverage
VIII
profitability
capital
market-to-book
γ FE
Firm FE

IX
∗

−0.020
0.015∗
−0.026∗
No
No

Panel C: LHS is inverse coverage ratio

X
∗

−0.001
0.005∗
−0.231∗
Yes
No

XI
∗

−0.204
0.375
−0.099∗
No
Yes

XII
∗

−0.050
0.380∗
−0.070∗
No
No

XIII
∗

−0.002
0.009∗
−0.641∗
Yes
No

−0.425∗
0.761
−0.380∗
No
Yes

This table shows results of the following regression LHS = β0 + β1 log(X) + β2 log(K) + β3 + mb + ε based
on the data from a simulated cross-section of firms; see the text for details of the simulation. Specifications
V, VI, IX, X, XII, and XIII also control for fixed affects. LHS is: Panel A: firm’s market leverage (the
ratio of the market value of firm’s debt to the sum of market values of debt and equity); Panel B: firm’s
book leverage (the ratio of the market value of firm’s debt to the value of its assets); Panel C: firm’s inverse
coverage ratio (z in the model, the ratio of firm’s interest expenses c to its cash flow y). Specification VII is
only based on a sub-sample of firms all of which have γ = 4% (median value in the distribution). ∗ denote
variables significant at 5% level.

What is the mechanism behind the negative correlation between leverage and profitability?
This result is mainly driven by the effect of heterogeneity in γ’s among firms. Firms with
ex-post high profitability are firms that have high γ - their investment opportunities are
better, and so they end up with a higher value of X after every round of investment. Firms
with higher γ, on average, also have a smaller leverage. This effect is mainly driven by two
factors. First, a firm with a good investment opportunity (a high-γ firm), when it raises
debt to pay for an investment opportunity, is able to obtain a smaller interest rate from
debtholders. Therefore, every time a high-γ firm invests, its total debt value increases by
a smaller value than for a comparable low-γ firm. The second effect is purely pricing: the
way leverage is measured in the model, it has firm’s equity value in denominator. Naturally,
equity value of firms with high γ is much greater than the equity value of low-γ firms, and
so leverage is mechanically lower for high-γ firms than for low-γ firms with the same level
of debt. There is also a third factor: firms with higher γ have more incentives to delay
debt issuance until investment opportunities arrive, while firms with low γ may choose
to issue debt to purely exploit benefits of tax-shield even when there are no investment
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opportunities. This third factor, however, does not play a role in the current calibration of
the model: all firms optimally choose to never issue debt if they do not have investment
opportunities.
Between the other two factors (cheaper debt and higher pricing of equity for firms with
high γ) - which one has a more significant effect on the relationship between leverage and
profitability? It appears that both factors have the same effect. To show that the effect
of cheaper debt plays an important role, Panels B and C of Table 9 replaces leverage on
the LHS of the regression by two alternative measures of firm’s indebtedness that are not
affected by the pricing of equity: book value of leverage and inverse coverage ratio. Book
value of leverage puts the price of capital in denominator, and price of capital is the same
for all companies independent of their γ. Inverse coverage is the ratio of firm’s interest
expenses and cash flow, which are not affected by firm’s future investment opportunities.
As evident from the Table 9, the negative relationship between leverage and profitability
remains in these regression.
One can argue that since the negative correlation between leverage and profitability in the
model is purely driven by firm’s γ, the relationship should revert back to positive once
the regression is controlled for γ-fixed effects (or firm fixed-effects, since γ is fixed for every
firm). Such result would be problematic for the model: in the data, the relationship between
leverage and profitability remains negative even if the regression controls for firm fixedeffects. Specifications V and VI in Table 9, however, show that the model addresses this
concern and produces negative relationship between leverage and profitability even after
accounting for fixed-effects. To understand why the coefficient for profitability remains
negative in the regressions that control for fixed-effects, remember that fixed-effects only
allow for different slopes in a regression, while the relationship between the variables in the
model is highly-non linear. In particular, firms with different γ’s follow different investment
rules, and this interaction affects regression coefficients.
At last, to prove that the difference in γ is indeed the factor that drives the negative relationship between leverage and profitability in the model, I additionally run a regression on
a sub-sample of firms, all of which have the same γ. More specifically, Table 9 specification
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Table 10: Cross-sectional regressions in the model
Panel B: Investment-predicting regressions
I
cash flow
market-to-book
γ FE
Firm FE

II
∗

0.003
0.018∗
No
No

III
∗

0.000
0.016∗
Yes
No

IV
∗

0.045
0.016∗
No
Yes

0.002
0.018∗
No
No

V

VI
∗

0.871
0.091∗
No
No

VII
∗

0.083
0.581∗
Yes
No

VIII
∗

1.690
0.559∗
No
Yes

0.141
0.446∗
No
No

This table shows results of regressions based on the data from a simulated cross-section of firms; see the text
for details of the simulation. LHS variable for specifications I - IV is a dummy variable which equals one
for firm-year observations with non-zero investments, and zero otherwise. LHS variable for specifications
V - VIII is a log of the investment amount for firm-year observations with positive investments, and zero
otherwise; results are robust if a different negative number is used instead of zero for firm-year observations
with no investments. Specification I is a probit regression, and all other specifications are linear regressions.
Specifications IV and VIII are based on the data from a sub-sample of firms for which γ = 4 (median value
of γ in the population). ∗ denote variables significant at 5% level.

VII shows results for a regression of leverage on the three factors only based on observations
for firms, for which γ = 4% (the average value of γ in the cross-section). The coefficient
on profitability flips its sign to positive. This shows that heterogeneity in γ 0 s is indeed the
driving factor for the negative correlation.
2.3.4. Investments and cash flow
The next stylized fact that the model attempts to explain is why cash flow has a significant
effect in a regression of investments on cash flow and market-to-book ratio. First, the
model manages to replicate this stylized fact. Table 10 shows results of a regression of
firm’s investments on market-to-book ratio and cash flow, and the same regressions when
the LHS is the probability that a firm invests in a given period. It appers that inbth cases
the cash flow has significant explanatory power.
To understand the mechanism of this result, recall that in the model investment opportunities arrive randomly; the decision to invest, however, is endogenous, and depends on
two factors: 1) firm’s current leverage, and 2) the profitability of the investment (firm’s γ).
While firm’s market-to-book ratio is well correlated with firm’s γ, these two are not the
same things. Therefore, even when one controls for firms market-to-book ratio, the effect of
the γ is not fully captured. On the other hand, firms with ex-post high cash flows are firms
with high γ - their cash flow is higher precisely because all their projects were good. In this
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Since the explanation for the significance of the cash flow in the investment regression comes
from heterogeneity in γ, and γ is fixed for each firm at the origin, one can claim that the cash
flow significance should disappear once firm-fixed effects are controlled for. Nevertheless,
the model shows that the cash flow remains significant even when fixed-effects are added
to the regression. This is shown in specifications II, III, XI, and XII of the Table 9. The
explanation why the significance does not disappear is similar to the explanation in the
previous section: firm fixed-effects only allow for different average levels of investments for
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Table 11: Moments of leverage distribution in the data and in the steady-state cross-section
in the model
Panel A: Moments of leverage distribution

mean
median
standard deviation
quantiles
5%
10%
25%
75%
90%
95%

Data

Model

26.3%
22.9%
17.1%

25.2%
22.2%
16.0%

5.9%
8.33%
13.9%
34.7%
48.3%
59.47%

5.8%
8.2%
13.6%
33.3%
45.9%
55.3%

Panel B: Moments of market-to-book distribution
Data

Data, winsorized

Data, censored

Model

mean
2.54
2.42
2.25
2.31
median
1.85
1.85
1.85
1.78
min
-12.36
0
0
0
max
24.93
8
8
8
This table reports summary statistics on leverage market-to-book distributions in the model and in the data.
For the data part, only firms that have access to the public debt markets are considered, and the access is
proxied by whether a firm has S&P long-term credit rating in a particular year. See the text in Section 3.1
for the details of simulation.

firms with low γ. In the model, however, γ is not the only factor that determines whether
and how much a firm invests; the decision to invest depends both on firm’s γ and on its
leverage, and the relationship between the variables is highly n0n-linear. Therefore, both
variables - market-to-book ratio and cash flow - are significant even in the regressions with
fixed-effects.
However, cash flow is no longer a significant factor in the regression once the regression is
restricted to a sub-sample of firms that all have the same value of γ. Specifications IV and
VIII of the Table 10 proves this by running the regression on a sub-sample of firms with
γ = 4% (the mean value of γ in the cross-section). The cash flow significance disappears,
which indeed confirms that γ drives the relationship in the model.
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Figure 17: Distribution of market-to-book ratio in the data and in the model
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This Figure shows the distribution of market-to-book ratios for firms in the data (white bars) and firms in
a simulated cross-section (black bars). See the text Section 3.1 for details of the simulation. Distribution
in the data is based on market-to-book ratios for firms that have access to S&P long-term credit ratings in
years 1978-2017.

2.3.5. Quantitative results
To study quantitative implications of the model, I first collect the data for the empirical
moments that are related to the distribution of leverage and market-to-book ratios. I focus
on these moments because the papers gives predictions about these moments, and they
are not directly assumed in the parametrization section. The sample of firms comes from
Compustat for years 1981-2017.13 Firms in the financial sector (6000s SICs) and the public
sector (9000s SICs) are excluded from the analysis; observations with the book value of
assets that is less than $1 million are also excluded.
As Faulkender and Petersen (2005) find, firm’s capital structure depends a lot on whether
the firm has access to public bond markets. The assumption that firms can issue debt
easily is crucial in this model, and for this reason, the paper only consider firms that have
S&P long-term credit rating, which is used as a proxy for whether the firm can issue public
debt. Data on the S&P long-term ratings is available on monthly basis, but financial data
is annual. To match the datasets, it is assumed that a firm has S&P long-term rating in a
13

1981 is the first year that has data on S&P long-term credit ratings
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given year if it has S&P long-term rating in at least one month of that year. Data on S&P
long-term ratings is available between years 1981 and 2017, and there is, on average, 1500
observations in each year. However, years 1981-1984 have only five observations combined,
and year 2017 has only 146 observations.
As the Table 11 shows, the model manages to fully reproduces leverage distribution in the
data. The model matches its mean (26.3% in the data vs. 25.2% in the model), median
(22.9% vs. 22.2%), standard deviation (17.1% vs. 16.0%) and every quantile between 5%
and 95%. In addition to market leverage, the model also matches the mean and median
values of book leverage (37.3% and 37.1% in the model and 36.6% and 34.2% in the data,
though the rest of the distribution is not matched as well as the distribution of market
leverage. This is in part because the definition of book leverage that this paper uses and
the definition that is used in the data are different: in the data, book leverage is measured
as book value of debt divided by book value of assets. In the model, I measure book value
of debt as the market value of debt divided by the value of assets. The concept of the face
value of debt is not very meaningful in this model, and therefore there is no way to measure
the book value of leverage in the model the same way as it is measured in the data.
The model also reproduces the distribution of the market-to-book ratios in the data well, as
illustrated by the Figure 17. The model can’t account for firms with extremely high values
of market-to-book ratios (above 8) or negative values, but it matches the distribution in the
middle. The mean and median values of the market-to-book ratio produced by the model
(2.31 and 1.78) are very close to those in the data (2.42 and 1.85).
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CHAPTER 3 : Economics of Leveraged Buyouts: Theory and Evidence from the
UK Private Equity Industry
3.1. Introduction
Private equity (PE) industry has grown significantly since early buyouts of the 80s, reaching $4trln in 2020. Nevertheless, economics of PE firms is still poorly understood. Due to
the scarcity of available data, most academic knowledge is based on small and often biased
samples. Similarly, the public perception is colored by salient but not necessarily representative cases. This paper aims to address the gap in knowledge by analyzing a representative
sample of PE-backed companies and explaining their behavior.
The main message of this paper is that PE-firms help their portfolio companies grow by
alleviating the debt overhang problem. The debt overhang problem is less severe for PEbacked companies because PE-owners can directly inject equity in the event of a financial
distress. In contrast, existing evidence shows that public and other private companies
have hard time accessing equity financing in distress.1 Instead, they mostly rely on debt
financing, which is particularly expensive for financially distressed companies, and often
exacerbates their situation. Through a dynamic quantitative model, I show how that leads
to greater investment and faster growth of PE-backed companies, and use it to measure the
value creation by PE firms.
In order to empirically support the premise of this paper - that PE firms provide capital to
portfolio companies in situations, in which other companies have hard time raising external
financing - I analyze a novel hand-collected dataset with information about a representative
sample of buyouts in the UK. I first show that there are frequent money flows between
sponsors and their portfolio companies and, contrary to a common stereotype, these flows
go both ways. As Figure 1 illustrates, in 34% of buyouts the target company receives more
1

See, for instance, Senber and Senber (1995); literature review section provides an extensive discussion
about equity issuance by financially distressed companies. This paper does not take a stance on why equity
issuance costs are disproportionally high for companies without PE-ownership in financial distress, but a
possible explanation is that public companies in financial distress are particularly affected by the information asymmetry problem. Private companies with concentrated ownership do not suffer from information
asymmetry necessarily, but their owners usually have limited capital. PE firms solve both problems.
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Figure 18: Total money flow between the PE and the company
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Total money flow is the difference between the amount of money received by the company from the PE
and the amount of money paid by the company to the PE, during the time when the PE controls the
company excluding the year when the PE acquires the company, normalized by the buyout size. Negative
money flow means the company pays more money to the PE than what it receives from the PE, and
positive money flow means the company receives more money from the PE than what it pays to the PE.
The figure does not show 29.1% of companies that have zero money flow - those companies that neither
pay nor receive money from the PE (therefore, bars on the figure add up to only 0.709).

direct equity injections from the sponsor post-buyout than what it pays in dividends.2 The
fraction of companies that pay more dividends than what they receive from the sponsors is
almost the same, 38%.
I further show that cases of financial distress are among factors correlated with the timing
of equity injections: on average, a company receives an equity injection from the sponsor
that equals 4% of the original deal amount every time its cash flow is insufficient to pay
debt interests. PE owners seem to be acting as deep-pocket investors, covering the gap
between needed and available cash of their portfolio companies.3 As a result, investment of
PE-backed companies - both CAPEX and acquisitions of other companies - is not sensitive
to the level of internal cash flow. Similarly, there is no difference in investment between
2

My sample of buyouts excludes VC and PE-growth deals, both of which presumably have even more
money injections from sponsors.
3
One might argue that dividends and equity injections do not show the full picture of how money flows,
as PE firms allegedly charge high fees for consulting and management services. Such fees, however, are
present in less than 50% of buyouts, and combined over the whole ownership period they make less than 1%
of the original deal amount.
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distressed and non-distressed companies if they have PE-ownership.
I develop a quantitative framework to show how availability of external financing relates
to debt overhang, and measure the value created by PE firms through their ability to
relieve it. In the model, companies use debt to pay for investments that are too big to
finance internally. Investment change the expected growth of cash flows, but the actual level
depends on exogenous shocks. An unlucky company that is hit with a series of negative
shocks may fall in financial distress, when its cash flow is not sufficient to make required
debt payments. Even though such company is not profitable, it might still have economic
value because the cash flow may recover in the future. Therefore, it is optimal for the
company to raise external financing to avoid bankruptcy. What type of external financing
is available in distress is the only difference between companies with and without PEownership. Companies with PE-ownership can pay negative dividends as long as its optimal
for the sponsor, while companies without PE-ownership have to rely on debt financing.
The model shows that financial distress becomes a rare event that governs investment
policies of non-distressed companies. To understand the intuition, consider what happens
to a company without PE-ownership that falls in distress. In order to avoid a default, the
company issues debt, which increases its future interest payments. Since today’s interests
cannot be covered internally, the company will likely need to issue debt again to finance
even greater interests next period, forcing itself deeper into distress. Moreover, the rates
on additional debt grow exponentially with every round of debt issuance as debt is fairly
priced. Effectively, once a company falls in financial distress, there is a high chance of a
continuous debt spiral. Expecting this, companies maintain low leverage, and sometimes
forgo good investment opportunities that require external financing.
At the same time, expectations about financial distress do not affect investment policies of
companies with PE-ownership as significantly. PE-owners have the ability and incentives
to inject equity into their companies that are in financial distress to prevent the debt spiral.
Expecting this, non-distressed companies invest more and grow faster. Smaller default
probabilities also mean that debt is safer,4 implying that rates to issue debt are lower for
4

In this context, ”smaller default probability” implies conditioning on the debt level. That is, among two
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PE-backed companies, further increasing their investment activity.
The calibrated model shows that companies without PE-ownership stop investing in projects
that require external financing once their leverage exceeds 42%, and stops investing completely if their leverage exceeds 67.4%. In contrast, companies with PE-ownership take all
investment opportunities - those that can and cannot be financed internally - as long as
their leverage is below 78.5%. As a result, the average growth rate of cash flows of a group
of companies without PE-ownership is 8.9%, and it is 9.6% for a group of companies with
PE-ownership.
Empirical results strongly support the fact that companies with PE-ownership make large
investment more often. The data shows that, in a sense, buyouts do not stop when a PE
firm acquires a company. Instead, 59.6% of buyouts have a follow-on acquisition, meaning
another company is acquired and merged with the first. Among companies that are originally bought for £100mln or more, the frequency of follow-on acquisitions is 76.7%. On
average, a company with PE-ownership has one acquisition every 2.5 years. For comparison,
the frequency of acquisitions by COMPUSTAT companies in the UK and the US is once
every five years.
I use the model to estimate what fraction of the abnormal PE return can be explained by the
superior growth of their portfolio companies. Because PE-ownership increases company’s
growth, the value of the company is higher when it is owned by a PE firm. Therefore, when
a PE firm buys a company, there is a range of prices at which the buyout can happen. If
the PE industry is small relative to the size of the public market, buyouts will happen at
the lowest price that public investors accept. As a result, the PE firm pays a relatively
small price for a company that produces high dividends after the buyout. Because realized
dividends are disproportionately high relative to the purchase price, the average realized
returns are higher than the discount rates. The difference between the average realized
returns and the appropriate discount rates is the abnormal return of the private equity
investments.
companies of equal sizes with equal amount of debt, the one that has PE-ownership has a smaller probability
of default than the one without PE-ownership. The model predicts, however, that PE-backed companies
will still default more often as they endogenously choose to have greater leverage.
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I calibrate the model to produce the market excess return of 5.6%. The model then implies
that the average excess return on a portfolio of PE-backed companies is 13.3%. Companies
with PE-ownership are more levered, and so are more exposed to systematic risk, implying
a beta of 1.2. Therefore, 6.6% of the 13.3% outperformance is compensation for the market
risk. The remaining 6.7% represents the alpha that PE-firms generate, which can be further
decomposed into 5.6% due to higher investments, and 1.1% due to higher benefits of taxshield. Since this alpha is only available to specialized PE-firms, the high abnormal returns
cannot be exploited by average investors.
The difference in capital structure between companies with and without PE-ownership is
another results that follows from the model, and since leverage is not a moment that is
used to calibrate the model, it can be used to independently validate whether the model
is quantitatively plausible. For companies without PE-ownership, the average leverage in
a modeled cross-section is 27%.5 This number is consistent with the average leverage of
public companies, which is in the range between 20%-30% in the US and the UK.
The leverage of a PE-backed company in the model at the time of buyout is 49%, which is
significantly larger than what companies without PE-ownership have. This number might
seem small relative to the 60%-65% LBO leverage that is often quoted in the literature, but
I show that prior empirical studies overestimate the average debt level in PE-buyouts due
to two challenges that I address and correct for in this paper. In my sample of PE-backed
companies, the average leverage at the time of buyout is only 41% (42% median). There are
as many companies with leverage above 65% as companies with leverage below 5%. Large
companies are more levered than small companies, but the average leverage is still only 52%
among companies larger than £200mln.
The first challenge that I address in my empirical setting is data availability, which forces
many studies to work with biased samples. I address it by analyzing a sample of PEbacked companies in the UK, where all private companies release their financial statement.
To estimate the effect of data availability bias, I separately estimate the average leverage
5
It is important to note that the calibration assumes that all parameters are the same for companies with
and without PE-ownership, and any difference is coming from the difference in expectations about financial
distress. Specifically, bankruptcy costs for both types of companies are 10% of the asset value.
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Figure 19: Structure of a typical buyout
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The figure shows the structure of the buyout of Callcredit Information by Vitruvian Investment Partners
in December 2009. The overall transaction size was £120mln, of which £23mln was a loan from a bank,
and the rest was paid by the PE firm. Of the £97mln paid by the PE, only £50’000 were structured as
equity, while the remaining part was structured as shareholder loans. Shareholder loans - money paid by
the PE but recorded as debt on company’s balance sheet - are present in 92% of the deals in my sample,
and on average they constitute 40% of the deal size.

for a subgroup of companies in my sample that also have information about their buyout
structure in the LPC/Dealscan database, which is frequently used in empirical PE research.
I show that the average leverage increases by 10% for this subset of companies. Perhaps
surprisingly, size does not predict whether a certain deal is included into the database, and
it is rather the amount of debt that is used to finance the buyout.
The second challenge that I address is that accounting rules that PE-backed companies
follow make it difficult to interpret information about their cash flows and capital structure. Figure 19 illustrates this problem: PE-owners hold a big portion of the debt that
is used to finance buyouts. The PE-held debt, which is called shareholder loans, is only
nominally debt, but has all properties of equity,6 and as such, should be treated as equity.
Accounting rules for the treatment of shareholder loans create a lot of paper transactions
6

Shareholder loans do not have interest expenses, no payments on them are allowed before the actual
debt is paid off, and they are written off in case company’s performance deteriorates. Most importantly,
shareholder loans are only senior to company’s equity, which is also held by the PE-owner. Professional data
vendors that focus on debt analysis, such as LPC/Dealscan, correctly treat them as equity. In contrast, data
vendors that solely rely on companies’ reporting and do not do their own adjustments, such as AMADEUS,
classify them debt.
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that obscure the actual cash flow and financing data at the time of buyout and later in
company’s life cycle. To get a complete picture about the financing, investment, and cash
flows between companies and PE-owners, I manually analyze companies’ reports to separate
paper transactions from actual transactions.7
Related literature
This paper is related to the line of literature that discusses the capital structure choices
of companies, both with and without PE-ownership. The big-picture puzzle is the fact
that companies with and without PE-ownership have very different leverage, which is hard
to rationalize on the basis of traditional theories. On the side of companies without PEownership, Miller (1977) argues that the present value of expected default losses seems
disproportionally small relative to the tax-shield benefits of debt, concluding that most
companies are, on average, underlevered. Graham (2000) estimates that the value of an
average company would go up by 5% if it increased its leverage to the optimal level. This
puzzle is known as the underleverage puzzle, and several papers discuss frictions that prevent
companies from issuing additional debt (e.g. Faulkender and Peterson (2006)) or propose
mechanisms that could rationalize the seemingly-suboptimal behavior (e.g. Chen (2012),
Morellec, Nikolov, and Schuroff (2012), or Glover (2016) among others).
The flip side of the underleverage puzzle is the fact that companies with PE-ownership
are more levered than most theoretical models predict, and more levered than companies
without PE-ownership. For instance, Axelson, Jenkinson, Stromberg, and Weisbach (2013)
study a sample of leveraged buyouts and conclude that “there appears to be no discernible
relation between leverage in buyout firms and median leverage of public firms in the same
industry-region-year, regardless of what leverage measure we use” (see also Gompers, Kaplan, and Mukharlyamov (2015)). Several channels have been discussed in the literature
that could explain the high leverage of LBO-transactions. Ivashina and Kovner (2011) emphasize the role of the PE-banking relationship in determining the amount of debt used
7

In addition to having a very high noise-to-information ratio, the mis-measurement of certain items on the
balance sheet and cash flow statements of PE-backed companies is correlated with many different variables,
such as what PE firm finances the deal, the complexity of the transaction, the size of the acquired company,
etc.
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in a buyout (see also Demiroglu and James (2010)). Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997)
argue that the optimal capital structure is linked to company’s corporate governance, and
it has been shown that the corporate governance changes significantly following the buyout
(see, for instance, Gertner and Kaplan (1996), Acharya and Kehoe (2008), or Cornelli and
Karakas (2008)).
This paper contributes to the discussion of capital structure by proposing a mechanism
that quantitatively explains the leverage of companies with and without PE-ownership
simultaneously. The paper focuses on the access to external financing in distress. External financing costs increase with company’s leverage for companies without PE-ownership,
and so they optimally choose to follow conservative leverage policy ex-ante. Companies
with PE-ownership, in contrast, can always receive an equity injection from the PE-owner,
and so they optimally choose a much higher leverage. Empirically, Hotchkiss, Smith, and
Stromberg (2014) show that private equity firms are indeed efficient at resolving the financial
distress of their portfolio companies (see also Andrade and Kaplan (1998)).
The mechanism in this paper is most closely related to Elkamhi, Ericsson, and Parsons
(2011), who show that if companies experience even modest financial distress costs prior to
bankruptcy, they are much more conservative in their ex-ante leverage policy. This paper
complements the Elkamhi, Ericsson, and Parsons research by explicitly showing how the
financial distress costs can arise if external financing costs increase with company’s leverage
(through higher default probability), and how private equity firms can mitigate these costs.
This paper is also related to the line of literature that discusses the performance of companies
with PE-ownership. The majority of authors agree that PE-ownership positively affects the
value of companies, and that companies with PE-ownership have higher operating growth
(Harris, Siegel and Wright (2005)), better margins (Kaplan (1989)), greater investments
(Chung (2009)), and increased labor productivity (Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990), or Davis,
Haltiwanger, Handley, Lipsius, Lerner, and Miranda (2019)). This paper contributes to
the literature by showing how better access to external financing in distress can change
incentives of PE-backed companies, and how many of the empirical results that abovementioned papers document can endogenously arise without a direct involvement from the
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PE-owner.

3.2. Discussion of the main assumption of the model
The underlying assumption of the model is that financially distressed companies without
PE-ownership cannot issue equity, while companies with PE-ownership can. As a result
of this assumption, external financing costs exponentially increase with company’s leverage
for companies without PE-ownership, making financial distress costly, and affecting their
ex-ante policies.
The assumption that companies without PE-ownership cannot issue equity in distress is
strong, and is mainly made to achieve the tractability of the solution. Results of the model
would hold if one assumed instead that companies without PE-ownership could issue equity,
but costs of equity issuance increased with leverage. This section 1) discusses these two
assumptions - that companies cannot issue equity at all or that costs of equity issuance
increase with company’s leverage - from the point of view of theoretical and empirical
evidence, and 2) shows what happens when the company is acquired by a private equity
firm.
Start with the equity issuance costs by companies without PE-ownership. Myers and Majluf
(1984) show that if there is information asymmetry between company’s insiders selling stocks
and outside investors buying stocks, newly issued stocks are sold at a discount. As Appendix
A shows, a simple modification of their model implies that equity issuance discount is higher
if the company has some outstanding debt. The intuition behind debt and equity issuance
costs is that any information asymmetry about the value of underlying assets of the company
is amplified by company’s leverage because equity is a residual claim on company’s assets.8
While the model from Appendix A is fairly simple, it does show unequivocally that issuing
equity becomes expensive for highly levered companies, and lays out the conditions that are
8
While Appendix A shows a very stylized model, a companion paper to this one extends the model from
the appendix to a full dynamic model, and shows that the main intuition holds, and that equity issuance
costs (i.e. the share price discount following the announcement of equity issuance by the company) increase
with the leverage. In this model, highly-levered companies are also distressed companies, and consistent with
the model predictions, distressed companies are characterized by severe information asymmetry, as shown
by Hertzel and Smith (1993) and Lim and Schwert (2019).
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Figure 20: Stock price discount following equity issuance announcement
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Data is based on SDC/Platinum database that tracks equity issuances, and shows the average stock price
reaction following an equity issuance announcement. Each bar represents the average discount for a group
of companies with a given leverage; for instance, among companies, whose leverage was between 30% and
40% at the time when they announced an equity issuance, the stock price fell by 3.59% on average. Negative
4.32% (red line) is the average stock price reaction following an equity issuance announcement.

necessary to reverse this result. Specifically, only if there is an investor with 1) enough funds
that 2) does not suffer from the information asymmetry problem, equity issuance costs will
not be affected by company’s leverage. It is easy to see why companies with PE-ownership
satisfy both of these conditions (PE-firms have money, and they are actively engaged in
the management of their portfolio companies9 ), while both public and private companies
without PE-ownership only satisfy one. In case of public companies, there are enough
deep-pocket investors that can provide financing, but managers usually know more about
the company than outside investors. In case of most private companies, their managers and
indeed their owners, and so there is no information asymmetry, but owners usually do not
have enough resources to invest into the company.
Figure 20 shows how company’s stock price reacts to the SEO announcement, depending
on company’s leverage. The figure supports the result that costs of equity issuance indeed
increase with company’s leverage. Undoubtedly this result suffers from the selection bias,
9
See, for instance, Gertner and Kaplan (1996), Acharya and Kehoe (2008), or Cornelli and Karakas
(2008)
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since companies endogenously choose which type of external financing they want to raise.
Nevertheless, the equity issuance discount would probably be even higher if one could control
for the selection bias, since costs of debt issuance increase with company’s leverage, and
so the highly levered companies that optimally issue equity should be those for which the
equity issuance costs are the smallest.
Several other papers in the literature address the question of equity issuance costs by highly
levered or distressed companies, but empirical evidence is mixed. Below is a review of papers
that study this question. The overall conclusion that follows is that most companies issue
equity when their leverage is low; there are instances of equity issuances by financially
distressed companies, but the costs are high, and such companies use equity financing
because they cannot raise debt.
The first group of papers argues that most companies issue equity when their performance is
good. For instance, Senber and Senber (1995) report a complete absence of equity issuance
by distressed companies. Fama and French (2005) show that equity issuances are frequent,
but most companies issue equity when their leverage is low. Similarly, Mikkelson and
Partch (1986) and Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2007) find that equity issuances for cash
are rare - both in absolute level and relative to public debt issuances. Some other studies
provide indirect evidence that companies in distress do not issue equity. Korajczyk, Lucas,
and McDonal (1990) find that company’s leverage does not increase significantly two years
before an SEO; should firms issue equity to make required debt payments when internally
generated cash flow is insufficient, one would expect to find an increase in leverage prior to
an SEO. DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2010) find that the average leverage of a companies
before an SEO is only 27%. Denis and McKeon (2012) show that companies, whose leverage
is above the target, tend to cover financial deficit by issuing new debt and increasing leverage
further.
Other authors argue in contrary that a sizable number of distressed companies issue equity,
but they sell new shares at a large discount, and do so because debt financing is unavailable. Park (2017) finds that public equity offerings decrease for firms in distress, but private
placements increase. Walker and Wu (2019) find that a third of all SEOs are conducted by
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financially distressed companies. Both of these papers, however, use the distress measure
from Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008), which is only partially related to company’s
leverage. Indeed, the average leverage in the subsample of distressed companies in Walker
and Wu is 32%, which implies that these companies are in distress for reasons other than
their indebtedness, and they likely have very limited access to debt financing. This conclusion is further reinforced by Lim and Schwert (2019) who study all private placement of
equity (PIPEs) by U.S. companies. They find that most companies issuing PIPEs are small
distressed companies without access to debt markets: the median leverage of companies
issuing PIPEs is only 7.2%, and 93% of all companies do not have credit rating. When such
firms issue PIPEs, they offer shares to the market at a large discount.
The model derived in this paper assumes that companies without PE-ownership always
have access to debt capital markets. Therefore, the assumption that such companies do not
issue equity to pay required debt payments in distress is consistent with empirical evidence
discussed above.

3.3. How PE buyouts are structured and why it is important
PE firms are famous for disclosing as little information as possible about their business,
and even the information that is sometimes scarcely available should be properly adjusted
in order to lead to meaningful conclusions. Two aspects of the structure of a PE-buyout
are particularly important for the analysis in this paper: 1) the fact that the majority of
money that the PE pays in the buyout is structured as shareholder loans, and is reflected
as debt on company’s balance sheet, and 2) a complicated parent-subsidiary structure that
PE firms create on top of the companies they acquire. This Section discusses these two
issues in detail, the proper way to account for them, and why results could be misleading
if the specifics of these two issues are ignored.
A. Shareholder loans
A textbook definition of a buyout says that a PE finances the deal by taking some bank debt
and investing their own money. In reality, only a small portion of the PE money comes in a
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form of equity, and the majority comes in a form of debt that is called shareholders loans.10
To be precise, the PE still controls the majority of company’s shares - usually above 80%;
the way this is achieved is that company’s old shares are purchased using external debt and
shareholder loans, and canceled, and a small number of new shares is issued, which the PE
buys for a small price. In case when company’s management participates in the buyout
(which is usually the case), they also mostly receive shareholders loans and a small number
of shares.
To illustrate this, consider an example of a company Buckingham Bingo, an operator of
bingo clubs in the UK, that was acquired by a PE firm Alchemy Partners in December 2005.
The total deal value was approximately £118mln, of which £56mln was a loan from Barclays
bank. The remaining £62mln was provided by the Alchemy Partners and the company’s
management. Of the £62mln, only £1mln was paid for company’s shares, and the remaining
£61mln were structured as shareholder loans, which were called subordinated debt and loan
notes in this particular case. Figure ?? shows the balance sheet of the company in the first
annual report that the company filed; both forms of loans - from Barclays bank and from
the Alchemy Partners - are treated as debt.
Shareholder loans are structured as debt for accounting purposes, and have some nominal
features of a debt security, such as interest expenses, maturity, and seniority over some
other securities in default. Nevertheless, for all practical purposes shareholder loans should
be treated as equity. The maturity of shareholder loans is usually above ten years, and it
is not uncommon to see shareholder loans with maturity after the year 2050. There are
interest expenses associate with shareholder loans, but they are almost always structured
as payment-in-kind, which means that interest expenses are added to the face value of
shareholder loans every year instead of being paid out. In fact, because large amount
of bank debt is usually used to finance buyouts, companies are restricted from making
any payments on shareholder loans - including interest expenses - before the bank debt
10

Shareholder loans is a collective name that I use for the rest of the paper to refer to money that PE
provided to finance the buyout that was structured as debt. In reality, shareholder loans have all types of
names, such as loan notes, bond notes, institutional loans, deep discounted bonds, or supermezzanine debt.
Confusingly, debt from private debt providers may also be called this way, and I was carefully to make
sure that debt that I identify as shareholder loans is actually the money that was given by the PE and not
someone else.
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Figure 21: Example of a balance sheet of a PE-backed company

Company Buckingham Bingo, an operator of bingo clubs in the UK, was acquired by a PE firm Alchemy
Partners, in December 2005. Balance sheet in the 2008 annual report shows total liabilities of £131mln,
but further notes show that half of the securities in the liabilities are issued to Alchemy Partners.

is repaid. Furthermore, shareholder loans are usually junior unsecured, which means that
they are only senior to equity in case of bankruptcy. Since the PE itself is the holder of
the shareholder loans, the company will never default on the shareholder loans. It is quite
often that shareholder loans are partially or completely written off or converted into equity
if company’s financial position deteriorates.
In fact, most companies controlled by PE are pretty straightforward that the majority of
liabilities on their balance sheet are not real. Here is how one such company, All3Media,
acquired in 2007 by a PE firm called Permira, describes the shareholder loans in its first
annual reports:
“The bulk of investment from Permira and management is through unsecured
Subordinated Preference Sertificates (“SPC’s”) which carry a rolled up interest
coupon with all interest and principal only repayable in 2016 or on sale or listing of the Group. These are treated as debt instruments and account for over
£20.2 of the accrued interest costs but do not represent a cash flow strain on
the company”
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It is an open question why PE firms structure their stake in a form of shareholder loans
rather than equity. One such reason might be that interest expenses on shareholder loans
are subtracted from the pre-tax profit on the income statement, and can potentially reduce
the amount of taxes the company pays. Tax-laws, however, are complicated, and not
all interest expenses on shareholder loans are tax-deductible. In particular, at least one
company was discussing in its annual report that it had legal disputes with HM Revenue
& Custom (agency responsible for tax collection in the UK) regarding the tax relief that
the company claimed for “interest payments on certain loans”. Another reason is that
shareholder loans allow the PE to be formally considered a creditor, albeit a very junior, in
bankruptcy proceedings, and participate in negotiations with company’s other creditors.
The preference of PE firms to structure their money as shareholder loans, and the fact that
shareholder loans are formally considered as debt on the balance sheet, should significantly
affect how the information that is reported by PE-backed companies is analyzed. Start
with the income statement. Because shareholder loans have interests - usually very big the amount of interest expenses that companies claim they pay on the income statement
significantly overestimates what they actually pay. An average company in my sample
claims that interest expenses make up 64% of its gross profit (EBITDA), while the actual
interest expenses they pay are 2.5 times as small (27% of EBITDA).
Furthermore, interest expenses on shareholder loans that companies claim but do not pay
create a problem with analyzing information from company’s balance sheet: liabilities constantly grow year-over-year because interest expenses on the shareholder loans are rolled
up to their face value. Furthermore, in cases when company’s performance deteriorates,
shareholder loans can be reevaluated, converted into equity, or written off - partially or
completely. That affects the balance sheet value of both liabilities and shareholders’ equity,
without any actual cash flow from investors.
Not only the original PE-investment is structured in a form of shareholder loans, but also
the subsequent equity injections by the PE take this form. Moreover, the dividends that
PE-backed companies pay to the PE are also structured as a repayment of shareholder
loans, or payment of interest expenses on shareholder loans. In contrast, what sometimes
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appears as dividends on the cash flow statement is usually dividends to join ventures or to
the minority shareholders11 .
To be completely clear, shareholder loans and interest expenses on shareholder loans are by
far not the only features that make the analysis of PE-backed companies complicated. For
instance, buyouts usually have large transaction costs - of the order of millions of pounds.
Oddly enough12 , PE-backed companies capitalize transaction costs on the balance sheet - as
goodwill on the left-hand side and as liabilities or shareholders equity on the right-hand side
- and amortize them later on. This paper specifically focuses on the cash flows between the
company and its investors, and so I carefully examine shareholder loans for each company
I consider (see the data description section below). However, any further analysis of PEbacked companies should adjust for other specifics of PE-buyouts depending on the focus
of the analysis.
B. Parent-subsidiary structure
The second important issue of every PE-buyout is the structure of the acquisition. In
order to finance an acquisition, the PE create a complicated vertically integrated parentsubsidiary chain of holding companies. The PE ultimately controls the company at the top
of the structure, and the company at the bottom of the structure acquires and controls the
target company, which is then called the operating company. Companies in the middle issue
different types of securities to investors, and the money they raise is transferred through
inter-company loan down the structure to finance the buyout. Of the companies that issue
securities and receive money from investors, those that are closer to the bottom of the chain
(and, therefore, closer to the operating company) issue securities with higher seniority. For
instance, the company closest to the operating company issues bank debt, company slightly
above issues corporate bonds (if corporate bonds are used to finance the structure), the
company closer to the top issues shareholder loans, and the company at the very top issues
equity.
11

Minority shareholders are shareholders of companies, in which the PE-backed company controls more
than 51% of the stake but less than 100%
12
Though I have to admit I do not know if companies that are not controlled by PE do a similar thing
with transaction costs
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There are different reasons why PE firms prefer to follow such obscure structure. Taxoptimization is certainly one of the reasons, according to industry professionals. Other
than that, I saw several companies, for which some of the intermediary holding companies
were established outside of the UK, and the company later expanded the business to those
regions. The fact that holders of senior debt prefer to be closer to the bottom of the chain
implies that bankruptcy considerations are another factor. This later point is supported
by Ayotte (2019), who theoretically shows how complex levels of company structure arise
when investors disagree about the value of assets that back loans.
Understanding the parent-subsidiary structure is important to properly analyze the business
of PE-backed companies. Conceptually speaking, the acquired company is liable for the debt
that was used to finance the buyout: its cash flow is used to repay the debt, and its assets
are used as the collateral. Nevertheless, the balance sheet of the acquired company does not
change much following the buyout13 because, formally, debt is issued by one of the parent
companies. Every company in the chain files their own annual report after the buyout, with
their own balance sheet and income statement.
Therefore, it is not the target company that should be analyzed, but all companies in the
chain collectively. Fortunately, UK laws require that at least one company files a consolidate
report for the whole group. The consolidated report shows all securities that are issued by
any member of the group, and all money earned and spent. Therefore, it is the company
that files consolidate reports that should be analyzed, and not the operating company, or
any other individual company in the chain.
There is one big advantage, for research purposes at least, of the parent-subsidiary structure.
A new company is incorporated for every buyout, and the company begins the annual
reporting from scratch. This means that every dollar that is used for the buyout - whether
that dollar comes from a bank, a private debt provider, the PE, or company’s managers is reflected on the balance sheet of the new company, and nothing else is. Therefore, by
adding up the values of all securities on the balance sheet of the company based on the
13
To be precise, it does change significantly, but mostly because most things on the balance sheet are
reevaluated.
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first report it files, it is possible to recover the value of the company at acquisition, which
otherwise would not necessarily be publicly available.

3.4. Empirical results
3.4.1. Sample selection and data sources
Preqin and UK companieshouse
This paper focuses on PE-backed companies incorporated in the UK because all companies in the UK14 - public and private - are required to file annual reports. These reports,
with some rare exceptions, include balance sheet, income statement, and cash flow statement, and, thus, allow to see how companies are being managed after they are acquired
by private equity firms. Scanned versions of these reports are publicly available on the UK
companieshouse web-site.15
I use Preqin database to construct an initial sample of companies. The focus of this paper
is on buyouts, and, therefore, I filter the Preqin sample to exclude all deals that are not
classified as buyouts or public-to-private transactions. In particular, VC (Venture Capital)
and PE-growth deals are excluded. Only deals, in which the acquired company is in the
UK, and in which the PE-sponsor has already exited the company, are included. Deals, in
which the PE controls the company for less than a year are only included if the acquired
company published at least one report while it was controlled by the PE. I take the following
information from Preqin: the name of the acquired company, the name of the PE firm, the
dates of investment and exit, and the type of exit.
The resulting Preqin sample has 2174 deals. Each deal represents one company, from the
year it is bought by a PE, and until the year the PE exits the company. Some deals involve
the same company, in case one PE sells the company to another PE, or in case the same
company is bought several times in different years.
Buyouts have an obscure structure, with a lot of tax-optimization and financial engineering
14
15

Generally everywhere in Europe, though UK in particular is the focus of this research
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/companies-house
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involved, as explained in the previous section, and as is also discussed below. Due to the
level of complexity, simple aggregation of reported information is misleading, and so each
deal that is studied in this paper is analyzed individually. Naturally, it required a lot of
time and efforts, and instead of analyzing the whole sample of 2174 deals, I only analyzed a
subsample of 410 deals. To ensure representativness of the subsample, names of all acquired
companies were sorted alphabetically and analyzed from top down. While I skipped some
deals, the eventual subsample is representative of the full Preqin sample, as Table 12 shows.
The analysis of deals is based on the annual reports filed by the acquired companies, and
information from the reports was corroborated by news articles in some cases. In order to
obtain the reports, I matched names of acquired companies as reported in Preqin to the
UK companieshouse web-site. Preqin only reports approximate names, and the legal names
might be slightly (or significantly) different, i.e. All3Media vs. All3Media Holdings Limited,
or Amtech vs. DeFacto 1731 Limited. Furthermore, as discussed in the previous Section, a
whole parent-subsidiary structure is created to finance the acquisition, and all companies in
the structure have similar names. Therefore, I manually search for each company on the UK
companieshouse web-site, and then identify the ultimate parent company that published the
consolidated financial reports.
Once a company is matched to the UK companieshouse web-site, I see its tax-identification
number. The tax-identification numbers can be used to link companies to the AMADEUS
database, which has some of the information from the reports. I rely on AMADEUS data
for some of the variables that are later used in the analysis, such as sales or SIC number.
Nevertheless, the majority of information is manually collected, by a company called Qynn,
and by two research assistants and I.
Acknowledging the support of Qynn
Established in 2017, Qynn provides in-depth financial analysis, research and data on UK
companies. The data within Qynn is generated from a number of public data sources including several UK Government Departments which Qynn then aggregates to create proprietary
information and insight on 5.5 million UK companies stretching over 20 years. With more
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Table 12: Sample of companies in Preqin vs. analyzed in this paper
Panel A: Industries

whole sample
sample in this paper

whole sample
sample in this paper

Consumer
& Retail

Industrials

Business
Services

Information
Techn.

Healthcare

Telecoms &
Media

Food &
Agriculture

24.2% (526)
22.2% (91)

23.4% (508)
20.6% (84)

15.1% (329)
16.2% (66)

11.9% (259)
8.4% (34)

8.3% (181)
10.1% (41)

5.2% (114)
6.1% (25)

4.5% (98)
4.7% (19)

Energy &
Utilities

Materials

Clean
Techn.

Real Estate

Infrastructure

Unspecified

Total

2.9% (63)
3.7% (15)

1.6% (34)
1.5% (6)

1.1% (24)
2.2% (9)

0.8% (17)
0.7% (3)

0.7% (16)
3.2% (13)

0.2% (5)
0.3% (1)

2174
407

Panel B: Exit type

whole sample
sample in this paper

Trade Sale

SBO

Default/
Restruct.

Sale to
mngm.

IPO

Unspecified

Other

42.4% (921)
40.9% (167)

26.7% (581)
35.3% (144)

3.9% (84)
4.2% (17)

3.17% (69)
2.9% (12)

2.5% (54)
3.2% (13)

16.5% (358)
6.9% (28)

4.9% (107)
6.6% (27)

Panel C: PE-sponsors (top 7 in the whole sample)

whole sample
sample in this paper

LDC

CVC

3i

Equistone

Livingbridge

Cinven

Graphite

4.0% (98)
5.9% (27)

3.3% (81)
0.9% (4)

3.0% (74)
3.5% (16)

2.9% (70)
4.6% (21)

2.1% (52)
1.8% (8)

1.8% (43)
0.9% (4)

1.7% (42)
1.1% (5)

Panel D: Investment year

whole sample
sample in this paper

before 1990

1990-1999

2000-2003

2004-2007

2008-2011

2012 - 2015

after 2015

4.0% (88)
0% (0)

14.2% (309)
9.6% (39)

15.5% (336)
15.7% (64)

31.1% (677)
32.1% (131)

20.1% (437)
21.8% (89)

13.2% (288)
18.1% (74)

1.8% (39)
2.7% (11)

Panel E: Exit year

whole sample
sample in this paper

before 1990

1990-1999

2000-2003

2004-2007

2008-2011

2012 - 2015

after 2015
& no data

0.6% (13)
0% (0)

4.1% (89)
1.5% (6)

4.7% (103)
4.7% (19)

18.7% (406)
20.6% (84)

14.6% (317)
13.5% (55)

25.9% (563)
30.4% (124)

31.5% (683)
29.4% (120)

Panel F: Investment length

whole sample
sample in this paper

< 1 years

1-2 years

3-4 years

5-6 years

7-8 years

9-10 years

>10 years
or no data

1.2% (27)
0% (0)

15.6% (340)
14.0% (57)

25.4% (553)
33.3% (136)

23.4% (509)
28.2% (115)

13.3% (290)
15.7% (64)

5.7% (123)
3.7% (15)

15.3% (332)
5.1% (21)

Panel G: Size in USD mln (based on Preqin)

whole sample
sample in this paper

<1

1-50

50-100

100-200mln

200 - 1000

> 1000

no data

0.3% (6)
0% (0)

24.5% (532)
22.3% (91)

10.1% (220)
13.2% (54)

9.3% (202)
15.0% (61)

11.5% (251)
15.4% (63)

3.5% (77)
2.9% (12)

40.8% (886)
31.1% (127)

This table shows how a sample of PE-led buyouts analyzed in this paper compares to the sample of all PE-led buyouts
in the UK, based on the information from Preqin database. Only 410 buyouts are analyzed because the analysis of
each requires a long of data hand-collection. “whole sample” refers to all 2174 buyouts, and “sample in this paper”
refers to 408 transactions analyzed in this paper. Numbers in the table show the fraction of deals in a specific category,
and numbers in brackets show the number of deals in that category; for instance, 526 deals in the whole sample are
in the Consumer & Retail industry, which makes 24.2% of all deals in the whole sample. In Panel B, “Trade Sale” is
the exit type, in which the PE sells the company to another company; “SBO” is the exit type, in which the PE sells
the company to another PE. Panel C has PE that have the most deals in the whole sample.

than 100 million data points a week being added to the system, Qynn updates in real time.
Qynn’s help was mostly used to collect the data that is reported in a standardized form
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in annual reports and is incorrectly classified by other data providers. One good example
is the interest expenses paid by companies with PE-ownership. As the previous subsection discusses, shareholder loans have massive interest expenses that are recorded on the
company’s income statement, but are rarely paid to the holders of shareholder loans. By
analyzing the data from the statement of cash flows instead of the income statement, Qynn
was able to identify the interest expenses that were actually paid, and separate those from
PIK-structured interest expenses on the income statement.To show the significance of this
adjustment, the accrued interest expenses that an average company in the sample reports
are 2.4 times larger than the interest expenses it pays.
In total, Qynn was able to provide 30,685 data points to help with this research against
a total of 407 UK companies at an average of 75 points per company. In addition, Qynn
also identified a small, but significant number of instances where annual accounts had been
presented, and then later restated.
Manually-collected data
Many important aspects of the structure and financing of buyouts are reported in a way
that does not allow for automatic analysis, and, hence, required the careful reading of the
reports. Therefore, I, with the help of two research assistants, examined the reports and
hand-collected specific information. First, we studied the balance sheet of each company to
identify which securities are actual external debt, and which securities are shareholder loans.
In some cases it was easy, when the company explicitly discussed the holders of the securities
it issued (as in the example of Figure 21). In other cases, companies did not explicitly say
that certain loans were provided by the PE, but it was clear from other discussions in the
report.16 In other cases, especially for larger transactions (i.e. transactions above £1bln),
identifying shareholder loans was harder or even impossible, because there were too many
securities on the balance sheet. For instance, company Debenhams was acquired by a group
of Private Equity firms in 2003 in a £1.7bln public-to-private transaction. The first report
filed by this company shows the following securities on the balance sheet: three types of
16

For instance, the company could discuss that it received £10mln from its shareholders, and a certain
type of securities increased by £10mln in that year
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senior term loan, property mortgage, deep discounted bonds, and high yield notes, with
no further explanation.17 For some of such cases, including the Debenhams buyout, we
found news articles that discussed the transaction and how much debt was used to finance
it; using these news articles, we were able to identify the shareholder loans on the balance
sheet based on which securities added up in value to the correct amount.
The second type of information we hand-collected is the flow of external financing between
the company and its investors, in years following the buyout but before the PE exited the
company. In particular, we collect information on how much external debt is issued and
repaid every year, how much money the company receives from the PE, and how much
money the company pays to the PE. There are two types of payments that companies
make to the PE. The first is what would traditionally be considered as dividends. These
payments are not structured as dividends, though, and instead take a form of repayment
of shareholder loans and/or accrued interest expenses on shareholder loans. This type of
payments we always observe and record.
The second type of payments is what’s collectively called monitoring fees. Monitoring fees
can take different forms; for instance, the PE may appoint several directors to the company’s
board, and charge annual payments for their service (in addition to the salary that is paid
directly to the directors). Monitoring fees do not always exist, and, similar to interest
expenses on shareholder loans, they sometimes accrue instead of being paid. Monitoring
fees appear early on the income statement, usually as a part of COGS or SG&A expenses.
Theoretically, companies are required to disclose all such payments, but there seem to be
cases, in which there is no information about such fees, even though the fees were likely paid.
It is, therefore, possible, that we sometimes underestimate the frequency of the monitoring
fees. Nevertheless, as the following Section shows, these fees are much smaller than other
payments the company makes to the PE.
At last, we manually collect information about the exit value for deals that ended with the
company being sold by a PE to another PE. This type of exit is the second most common
exit type in my sample, constituting 35% of all exit types. The reason why the exit value
17

All these securities are shown in liabilities. Money raised by selling shares is less than £5mln
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can be computed for these deals and not for others is because, as discussed in the previous
Section, a new chain of holding companies is created for every buyout. The first consolidated
report filed by the ultimate parent company of the new group, therefore, allows to back out
the buyout amount. Therefore, by finding the new ultimate parent of the company after it
is sold by one PE to another, we can find the value that was paid for the company. This is
generally not possible for other exit types.
Comparison with companies without PE-ownership
Understanding how companies with PE-ownership operate is important because of the large
number of companies that are owned by private equity firms. Equally important, however,
is understanding how companies with and without PE-ownership are different from each
other. The problem with comparing two group of companies is the endogenous nature of
PE-ownership: private equity firms do not choose acquisition targets randomly. Therefore,
any difference between companies with and without PE-ownership can be attributed to the
presence of the PE-owner, as well as to unobserved factors that influenced the decision of
private equity firms to buy certain companies.
One approach to partially address the selection bias would be to analyze a group of comparable companies - that is, a group of companies without PE-ownership that are similar
based on observed characteristics to the sample of companies with PE-ownership. In the
context of private equity, however, such approach is, at best, complicated, and can often
be misleading. First, private equity firms extensively study potential target companies before the buyout, and analyze large amount of public and private information. Most of this
information - think of customer concentration, supply chain management, or quality of the
management team - is company-specific and rarely observable, and, hence, cannot be conditioned on in making a comparable group. Variables that are observable by a researcher,
such as size, sales growth, or profitability, in practice explain less than 10% of the selection
choice.
Second, numbers reported by companies with and without PE-ownership are not readily
comparable before appropriate adjustments. As discussed in the previous section, some
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of the accounting practices of PE-backed companies are unusual. For instance, intangible
capital constitutes 60% of the total value of assets, on average, among companies with
PE-ownership. Therefore, matching companies using book value of assets, or any moment
that involves the book value of assets (such as profitability), is a statistical exercise before
one understands what goes into intangible capital, or how intangible capital evolves over
time. Intangible capital is one example; many other adjustments that companies with PEownership make should be taken into account before a reasonable group of comparable
companies can be constructed.
In the absence of a clear group of matched companies, I compare companies with PEownership to two very broad group of companies: 1) all companies in COMPUSTAT Global
that are incorporated in the UK (referred as “UK” companies later in the paper), and 2)
all companies in COMPUSTAT North America (referred to as“ US” companies later).18
I acknowledge that there is a limit to how much can be concluded from comparing these
two group of companies, and, therefore, “US” and “UK” numbers are mostly interpreted
as a benchmark in the following subsections. Nevertheless, even though the two group of
companies are different, it does not mean that they are completely incomparable. Where
appropriate, regressions include year fixed effects and company or industry fixed effects,
to account for the fact that private equity firms target unevenly target certain companies.
Furthermore, it is often clear, at least qualitatively, what other factors and to what extent
can account for the observed difference between the two group of companies.
At last, all hand-collected data about companies with PE-ownership that is used in this
paper is publicly available on the author’s web-site. This makes it easy for anyone with
specific views on the direction of the selection bias to compare the group of companies in
this paper against another group of companies.
18

Both for the period between 2000 and 2019.
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3.4.2. Capital structure and external financing
A. Buyout leverage
According to the UK accounting rules, securities are added to the balance sheet at the value
that the company receives when it issues them. Therefore, I measure deal size by adding up
the values of external debt, shareholder loans, nominal value of shares, and share premium,
as shown in the first report filed by the company post-buyout. Since, as discussed in the
previous Section, a new parent company is created for the purpose of buyout, all securities in
its first report were issued to finance the buyout, meaning I do not occasionally overestimate
the deal value19 by considering securities that could have been issued by the company before
the buyout. To measure the buyout leverage, I divide the amount of external debt (i.e. all
debt excluding shareholder loans) in the first report by the deal amount.
PE-backed companies are significantly less levered than traditionally thought. As Table 13
indicates, the average leverage in a PE-transaction is only 41%, and the median leverage is
43%. To put it into perspective, there are as many companies with leverage below 5% (40
companies), as companies with leverage above 65% (42 companies).
The data shows that larger deals have greater leverage. As follows from Table 13, the
average and median leverage increase by roughly 10 percentage points if the deal size is
restricted to be above £100mln, and even more if the deal size is restricted to be above
£200mln. Nevertheless, the mean and median leverage are below 60% even among deals that
are larger than £200mln. It is not infrequent to see large transaction that have very small
amount of debt; for instance, PE firm Epiris acquired a footwear producer Beaconsfield
Footwear in 2015 for approximately £165mln with only £40mln of debt.
There is s substantial time-variation in leverage values. Deals that were financed prior to
the 2008 financial crisis used more debt than deals financed during or after the crisis, and
the difference in leverage is roughly 10-15 percentage points. A part of the time-variation
in leverage values, especially when deals are broken down into size groups, can likely be
19
To be precise, the value of these securities might be affected by what happens between the buyout and
the date report is filed, which are, on average, seven month apart. I discuss later how this can affect the
results.
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explained by the fact that I do not correct deal size for inflation. Therefore, deals above
£100mln prior to 2008 are larger than deals above £100mln after 2011; as noted above,
larger deals have greater leverage. The time-variation in leverage is also consistent with
the argument of Axelson, et. al (2008) that economy-wide credit conditions determine the
buyout leverage. Nevertheless, leverage rarely exceeded 60% even before 2008.
The results about average leverage seem to be in contrast with findings of other authors,
most of whom report that the leverage of PE transaction is usually above 60%. A number
of factors could contribute to the fact that the value of leverage I find is lower than what
other authors find.
First, I might underestimate the leverage value because companies file the first report some
time after the buyout, on average eight month. Therefore, I do not observe the portion
of debt that was used to finance the buyout and repaid during this period. This probably
does not affect results much, because the majority of debt that is used to finance buyouts is
structured in a way that only a small fraction of it is repaid annually.20 . More importantly, I
might also overestimate the value of shareholder loans (and, therefore, the total deal value)
by the amount of interest expenses on shareholder loans that accrue to the face value over
the period after the buyout and before the first report is filed.
It is unlikely, however, that debt repayments and interests on shareholder loans in the
first seven months after the buyout can fully account for the difference in average leverage
in this paper and in other papers. Another problem might be coming from the nature of
databases that are frequently used to study the capital structure of buyouts. Several papers
used AMADEUS database, but as the previous subsection discusses, AMADEUS does not
distinguish between external debt and shareholder loans. In fact, as Figure 22 illustrates,
the average and median leverage increase by 20 percentage points if measured incorrectly,
by divining reported debt by the total value of assets, as reported in the first post-buyout
year.
LPC/Dealscan is another database that is sometimes used to study the leverage of LBO
20

That does not include interest payments, which are usually quarterly, but do not change the face value
of debt
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Table 13: Leverage
Panel A: Size

size

mean

q25

q50

q75

min

max

N

£133.5 mln

£23.0 mln

£50.8 mln

£120.3 mln

£3.6 mln

£4.4 bln

410

Panel B: Leverage

whole period
all companies
size > £50mln
size > £100mln
size > £200mln
years 2011 - 2019
all companies
size > £50mln
size > £100mln
size > £200mln
years 2008-2010
all companies
size > £50mln
size > £100mln
size > £200mln
years 2000-2007
all companies
size > £50mln
size > £100mln
size > £200mln
before 2000
all companies

mean

q25

q50

q75

N

40.9%
46.3%
49.7%
51.7%

28.6%
34.7%
39.9%
41.1%

42.7%
47.2%
52.9%
57.3%

55.7%
59.9%
63.1%
63.5%

410
206
125
66

30.3%
36.6%
38.2%
41.1%

15.7%
29.7%
30.1%
30.2%

32.2%
36.7%
39.9%
40.8%

41.1%
41.1%
42.3%
50.5%

118
53
32
15

36.6%
39.4%
44.2%
45.7%

23.5%
23.9%
33.8%
37.0%

38.8%
42.4%
42.9%
42.9%

46.9%
54.3%
56.3%
56.1%

85
46
26
12

49.6%
55.3%
57.9%
58.5%

42.5%
46.8%
50.9%
52.9%

51.2%
58.2%
60.6%
62.5%

62.3%
64.8%
66.2%
66.5%

171
91
58
25

43.9%

34.6%

49.3%

55.9%

36

Panel C: Comparison with the LPC/Dealscan database
leverage, whole period
in LPC
in LPC & size >
£50mln
in LPC & size >
£100mln
in LPC & size >
£200mln
size, whole period
all companies
in LPC

51.3%

40.6%

52.6%

62.1%

89

52.7%

41.3%

54.4%

63.0%

81

53.5%

41.3%

55.7%

63.7%

61

53.2%

43.2%

55.8%

64.3%

35

£133.1mln
£290.0mln

£22.9mln
£90.5mln

£50.5mln
£147.0mln

£119.8mln
£287.5mln

410
89

All numbers in this table are computed based on the first report that a company files after the buyout, which is
usually six month after the buyout. Size is the amount of money paid to acquire the company, and is inferred from
the sum of the value of all securities issued to finance the buyout. Leverage is the ratio of company’s debt to the
buyout size, and company’s debt is computed as the sum of all securities that were issued to parties other than the
PE and company’s management (most often to banks, more rarely to private debt providers and to public investors).
LPC/Dealscan is a database that is often used to study the leverage of PE-buyouts.“in LPC” refers to deals in the
sample, which also have information in the LPC/Dealscan database. q25, q50, and q75 refer to the corresponding
quantiles of the distribution, and N is the number of observations.

transactions. LPC/Dealscan has reliable information about external debt (i.e. debt only
includes external debt, and does not include shareholder loans), but, as most authors ac103

Leverage
in afrom
PE-buyout
Figure 22: Leverage based
on the data
several commonly-used databases
67.8%
62.7%

40.6%

42.2%

mean

median

correct values

51.3%

52.6%

mean

median

based on
LPC/Dealscan

mean

median

based on Bureau
Van Dijk data

The first pair of bars shows the mean and median values of leverage in PE-buyouts based on the manually collected
data (in total, 410 deals). Refer to text, and also notes to Table 13, for details of how leverage is computed. The
second pair of bars uses the same information, but restricts the sample to those deals that also have information about
debt issuance in the LPC/Dealscan database (in total, 89 deals). The third pair of bars restricts the original sample
to those deals that also have information in the AMADEUS database (in total, 381 deals). In addition, AMADEUS
data (total debt and total assets), rather than hand-collected data, is used to compute the leverage for the third pair
of bars. See text for the discussion of the difference between values in the first, second, and third pair of bars.

knowledge, it has a selection bias towards larger deals with more debt. Indeed, among 410
companies in my sample, only 76 are also in the LPC/Dealscan database and have information about debt issuance in the buyout year21 , and these companies have significantly
higher average leverage than other companies.
B. Debt management post-buyout
In order for the PE to earn money on their investments, one of the two things should happen.
Either their portfolio companies should reduce the amount of debt that was used to finance
the buyout in the first place, or the value of the company should increase. This and next
sections analyze the empirical evidence in favor and against both of these alternatives.
A textbook description of the life-cycle of a PE-backed company states that company’s cash
flow is primarily used to repay the debt that was used to finance the buyout; by the time
21

Other 50 companies are in the LPC/Dealscan database but have no records about debt issuance in the
year when the buyout happens, and other 300 companies are not in the database.
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the PE exits the company, all or most of the debt is repaid, therefore, naturally increasing
the value of equity and generating “healthy” returns on equity capital.
The data does not support this narrative. To show this, I compute how the value of debt
on the balance sheet of PE-backed companies changes year-over-year. As Table 14 shows,
PE-backed companies have more debt by the time the PE exits the company than what
they had at the time of the buyout. On average, the value of debt grows by 20% between
the acquisition and the exit years, from 41% relative to the deal value in the acquisition
year to slightly less than 50% in the exit year. This big increase in leverage is mostly driven
by smaller companies; yet, even large companies do not reduce their amount of debt.
Furthermore, in the majority of cases, the debt that is used to finance the buyout is not
even structured to be repaid out of the company’s cash flow. Aside from interest expenses,
only a small portion of the debt has any face value repayments before the maturity. The
maturity, in turn, is usually more than five years after the buyout, implying that it exceeds
the expected exit time of the PE that usually plan to exit the company withing three-five
years. Having said this, most of the debt that is used for acquisition has a clause that says
that the debt should be immediately repaid in case of the PE sells the company to a new
owner.
Even though the absolute amount of debt that PE-backed companies have increases, the
overall leverage - that is the value of debt over the value of the company - seems to go
down, at least for those companies, for which the exit value is known. For this subset of
companies, I compute the leverage in the exit year, which is the value of debt the company
has in its last year divided by the value at which it is sold to the new owner, vs. the leverage
in the buyout. As Table 14 shows, the leverage at exit is only 26%, down 16 percentage
points from the acquisition year. All in all, among the two alternatives that say that the
PE generate money by repaying the debt vs. by increasing the value of the assets, the first
has very little support in the data.
The fact that the PE-backed companies start and finish with roughly the same amount of
debt implies that they either have static capital structure, or that they issue and repay
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Table 14: Debt management
PanelA: Amount of debt several years after the acquisition (relative to the original deal size)

all companies
acquisition year
exit year
size > £50mln
acquisition year
exit year
size > £100mln
acquisition year
exit year
size > £200mln
acquisition year
exit year
companies with known exit value
acquisition year, D0 /V0
exit year Dend /V0
exit year, Dend /Vnew

mean

q25

q50

q75

N

41.2%
49.5%

29.2%
20.1%

43.1%
39.4%

55.8%
61.5%

388
388

46.6%
50.1%

34.7%
26.7%

47.4%
45.3%

59.9%
62.9%

196
196

49.8%
49.4%

39.9%
28.4%

51.9%
48.7%

63.1%
66.2%

120
120

51.5%
52.3%

41.4%
35.4%

56.3%
51.1%

63.3%
66.8%

65
65

41.1%
60.5%
25.9%

28.3%
29.4%
10.6%

42.2%
44.9%
18.4%

52.9%
67.7%
30.4%

107
107
107

Panel B: Frequency of follow-on debt issuance

all companies
size > £50mln
size > £100mln
size > £200mln

1

2

3

≥4

0

N

112
52
30
19

78
44
28
16

40
20
16
6

38
20
12
9

120
60
34
15

388
196
120
65

Panel C: Total size of follow-on debt issuance (for companies with at least one debt issuance)

all companies
rel. to original
rel. to original
size > £50mln
rel. to original
rel. to original
size > £100mln
rel. to original
rel. to original
size > £200mln
rel. to original
rel. to original

mean

q25

q50

q75

N

deal size
debt amn.

51.7%
575.1%

7.4%
18.9%

24.6%
60.5%

65.6%
178.7%

268
256

deal size
debt amn.

42.3%
188.7%

6.3%
13.1%

22.2%
49.1%

65.9%
148.4%

136
133

deal size
debt amn.

40.8%
100.8%

6.3%
12.0%

22.9%
49.4%

65.7%
136.2%

86
84

deal size
debt amn.

36.4%
100.9%

6.2%
13.3%

21.5%
49.1%

62.9%
109.0%

50
49

Numbers in the table are based on acquisitions, in which the PE controls the company for at least two years. q25,
q50, and q75 denote corresponding quantiles of the distribution, and N shows the number of observations. Panel A
compares the amount of debt that a company has in the year when it is acquired by a PE (acquisition year), and
when it is sold by the same PE (exit year). companies with known exit value only include companies that are sold
from one PE to another, as exit value is not known for most other transactions. Follow-on debt issuance is any debt
issuance that happens after the buyout year. In Panel B, frequency of follow-on debt issuance is the number of years
that have non-negative debt issuance (excluding the acquisition year but including the exit year if debt is issued in
the exit year). “0” is the number of companies that issue no debt after the buyout year. In Panel C, only companies
that have at least one follow-on debt issuance are considered. Total size of follow-on debt issuance is the amount of
money received from all follow-on debt issuances, normalized by either the buyout size, or by the amount of debt
issued to finance the buyout. Debt repayments are not included in the calculation, and numbers are not discounted
if a company has several follow-on debt issuances. Some buyouts are financed with no debt (original debt amount is
0), which explains the mismatch in the last column of Panel C.
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roughly the same amount of debt. Further analysis of the data shows that the capital
structure of PE-backed companies is anything but static.
PE-backed companies frequently issue debt following the acquisition year. In fact, as Table
14 shows, almost 70% of companies issue debt at least one more time, and more than 40%
of companies issue debt at least twice. This pattern is consistent among small and large
companies, with 72% of companies with the value above £100mln, and 68% of companies
with the value below issuing debt at least once after the buyout year.
The size of the follow-on debt issuance is also significant. For each company, I compute the
total amount of debt that it issues over all years following the acquisition year (excluding
the acquisition year). For an average company that issues debt at least once after the
acquisition year, the total additional debt that it issues exceeds 50% of the original deal
value. More strikingly, it is almost six times as large as the amount of debt issued to
finance the buyout, though this is probably driven by companies which issued very little
debt originally. Yet, for the median company the total additional amount of debt issued
after the acquisition year is still 60% of the debt amount issued to finance the buyout.
Every time a company issues a significant amount of debt, it usually discusses the rationale
in its annual report. Some of the reasons that companies often mention include one of the
following. First and foremost, the loan that the PE and the bank agree on to finance the
buyout usually includes the CAPEX and/or working capital facility, which are not fully
drawn down at the time of the acquisition, but are available to the company down the road.
If the company decides to take on that debt later, it is shown on the cash flow statement
as debt issuance. Second, as the following section shows, PE-backed companies frequently
acquire other companies, and debt is often issued to finance these follow-on acquisition.
Third, companies sometimes refinance their original debt, by taking on new debt - often
from a different bank - and fully repaying the old debt. Debt refinancings usually happen
when credit conditions improve, and often come together with what is called dividends
recapitalization, when a part of the proceeds from new debt issuance go to pay dividends
to the PE.
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Table 15: Debt issuance by companies with PE-ownership post-buyout
Amount of debt added
I
distress
t-stat
acquisitions
t-stat
CAPEX
t-stat
debt repaid
t-stat
debt added
t-stat
money from the PE
t-stat
money to the PE
t-stat
cash flow
t-stat
sales growth(t−1)→t
t-stat
log(DealValue)
t-stat
deal leverage
t-stat

∗

0.02
(1.74)
0.58∗∗∗
(26.10)
0.40∗∗
(14.04)
0.71∗∗∗
(24.83)

Amount of debt repaid

Change in debt

II

III

IV

V

VI

−0.01
(−0.42)
0.47∗∗∗
(4.13)
0.30
(1.56)
0.63∗∗∗
(7.23)

−0.00
(−0.50)
−0.33∗∗∗
(−15.92)
−0.18∗∗∗
(−7.46)

−0.00
(−0.21)
−0.32∗∗∗
(−3.25)
−0.13
(−0.95)

0.01
(1.22)
0.58∗∗∗
(26.70)
0.38∗∗∗
(13.46)

−0.01
(−0.41)
0.51∗∗∗
(4.37)
0.26
(1.40)

0.47∗∗∗
(24.83)
0.38∗∗∗
(12.43)
−0.21∗∗∗
(−6.93)
0.13∗∗∗
(5.63)
0.00∗
(−1.71)
−0.00∗
(−1.69)
0.09∗∗∗
(6.12)

0.43∗∗∗
(6.98)
0.44∗∗∗
(5.38)
−0.21∗∗∗
(−2.64)
0.15∗∗
(2.29)
0.00
(−1.26)

−0.50∗∗∗
(−13.50)
0.63∗∗∗
(19.39)
−0.19∗∗∗
(−6.71)
0.00
(1.23)
0.01∗∗∗
(2.84)
−0.06∗∗∗
(−3.13)

−0.57∗∗∗
(−5.71)
0.69∗∗∗
(6.69)
−0.31∗∗∗
(−3.20)
−0.00
(0.83)

−0.41∗∗∗
(−10.84)
0.62∗∗∗
(18.89)
−0.14∗∗∗
(−4.88)
0.00
(1.24)
0.01∗∗∗
(2.70)
−0.03∗
(−1.86)

−0.43∗∗∗
(−4.06)
0.68∗∗∗
(7.01)
−0.27∗∗∗
(−3.23)
0.00
(0.36)

N

1270

1270

1270

1270

1270

1270

Year FE
Company FE

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

Regressions are based on company-year observations from 351 companies for years when they were controlled by PE.
Observations from the first year are always excluded; that is, if a company is acquired and controlled by a PE for three
years, only observations from the second and third years are included in the regressions. LHS variable is: I and II)
the amount of debt issued (positive if debt is issued and zero otherwise), III and IV) the amount debt repaid (positive
if debt is repaid and zero otherwise), V and VI) difference between issued and repaid debt.“distress” is a dummy
variable that equals one if company’s cash flow is below interest expenses. “money from the PE” shows the amount
of money the company receives from the PE. “money to the PE” shows the amount of money paid by the company
to the PE. ”“Sales growth” measures sales growth between the current and the previous year. “DealValue” is the
amount that was paid for the company at the time of buyout, and “deal leverage” is the fraction of the deal value
that was financed by debt. All variables, except sales growth, log(DealV alue), deal leverage, and dummy variables,
are based on the information from the cash flow statement, and are scaled by the deal value. “debt added”, “debt
repaid”, “money from the PE”, “money to the PE”, and sales growth are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. Positive
values of “acquisitions”, “CAPEX”, and “debt repaid”, and ”money to the PE” indicate cash outflows; that is, debt
repaid of 10 implies that debt value decreased. Positive value of “debt added” and “money from the PE” indicate
a cash inflow, that is, debt added of 10 implies that debt value increased. Specifications II, IV, and VI, have errors
clustered at the company-level. ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.

C. Flows between the company and the PE
The presence of shareholders’ loans, and more generally the tendency of PE-backed companies to structure their stake as debt rather than equity, has implications for how the
flow of money between the company and the PE should be analyzed. In the majority of
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cases when the PE injects additional equity into the company, it is structured as new shareholders’ loans. Similarly, whenever there are some dividends paid, they are structured as
repayments of shareholders’ loans or repayments of accrued interests on shareholders’ loans.
In addition to receiving the money from PE in a form of shareholders loans, PE-backed
companies very often report some small proceeds from equity issuance. These proceeds
usually come from the company’s management. Very often, PE-led buyouts involve the
managers of the company; usually the managers pay for their shares at the time of the
buyout, but sometimes they do it later, and that is reflected as proceeds from equity issuance
on the cash flow statement.
Distinguishing the money coming from the PE and from the management is important:
equity injections by the PE indicate that the company needs external financing as well
as more generally gives information about the role of the PE in managing the company.
Shares issued to the management tell very little about whether the company needs external
financing. Therefore, when I describe the frequency of the transfer of money between
the company and the PE below, I only count issuance and repayment of loan notes. At
the same time, when I describe the total amount of money provided in a form equity, I
count issuance of both new equity and loan notes. Even though issuance of shares to the
management constitutes the vast majority of all instances of equity issuance in number, they
are still orders of magnitude smaller than the combined amount of money that companies
receive from the PE in a form of equity, in those rare cases when the PE stake is structured
as equity.
PE-backed companies often receive additional financing from the PE: as Table 16 indicates,
almost 45% of PE-backed companies received some additional money from the PE at least
once after the acquisition year. Bigger companies receive money from the PE more often, though not by much: among companies than are smaller than £100mln, 41% receive
additional PE money vs. 48% among companies larger than £100mln.
The amount of equity injections is also big. An average company, which receives money
from the PE at least once, receives the amount of money that equals 28% of the original
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Table 16: Eequity injections
Panel A: Frequency of follow-on equity injections

all companies
size > £50mln
size > £100mln
size > £200mln

1

2

3

≥4

0

N

89
51
26
14

47
23
11
10

23
14
10
5

9
4
4
2

220
104
62
34

388
196
120
65

Panel B: Total size of follow-on equity injections (for companies with at least one equity injection)

all companies
rel. to original
rel. to original
size > £50mln
rel. to original
rel. to original
size > £100mln
rel. to original
rel. to original
size > £200mln
rel. to original
rel. to original

mean

q25

q50

q75

N

deal size
eq. amn.

28.1%
69.9%

4.2%
7.4%

10.7%
20.9%

28.6%
50.5%

168
168

deal size
eq. amn.

18.4%
71.5%

3.5%
6.7%

9.3%
19.0%

22.7%
43.7%

92
92

deal size
eq. amn.

20.8%
96.4%

2.8%
6.8%

8.8%
19.8%

22.5%
44.9%

58
58

deal size
eq. amn.

27.2%
59.2%

3.2%
6.8%

6.2%
14.8%

22.5%
74.7%

31
31

Panel C: Total money flow between the company and the PE

all companies (N = 388)
total flow 6= 0
total flow > 0
total flow < 0
size > £50mln (N = 196)
total flow 6= 0
total flow > 0
total flow < 0
size > £100mln (N = 120)
total flow 6= 0
total flow > 0
total flow < 0
size > £200mln (N = 65)
total flow 6= 0
total flow > 0
total flow < 0

N

fraction

mean

q25

q50

q75

275
127
148

70.9%
32.7%
38.2%

-14.1%
25.1%
-47.7%

-19.2%
5.6%
-0.4%

-0.7%
11.7%
-17.7%

10.1%
27.1%
-40.8%

136
67
69

69.4%
34.2%
35.2%

-1.8%
18.2%
-21.2%

-16.2%
4.1%
-3.0%

-0.1%
9.3%
-15.3%

9.3%
22.8%
-31.4%

82
43
39

70.9%
35.8%
32.5%

-0.1%
19.1%
-22.4%

-17.0%
3.9%
-2.9%

0.2%
8.7%
-18.6%

9.3%
21.9%
-34.4%

44
23
21

67.7%
35.4%
32.3%

1.5%
21.9%
-21.0%

-14.4%
3.9%
-1.9%

0.6%
7.9%
-18.6%

8.6%
21.9%
-34.4%

Numbers in the table are based on acquisitions, in which the PE controls the company for at least two years. q25, q50,
and q75 denote corresponding quantiles of the distribution, and N shows the number of observations. Follow-on equity
injection is any transfer of money from the PE to the company that happens after the acquisition year, but does not
include small but frequent inflows of money from stock compensations (see text for details). In Panel A, frequency of
follow-on equity injections is the number of years that have non-negative equity injections (excluding the acquisition
year but including the exit year if there is an equity injection in the exit year). “0” is the number of companies that
receive no equity injections after the buyout year. Total size of follow-on equity injections is the amount of money
received across all follow-on equity injections, normalized by either the buyout size, or by the amount of equity issued
to finance the buyout. Dividends and/or other repayments are not included in the calculation, and numbers are not
discounted if a company has several follow-on equity injections. In Panel C, total money flow is the total size of
follow-on equity injections minus any money paid by the company to the PE in a form of interests expenses and/or
repayments of shareholder loans: negative total money flow means the company pays more money to the PE than
what it receives from the PE, positive total money flow means the company receives more money from the PE than
what it pays to the PE, and zero total money flow means that company neither pays, nor receives any money from
the PE between the acquisition and exit years. Total money flow does not include small monitoring/service fees that
companies sometimes pay to the PE, see text for details.110
total flow 6= 0 only shows numbers for companies that have
non-zero total money flow, and similar for total flow > 0 and total flow < 0.

buyout value, or 70% of the original equity value. The distribution of these additional
equity injections is very skewed, with a few firms receiving a lot of money, and many firms
receiving smaller amount. Indeed, as Penal B of the Table 16 indicates, that three quarters
of companies receive the amount of money from the PE that is below the mean.
I do not systematically collect information on why the PE provides additional financing to
the company. Nevertheless, based on my reading of the reports, companies usually mention
two potential reasons why they receive money from the PE. First, they would sometimes receive money for follow-on acquisitions. Follows-on acquisitions are usually financed through
debt issuance, but if a company has several follow-on acquisitions throughout the course of
several years, the later follow-on acquisitions are usually financed by the money that the
PE provides. This observation seems to indicate that the PE-backed companies have some
target leverage.
The second - very frequent and important reason - explaining why the PE gives money to the
company is rescue in distress, when the PE would provide money to the company because
company’s cash flow is not enough to make required debt payments. This is usually - though
not always - accompanied by changes to the debt structure of the company. It seems likely
that in cases like this the PE renegotiates company’s debt with creditors. An example is
useful here; company Amtico International was acquired by the PE firm ”AAC Capital” in
an approximately £100mln transaction financed by different forms of debt. As usual, there
were certain covenants associated with the debt that was used for the acquisition, and the
company breached those covenants in 2009. Here is what the company reports in its 2009
annual report:
“On 13 November 2008, deep discounted bonds with an issue price of £30,024,000
were transferred by the registered holder, ABN Amro Bank MV, to AAC Capital
Nebro Fund I LP, the majority investor, for a consideration of £41,637,000. The
deep discounted bonds were then repaid and redeemed by AAC Capital Nebro
Fund I LP through the issue of PIK loan notes with a value of £41,637,000. ”
The direct equity injections of the type that I observe is not the only way for PEs to
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Table 17: Money flow between the company and the PE
Money flow:

PE → company:
dummy

PE → company:
amount

company → PE:
amount

I

II

III

IV

V

VI

VII

VIII

distress
t-stat
acquisitions
t-stat
CAPEX
t-stat
debt issued
t-stat
debt repaid
t-stat
cash flow
t-stat
sales growth(t−1)→t
t-stat
log(DealValue)
t-stat
deal leverage
t-stat

0.17∗∗∗
(4.90)
0.48∗∗∗
(6.93)
0.26∗∗
(2.81)
−0.06
(−1.26)
0.22∗∗
(2.54)
−0.03
(−1.05)
0.01
(0.81)
0.03∗∗
(3.15)
0.04
(0.71)

0.12∗∗
(2.50)
0.45∗∗∗
(2.92)
0.05
(0.46)
−0.08
(−0.92)
0.45∗∗∗
(3.41)
−0.09
(−1.06)
0.00
(0.01)

0.04∗∗∗
(5.45)
0.24∗∗∗
(14.50)
0.06∗∗∗
(2.60)
−0.04∗∗∗
(−4.01)
0.18∗∗∗
(8.90)
0.00
(0.67)
0.00∗∗
(2.48)
0.00
(1.25)
0.00
(0.05)

0.04∗∗∗
(2.79)
0.25∗∗∗
(2.77)
0.02
(0.50)
−0.03
(−1.08)
0.23∗∗∗
(3.06)
−0.01
(−0.65)
0.00
(0.04)

0.01
(0.74)
−0.12∗∗∗
(−6.97)
−0.05∗∗
(−2.14)
0.11∗∗∗
(9.35)
0.06∗∗∗
(2.66)
0.09∗∗∗
(11.92)
0.00
(0.66)
0.00
(0.33)
−0.07∗∗
(−4.49)

0.00
(0.16)
−0.13∗∗
(−2.09)
−0.08
(−1.49)
0.09
(1.24)
0.06
(0.90)
0.02
(0.56)
−0.00
(−0.18)

0.04∗∗∗
(3.94)
0.36∗∗∗
(17.39)
0.11∗∗∗
(3.92)
−0.15∗∗∗
(−11.38)
0.13∗∗∗
(5.18)
−0.07∗∗∗
(−8.20)
0.00
(1.50)
0.00
(0.80)
0.06∗∗∗
(3.58)

0.04∗∗
(2.10)
0.37∗∗∗
(5.07)
0.10
(1.31)
−0.12
(−1.24)
0.17∗
(1.80)
−0.03
(−0.66)
0.00
(0.30)

N

1270

1270

1270

1270

1270

1270

1270

1270

Year FE
Company FE

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

Net flow

Regressions are based on company-year observations from 351 companies for years when they were controlled by PE.
Observations from the first year are always excluded; that is, if a company is acquired and controlled by a PE for
three years, only observations from the second and third years are included in the regressions. LHS variable is: I and
II) dummy variable showing whether there is an inflow of money from the PE to the company in a given year, III
and IV) the amount of money the PE provided to the company in a given year (positive if there is equity injection
and zero otherwise), V and VI) the amount of money paid by the company to the PE (positive if there is a payment
and zero otherwise), VII and VIII) money given by the PE to the company minus the amount of money paid by the
company to the PE (positive if the company receives more money than pays, negative if pays more than receives, and
zero if neither). Amount of money paid by the company to the PE does not include monitoring fess that companies
sometimes pay to the PE. LHS variables for specifications III - VIII are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. “distress”
is a dummy variable that equals one if company’s cash flow is below interest expenses. “Sales growth” measures sales
growth between the current and the previous year. “DealValue” is the amount that was paid for the company at the
time of buyout, and “deal leverage” is the fraction of the deal value that was financed by debt. All variables, including
from the LHS, except sales growth, log(DealV alue), deal leverage, and dummy variables, are based on the information
from the cash flow statement, and are scaled by the deal value. Positive values of “acquisitions”, “CAPEX”, and
“debt repaid” indicate cash outflows; that is, debt repaid of 10 implies that debt value decreased. Positive value of
“debt issued” indicates a cash inflow, that is, debt issued of 10 implies that debt value increased. Specifications II,
IV, VI, and VIII have errors clustered at the company-level. ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level.

provide equity to the company. What also happens sometimes is the PE may attempt to
repurchase the public debt of the company, if public debt was used to finance the buyout in
the first place. This would usually happen if company’s financial position deteriorates after
the buyout, and price of debt falls as the result. By repurchasing company’s debt, the PE
effectively reduces the indebtedness of the company and helps it recover its financial health.
Since such transactions are off-balance sheet, there is no way of learning about them from
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annual reports of companies.
To further investigate the capital flows between the PE and the company, I construct the
money flow variable. This variable adds up all money that is provided by the PE to the
company, and subtracts the money paid by the company to the PE, every year after the
acquisition year (excluding the acquisition year) and before the company exits the company.
The positive money flow means that the PE invests more money into the company than what
it receives from it before selling the company, and negative flow means that the company
pays more money to the PE. Zero money flow means that there is no transfer of money
between the company and the PE.
As it turns out, there is almost the same number of companies with negative, positive,
and zero money flows: 33% of companies receive more money from the PE than what they
pay to the PE, 38% pay more than what they receive, and 29% neither pay no receive any
money from the PE. Surprisingly, as the size of the company increases, fewer companies have
negative money flow (pay money to the PE), and more companies have positive money flow
(receive money from the PE). Among companies smaller than £100mln, 41% have negative
money flow and 31% have positive money flow, while among companies larger than £100mln
36% of companies have positive money flow, and 33% of companies have negative money
flow.
The evidence about money flow completely refutes one of the traditional stories of the
PE business. It is often argued that the PEs prioritize short-term gains over long-term
benefits of their portfolio companies, and use every single opportunity to squeeze out all
the resources withing the company to benefit their shareholders. This is not true: not only
PEs do not take away company’s resources, they are actively contributing resources to the
company.
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Table 18: Unconditional statistics about investments
Panel A: Size of CAPEX
relative to sales
mean
q25
q50
q75
N

relative to EBITDA

relative to cash flow

PE

UK

US

PE

UK

US

PE

UK

US

7.7%
1.2%
2.9%
7.2%
1709

10.4%
1.1%
2.9%
7.1%
23857

14.5%
1.7%
3.9%
10.7%
121117

39.1%
7.0%
22.8%
50.4%
1715

30.5%
3.7%
19.0%
45.9%
23850

35.0%
0.9%
22.5%
53.9%
120954

35.5%
6.2%
23.4%
48.9%
1666

34.4%
1.4%
21.2%
57.4%
23838

44.7%
-0.3%
27.9%
73.6%
120970

Panel B: Size of follow-on acquisitions (for observations with non-zero acquisitions)
relative to sales
mean
q25
q50
q75
N

relative to EBITDA

relative to cash flow

PE

UK

US

PE

UK

US

PE

UK

US

13.3%
0.5%
2.6%
12.6%
450

15.4%
0.5%
2.6%
9.9%
6629

15.2%
0.5%
2.7%
11.0%
41048

64.0%
2.4%
20.1%
70.5%
450

57.9%
2.2%
16.2%
61.7%
6628

57.9%
1.6%
13.7%
62.2%
41017

79.5%
2.8%
21.6%
72.7%
434

71.4%
1.6%
18.7%
78.2%
6628

75.2%
1.4%
16.5%
81.2%
41005

Panel C: Frequency of follow-on acquisitions
size > £50mln

all companies
mean
q25
q50
q75
N

size > £200mln

PE

UK

US

PE

UK

US

PE

UK

US

13.3%
0.5%
2.6%
12.6%
450

15.4%
0.5%
2.6%
9.9%
6629

15.2%
0.5%
2.7%
11.0%
41048

64.0%
2.4%
20.1%
70.5%
450

57.9%
2.2%
16.2%
61.7%
6628

57.9%
1.6%
13.7%
62.2%
41017

79.5%
2.8%
21.6%
72.7%
434

71.4%
1.6%
18.7%
78.2%
6628

75.2%
1.4%
16.5%
81.2%
41005

“US” refers to the data from COMPUSTAT North America, and “UK” refers to the data from COMPUSTAT Global
for companies that are headquartered in the UK. Observations with sic in the range 6000-6999 (financial services and
institutions), with sic above 9000 (public administration), and with assets or sales below one million are excluded.
“PE” refers to the main sample of companies in this paper. For all companies, CAPEX and acquisition numbers are
taken from the cash flow statements. Numbers in Panel A are winsorized at 0.5% and 99.5% values. Panel B only
includes company-year observations for which acquisition value is positive and not missing. Additionally, Panel B
excludes all observations in the acquisition year for “PE” companies. In Panel C, frequency of acquisitions for “US”
and “UK” companies is the number of years, for which the acquisition value is not zero and is not missing, divided
by the total number of years that the company is in COMPUSTAT. Acquisition frequency is computed similarly for
“PE” companies, except that the acquisition year is always excluded; for instance, if a company is controlled by a PE
for three years, and it has an acquisition in the second year, but not the third year, acquisition frequency is 0.5. q25,
q50, and q75 refer to corresponding quantiles of distribution, and N denotes the number of observations.

3.4.3. Investments and performance
A. Investments
There are two types of investments that companies report: usual capital expenditures,
which most companies have every year, and infrequent but large acquisitions. Companies
report these two types of investments separately on the cash flow statement, as CAPEX and
acquisitions. While CAPEX size is probably correctly reflected on the cash flow statement,
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a word of caution should be mentioned about acquisitions. The cash flow statement only
reflects the actual amount of money paid for acquisitions, which in some cases may underestimate their actual size for two reasons. First, if a portion of the acquisition is financed
through equity (that is, the target company receives shares in the new company), the equity
amount will not be reflected on the cash flow statement. Second, if a company with some
amount of debt is acquired, and debt is not repaid during the acquisition, then only the part
paid in cash will be shown on the cash flow statement. Both of these concerns are negligible
in the case of PE-backed companies: additional acquisition are almost never paid for by
giving an equity stake in the new company to the owners of the acquired company, since
the PE prefers to have concentrated control in their portfolio company. Furthermore, in my
experience of reading through the annual reports, companies acquired through follow-on
acquisition rarely have debt, and whenever they do have debt, it is usually repaid during
the acquisition.
Table 18 shows how the size of CAPEX and acquisitions is different between companies with
and without PE-ownership. The results suggest that if there is any difference in the size
of investments between companies with and without PE-ownership, it is probably small.
Indeed, the Table implies that CAPEX is greater for US-based companies without PEownership when CAPEX is measured relative to sales and the cash flow, but smaller when
CAPEX is measured relative to EBITDA. Acquisitions follow a similar pattern: they are
slightly smaller for US- and UK-based companies without PE-ownership when measured
with respect to EBITDA and cash flow, but are slightly smaller when measured relative to
sales.
What is different, however, is the frequency of having an acquisition. I measure acquisition
frequency for each company without PE-ownership as a fraction of years with positive
acquisition amount relative to the number of years the company has data for. I measure
acquisition frequency for PE-backed companies similarly, with the exception that for each
company in my sample I exclude the first year (that is, if a company is in my sample for five
years, I measure acquisition frequency as the number of years with non-negative acquisition
between years 2-5, and divide that by 4). I do not include the first year of observation for
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Table 19: Conditional statistics about investments
LHS variable: CAPEX
PE

PE
∗∗∗

US
∗∗∗

US
∗∗∗

UK
∗∗∗

UK

cash flow(t - 1)
t-stat
distress
t-stat
leverage
t-stat
log(Size)
t-stat

−0.11
(−7.24)
0.01
(1.32)
0.00
(0.33)
0.01∗∗∗
(5.63)

0.01
(0.45)
0.00
(0.70)

0.05
(36.87)
−0.01∗∗∗
(−14.61)
0.02∗∗∗
(23.03)
−0.00∗∗
(−2.06)

0.02
(9.87)
−0.00∗∗∗
(−3.37)

0.04
(14.87)
−0.00
(−0.27)
0.02∗∗∗
(9.71)
0.00∗∗∗
(5.84)

0.02∗∗∗
(5.44)
−0.00
(−0.75)

Year FE
Company FE
N

Yes
No
1379

Yes
Yes
1379

Yes
No
99064

Yes
Yes
99064

Yes
No
20011

Yes
Yes
20011

PE

PE

US

UK

UK

LHS variable: Acquisitions
∗∗

US
∗∗∗

∗∗∗

∗∗∗

cash flow(t - 1)
t-stat
distress
t-stat
leverage
t-stat
log(Size)
t-stat

0.06
(2.26)
0.01
(0.86)
0.02
(1.07)
0.01∗∗∗
(4.24)

0.08
(1.40)
0.01
(0.51)

0.02
(14.07)
−0.01∗∗∗
(−9.42)
0.01∗∗∗
(14.41)
0.00∗∗
(9.27)

0.02
(12.51)
−0.00∗∗∗
(−3.11)

0.01
(4.29)
−0.01∗∗∗
(−5.08)
0.01∗∗∗
(4.24)
0.00∗∗∗
(2.99)

0.01∗∗∗
(4.09)
−0.00∗∗∗
(−2.70)

Year FE
Company FE
N

Yes
No
1379

Yes
Yes
1379

Yes
No
99064

Yes
Yes
99064

Yes
No
20011

Yes
Yes
20011

“US” refers to the data from COMPUSTAT North America, and “UK” refers to the data from COMPUSTAT Global
for companies that are headquartered in the UK. Observations with sic in the range 6000-6999 (financial services and
institutions), with sic above 9000 (public administration), and with assets or sales below one million are excluded.
“PE” refers to the main sample of companies in this paper. Observations from the first year of PE-control are
excluded; that is, if a company is acquired and controlled by a PE for three years, only observations from years two
and three are used in the regressions above. LHS for the first six regressions is company’s capex normalized by the
assets value for US and UK companies, and normalized by the deal value for PE companies. LHS variable for other
six regressions is the amount of acquisitions normalized by the assets value for US and UK companies, and by the
deal value for PE companies. Deal value is the amount that was paid for the company at the time of the buyout.
“CFt−1 ” is the cash flow in the previous period, scaled by the total value of assets for US and UK companies, and by
the deal value for PE companies. “distress” is a dummy variable which shows whether company’s cash flow is below
the level of interest expenses. Leverage is book value of debt over the book value of assets for US and UK companies,
and the fraction of deal value that was financed by debt for E companies. Size is the log of assets value for US and
UK companies, and log of the deal value for PE companies. LHS variables, and “CFt−1 ” are winsorized at 1% and
99% levels. “Y. FE” and “C. FE” indicate year- and company- fixed-effects. Regressions with company fixed-effects
also have errors clustered at the company-level. ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

PE-backed companies because it always has a positive acquisition amount, which simply
reflects the original buyout.
The data shows that PE-backed companies have follow-on acquisitions much more often than
companies without PE-ownership. A company in the UK on average has one acquisition
every five years, and a company in the US has one acquisition every three and a half years.
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At the same time, a PE-backed company in the UK has one acquisition as often as once
every two and a half year.
Furthermore, the follow-on acquisitions are more frequent for larger companies, and more
so for companies with PE-ownership. Among PE-backed companies with size larger than
£200mln, half have at least one acquisition every two years - twice as often as companies
without PE-ownership in the UK and the US. One concern might be that there is some
mechanical effect because PE companies exit larger companies earlier (and, therefore, the
denominator would be smaller for frequency calculation). This is not the case - the median
exit time is four years for all companies, and also a group of companies that are larger than
£50mln, larger than £100mln, larger than £200mln, while mean exit time is 4.7 years, 4.6
years, 4.6 years, and 4.5 years respectively.
It is possible that numbers above overestimate the actual frequency of PE-backed companies to have positive acquisitions. Sometimes, when PE-backed companies acquire other
companies, they do not pay the whole acquisition amount right away, but schedule deferred
payments, which may sometimes depend on the performance of the acquired company. In
case they later make the deferred payment, it is reflected as an acquisition on company’s
cash flow statement, and I count it as a new acquisition, therefore, increasing the frequency of acquisitions. I do not think, however, that this can explain the big difference
in the acquisition frequency between companies with and without PE-ownership. First of
all, these deferred acquisition payments are not scheduled often. Second, it might be the
case that companies without PE-ownership also extend the payment for acquisitions, which
would mean that the acquisition frequency is also overestimated for companies without
PE-ownership; implicit evidence suggest that it’s indeed the case, as the average size of an
acquisition is similar between companies with and without PE-ownership, as indicated by
the Table 18.
D. Performance
To study the performance of PE-backed companies, I analyze two measures. First, how
operating performance, measured by the growth rate of sales and EBITDA, of PE-backed
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companies is different from the operating performance of companies without PE-ownership.
Second, I study how the market value of PE-backed companies change when they are managed by the PE.
As Table 20 shows, companies with PE-ownership grow faster than other companies: the
median sales growth rate is 10.2% for PE-backed companies, and is between 6% and 7% for
companies without PE-ownership. Similarly, the median growth of PE-backed companies
is 8.6%, and median growth rate of EBITDA is between 4% and 6% for companies without
PE-ownership. While average numbers are also greater for PE-backed companies, they are
not reported because of a big number of outliers, for which the average growth rate exceed
1000%.
To partially account for the fact that private equity firms unevenly invest in companies
in certain industries over the business cycle, Panel B runs a regression that controls for
industry and year fixed effects. Because of the outliers, sales growth and EBITDA growth
are winsorized in Panel B: sales growth is winsorized at 0.5% and 99.5% values, and EBITDA
growth is winsorized at 5% and 95% values, which correspond to EBITDA growth of -179%
and 236%. Regressions confirm the results in the previous paragraph: the average sales
growth is 25% higher for PE-backed companies than for US-based companies, and is 20%
higher than for UK-based companies. Similarly, the average EBITDA growth is 12% higher
for PE-backed companies than for US-based companies, and 11% higher than for UK-based
companies.
There are two known factors that correlate with operating growth: size and leverage. Large
companies grow slower than small companies, and companies with high leverage grow slower
than companies with small leverage. In order to account for the effect of size and leverage,
Panel B also shows results for the regression, in which proxies for size and leverage are used.
For PE-backed companies, size is measured as the log of the buyout value, and for companies
without PE-ownership size is measured as log of assets value. Similarly, leverage for PEbacked companies is measured as buyout leverage, and leverage for companies without
PE-ownership is measured as the book value of debt over the book value of assets.
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Table 20: Operating performance
Panel A: Summary statistics about operational performance
Sales growth
PE
Failed Deals
US
UK

EBITDA growth

q25

median

q75

q25

median

q75

-0.3%
-1.9%
-5.6%
-4.6%

10.2%
4.3%
6.1%
7.2%

29.9%
15.9%
21.7%
25.8%

-23.5%

8.6%

46.4%

-26.6%
-29.1%

4.5%
5.8%

32.3%
36.8%

Panel B: Statistics controlling for year and industry growth
LHS variables: Sales growth
PE
Failed Deals
UK
size
leverage
Year FE
Industry FE
R2

∗∗∗

0.25
−0.06
0.05∗∗∗

Yes
Yes
1.2%

∗∗∗

0.14

−0.01
−0.05∗∗∗
Yes
Yes
2.9%

LHS variables: EBITDA growth
∗∗∗

0.14

−0.01∗
−0.05∗∗∗
−0.03∗∗∗
Yes
Yes
3.0%

0.12∗∗∗

0.11∗∗∗

0.11∗∗∗

0.01∗

0.01
−0.01∗∗∗

Yes
Yes
1.1%

Yes
Yes
1.1%

0.00
−0.01∗∗∗
−0.03∗∗∗
Yes
Yes
1.1%

In Panel A,“US” refers to the data from COMPUSTAT North America, and “UK” refers to the data from COMPUSTAT Global for companies that are headquartered in the UK. In Panel B, “UK” and “PE” refer to dummy variables
that equal one for this type of companies (variables for US are included, but dummy for “US” is dropped because of
col linearity). Sales growth and EBITDA growth have many outliers, and so not mean values are reported in Panel
A. In Panel B, sales growth is winsorized at 0.5% and 99.5% values, and EBITDA growth is winsorized at 5% and
95% values (correspond to -179% and 236% values). ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Neither the proxy for size, nor for leverage are great, mainly because they are marketbased for PE-backed companies, and accounting-based for all other companies. Moreover
there is no time-variation in size and leverage proxies for PE-backed companies (since for
each PE-backed company there is just one buyout price, but several sales growth values),
but there is time-variation in both size and leverage proxies for companies without PEownership. Nevertheless, it is possible, at least qualitatively, to estimate the direction of
mismeasurement, which is discussed below.
In regressions that control for size and leverage, average growth rate of PE-backed companies
is still higher than average growth rate of companies without PE-ownership: by 14% for
sales growth and by 11% for EBITDA growth. What is the likely effect of measuring
leverage and size differently for companies with and without PE-ownership? Leverage of
PE-backed companies is measured with an upward bias, since the buyout leverage is used
for every time-period, but leverage on average falls, as Section 3.1 shows. Therefore, the
growth rates of sales and EBITDA would probably be even higher for PE-backed companies
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Table 21: Example of IRR calculation, Ambasador Theatre Group buyout
Y2010
purchase price
debt issued
debt repaid
equity issued
dividends
selling price

£127,312

CF to/from investors
IRR

-£97,312
34.2%

Y2011

Y2012

Y2013

£77,500
-£1,553

-£2,200

-£18,368

-£64,505

-£3,412

-£11,442

£5,612

Y2014

£406,093
£18,368

£406,093

This table shows how IRR is measured based on the buyout of Ambassador Theatre Group in 2010 by Exponent
Private Equity and subsequent sale to Providence Equity Partners in 2014. Every year, except the first and last
years, the total cash flow to investors is computed as the sum of debt repaid (positive) and issued (negative), plus all
other securities repaid (positive) and issued (negative), plus any dividends or interest expenses that were actually paid
(positive). The first year cash flow is the total acquisition value with a negative sign; the last year cash flow is the total
exit value with a positive sign. Cash flows do not include 1) small monitoring fees that companies sometimes pay to
the PE-sponsor, and 2)small proceeds from equity issuance that result from stock compensations, 3) any transaction
costs. All numbers in the table are in thousands.

than for other companies if leverage was measured consistently.
Mismeasurement of size has two effects on the results, which go in the opposite directions:
1) market values of assets are usually higher than book value of assets, implying that size is
overestimated for PE-backed companies, 2) assets of PE-backed companies grow over time,
but buyout values are used as a proxy for size, implying that size is underestimated. Since
the regression coefficient on size is negative, the first effect implies that operating growth of
PE-backed companies is overestimated, and second effect implies that it is underestimated.
One can try to roughly estimate the first effect quantitatively: taking average market-tobook ratio of three, the sales growth would need to be adjusted down by 0.05∗log(3) = 5.5%,
and EBITDA growth would need to be adjusted down by 0.01∗log(3) = 1.1%. Both numbers
- sales growth and EBITDA growth - would still remain significantly higher than the growth
rates of companies without PE-ownership in the US and UK.
Ideally, one would include other controls in the regression that could potentially be correlated with operating growth, to see if the effect of the PE-ownership still remains significant
in the regression. This is not feasible, however, given that the data for PE-backed companies
is very limited.
The second way to analyze the performance of PE-backed companies is to study how their
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market value changes while they are controlled by the PE. Since the value is only observable
at the dates of buyout and exit, it is natural to use the internal rate of return (IRR). IRR
is usually measured on the equity stake of the company (that is, IRR that the PE-sponsor
earns), but I instead focus on the IRR of the whole company to eliminate the effect of
leverage and study how the value of the whole company changes. To compute IRR, I
take distributions to/from all company’s shareholders (the private equity firm, managers,
external debt providers, etc.), and take the whole company value at the times of buyout
and sale. The interpretation of the IRR is, therefore, the constant rate of return that an
investor would earn if she held both debt and equity of the company. Under the conditions
of Modigliani-Miller, one could interpret the IRRs as the annual growth rate of company’s
value if the company had zero leverage.
Table 21 shows an example of how IRR is computed, which is based on the buyout of
Ambassador Theatre Group by Exponent Private Equity in November 2009, and the subsequent sale of the company to Providence Equity Partners in November 2013. In 2009,
the company was acquired for approximately £125mln, which was structured as £124.5mln
shareholder loans and £0.5mln equity. No external debt was used to finance the acquisition,
but debt was issued in the subsequent year, and shareholder loans were partially repaid.
Every year, except the first (2010) and final years (2014), cash flow to investors is measured
as total distributions to investors from the company (repayment of debt/shareholder loans,
interest expenses or dividends) minus all external financing that the company receives from
investors (new debt, equity or shareholder loans). The value in the first year is the value at
which the company is acquired, and value in the last year is the value at which the company
is sold. Importantly, the company had an acquisition in year 2011, which does not affect
the calculations of the IRR because the acquisition itself was not a flow of money to or from
investors.
There are two types of distributions that I do not include in the IRR calculation. First, I
do not include monitoring fees, which companies sometimes pay to the PE-owner. These
fees are usually small, are not always reported, and, when reported, it is not always clear
whether they are actually paid or simply added to the balance sheet liabilities. Second, I
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do not include small but frequent equity inflows from share issuance, which usually arise
because of options or shares issued to the employee pension trusts.
There are several important caveats to keep in mind before interpreting the IRR numbers. Most importantly, I only compute IRRs for PE-backed companies, which were exited
through a secondary buyout (the company is acquired by another PE) because the exit
value is not systematically observable for other types of exit. As Section 2 explains, a new
special purpose vehicle (SPV) is created for each buyout, and the SPV begins to publish
annual reports from the date of buyout. It is, therefore, possible to recover the buyout price
from the first report published by the SPV (for the case of secondary buyouts, the buyout
price is the exit price).
What is the direction of the bias in IRR values given that they are only computed for deals
that ended with a secondary buyout? In my sample, secondary buyout is the second most
frequent exit type (35.3% of cases), with trade sale (exit type, in which the company is
sold to another company, 40.9% of cases), default/restructuring (4.2% of cases), and IPO22
(3.2% of cases) being three other most frequent cases. In terms of profitability, at least
from the perspective of returns on equity, IPOs are by far the most profitable, followed by
trade sale, then secondary buyouts, and finally default/restructuring cases.23 Therefore,
computed IRRs might have some downward bias.
There are also some timing problems with how IRRs are measured. Generally, IRRs are
computed as if the buyout happens on the day when the first report is published, and
exit happened exactly one year after the last report is published, which is not always true.
Going back to the example of Ambassador Theare Group in Table 21, periods Y2010 through
22

One could argue that it is also possible to compute the exit value - and, hence, the IRR - for companies,
for which the exit type was default or IPO. For the default cases, for instance, it is tempting to say that
IRR should be -100%, but that is not necessarily true, since IRR is measured on the company rather than
on equity stake of the company. That is, as long as there are some payments to debtholders after the buyout
date and before the default date and/or debtholders recover anything in default, the IRR will be above
negative 100%. For IPO cases, it is indeed possible to recover the exit value, though not always. For 13
companies in my sample that were exited through the IPO, exit value is only available for 8 cases; because
of the small number, they are not included in the analysis.
23
See, for instance, Degeorge, Martin, Phalippou (JFE, 2016). Generally, it is a well-known fact among
PE professionals. One, however, should keep in mind that profitability of exit channels is known from the
perspective of returns of the PE funds, not returns on the company as a whole. The ordering can change
if, for instance, companies with smaller leverage are more likely to be exited through an SBO than a trade
sale.
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Y2014 are assumed to be exactly one year apart from each other. Nevertheless, numbers
Y2010 are taken from the report published on March 27th, 2010, while the company was
acquired - and the price paid - on 9th November 2009. Similarly, numbers Y2014 are taken
from the report published on March 29th, 2014 (by a new SPV), but the company was sold
on November 30th, 2013. To the extent the timing discrepancy affects IRR calculations, the
effect is probably unsubstantial; for instance, the IRR on the Ambassador Theatre Group,
would change from 34.2% to 33.6% if the timing issues were taken into account properly.
Transaction costs are also ignored in measuring IRRs. It is not possible to account for them
because they are not always separately reported, but whenever they are reported, they can
be of the order of 7-12%.
With all these concerns in mind, Table 22 reports the computed IRRs. The average and
median IRR on an investments in a PE-backed company are strikingly big 43.6% and 27.3%.
Values are much higher for small companies, but average IRR is still around 15% even among
companies that were acquired for more than £200 mln. There is substantial variation over
time; IRRs are highest for deals that were closed before 2008 (65% on average), and relatively
lower for companies that were acquired between 2008 and 2010 (22.9%).
Numbers in Table 22 are hard to rationalize by risk-exposure, as there is no indication
that companies with PE-ownership are overly exposed to systematic risk. Companies that
were exited during the crisis period of 2008-2011 do not have overwhelmingly negative IRRs
(average is 28.9%). It is possible that private equity firms were selectively not exiting worstperforming companies in crisis, but that would imply that IRRs should be disproportionately
low for companies that were exited shortly after the crisis, and there is still no sign of very
low returns. One could argue that even though systematic risk is small, it is always possible
to use leverage to increase risk-exposure. This would also be misleading, however, since IRRs
are computed on the whole company, rather than on the equity stake of the company. In
other words, company’s exposure to systematic risks should not be affected by its leverage.
Interestingly, Table 22 indicates that what Preqin classifies as secondary buyout exits also
include some default cases. Specifically, there are 11 cases (10.3%), for which IRR is negative. The median IRR among deals with negative IRR is -20%, which, extrapolated over
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Table 22: IRR on the whole company, across secondary buyout deals
whole period
all companies
size > £50mln
size > £100mln
size > £200mln
deals started before 2008
all companies
size > £50mln
size > £100mln
deals closed before 2008
all companies
size > £50mln
size > £100mln
deals started between 2008 and 2010
all companies
size > £50mln
size > £100mln
deals closed between 2008 and 2010
all companies
deals started after 2010
all companies
size > £50mln
deals closed after 2010
all companies
size > £50mln
size > £100mln

mean

q25

q50

q75

IRR < 0

N

43.6%
33.4%
23.2%
14.3%

15.7%
13.5%
4.5%
-0.9%

27.3%
22.0%
17.1%
15.8%

45.4%
41.2%
33.1%
20.7%

11
7
6
5

107
51
29
17

48.8%
40.4%
19.1%

16.9%
13.5%
2.3%

26.6%
24.9%
21.4%

57.8%
45.4%
32.9%

4
4
4

51
25
16

65.3%
50.0%
21.6%

18.7%
13.5%
5.3%

36.8%
33.0%
21.4%

84.9%
68.2%
45.4%

2
2
2

32
18
10

28.8%
16.9%
15.3%

6.2%
8.9%
4.1%

18.5%
17.1%
14.9%

35.4%
29.4%
25.8%

5
2
1

31
16
8

22.9%

17.1%

24.9%

26.6%

1

7

51.7%
41.8%

24.5%
16.7%

35.6%
25.8%

69.5%
69.5%

2
1

25
10

35.6%
25.8%
26.9%

14.8%
14.7%
3.8%

26.7%
21.3%
15.9%

41.5%
32.8%
35.0%

8
4
3

68
29
15

This table shows the IRR on the company, not IRR on PE-investment. Every year, except for the first and the last
years, the total cash flow to investors is computed as the sum of debt repaid (positive) and issued (negative), plus
all other securities repaid (positive) and issued (negative), plus any dividends or interest expenses that were actually
paid (positive). The first year cash flow is the total acquisition value with a negative sign; the last year cash flow
is the total exit value with a positive sign. IRR equates the discounted stream of these cash flows to zero. IRR’s
are only computed for the set of SBO transaction (the company is sold from one PE to another), since the exit
value is not known for most other transactions (see text for potential selection biases). q25, q50, and q75 denote the
corresponding quantiles of the distribution, IRR < 0 denotes the number of deals with negative IRR, and N denotes
the total number of deals.

five years (typical investments length), means the value of the company falls by 65%. Since
the equity is a levered claim on company’s assets, it is very likely that the PE’s stake is
completely wiped out, even though formal bankruptcy is not triggered. What follows - the
acquisition of the company by another PE - is a common way of how restructuring cases
are resolved.
What do numbers in Table 22 say about returns that private equity firms earn? On one
hand, private equity firms hold equity of the portfolio companies, and so their returns should
be higher. On the other hand, returns of private equity firms are value-weighted among
all their portfolio companies, while Table 22 reports equally-weighted returns (and IRRs of
124

small companies are larger than IRRs of large companies). The overall effect is ambiguous,
and there is no direct way of measuring returns of private equity firms from reports of
portfolio companies because it is not clear what happens to shareholder loans at the time of
exit: sometimes shareholder loans are repaid as a part of the exit price, and sometimes they
are written off, with all value being paid for equity. Furthermore, company’s management
has a stake in company’s equity, and it is not always clear how much.
Overall, results above show two empirical facts: 1) operating performance of PE-backed
companies, measured as growth in sales or EBITDA or cash flow, is higher than that of
other companies, and 2) returns on PE-backed companies - or the rate at which their market
values grow - exceed the values that could simply be explained by risk exposure. While
each of the two facts separately can be explained in a number of equally-plausible ways,
jointly they argue strongly in favor of the fact that private equity firms add value to their
portfolio companies.
First, higher operating growth and higher returns of PE-backed companies are consistent
with the explanation that private equity firms add value to their portfolio companies. For
higher sales growth, it is almost straightforward: if private equity firms added value to
their portfolio companies, one would indeed expect to see them growing faster. It is not
as straightforward with higher returns, though: even if private equity firms added value to
the portfolio companies, one could argue that this should be expected at the time of the
buyout, and reflected in the buyout price. Returns would then adjust so that private equity
firms are only compensated for the risk they take, but not for the operational improvement
that they bring to the company. This type of argument, however, might be misleading in
the context of private equity.
To see why, imagine that there is a kind of operational improvement that only a private
equity owner can implement. The very same company can then have different values depending on whether it is owned by a private equity firm, or by other investors. At the time
of buyout, there is a range of prices on which the old shareholders and the private equity
can agree. As long as the private equity industry in smaller than the rest of the market,
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the buyout should happen at the lowest price of the range.24 This implies that the PE
buys the company at the value that does not reflect future operational improvement, helps
the company implement the improvement, and later sells the company at the higher value,
generating superior returns.
For the argument in the previous paragraph to hold, there should be ways to increase company’s value that are only available to the private equity owner, but not to other non-PE
investors. One such possibility that is supported by empirical evidence is the fact that,
thanks to the PE-sponsor, financial distress is less severe for PE-backed companies. Expectations about the severity of financial distress can, in turn, affect policies that companies
choose even before they fall in the financial distress. For instance, companies may optimally
forgo profitable investments that require debt issuance to be financed, if doing so unreasonably increases their leverage. The model in the following Section shows this mechanism
in action; by simply guaranteeing financial support in case of distress (which is, by the
way, ex-ante and ex-post optimal to both the company and the PE), the PE changes the
investment policies of the company, and increases its value.
There are not that many other explanations that could rationalize the superior returns that
private equity firms generate, and also account for the fact that PE-backed companies have
higher operational growth relative to companies without PE-ownership. As discussed above,
risk-exposure alone is unlikely to explain the whole magnitude of average returns. Similarly, even though there is a bias in the type of companies for which returns are computed
(secondary buyout cases), the selection bias probably understates returns than overstates
them. The only alternative explanation that could explain outperformance of PE-backed
companies is that private equity firms are able to fund significantly undervalued companies.25
24
Some clarification might be needed here. It is true that several PE funds would often try to acquire
the same company, and the ultimate buyer is determined through an auction. One might argue, therefore,
that each PE should bid their highest valuation for the company, and there should be no outperformance
subsequently. This, however, implies that the PEs have no outside options. As long as that is not the case
- and it likely is not the case if the PE industry is smaller than the market - the private equity firm will bid
the price that other non-PE investor would pay for the company.
25
The notion of undervaluation is tricky for private companies, but in the context of this paragraph it
implies that the price that the private equity firm pays for the company is below the expected value of
properly discounted future dividends.
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The hypothesis that private equity firms find undervalued companies, however, does not
explain why PE-backed companies have higher operational growth. In contrast, there is an
asset pricing puzzle, which shows that, at least for public companies, expected returns are
lower among companies with high growth rate. One could argue that private equity firms are
better at predicting the future growth of companies than other investors; they would then
buy companies, for which expected future growth is higher than what company’s existing
shareholders predict, and will have higher superior return. This would imply, however, that
private equity firms understand companies better than their shareholders - which is unlikely.
Generally speaking, it is likely true that, at least partially, the ability of private equity
firms to find undervalued companies explains the outperformance of PE-backed companies.
Indeed, private equity firms mostly buy private companies, and insufficient competition
among buyers could explain why prices they pay could be lower than what they would
be if the company was publicly traded. However, even this mispricing is likely due to
the fact that small private companies face financial constraints, which prevent them from
optimal investments. In this sense, mispricing correction by private equity firms is likely
very different from mispricing correction by hedge funds, which generally do nothing to
companies whose shares they buy.

3.5. Model
This paper models an infinite-horizon economy in continuous time. Markets are complete,
and there is a riskless asset that pays a constant rate of interest r per unit of time26 . In
what follows, P denotes the physical probability measure, and Q denotes the risk-neutral
probability measure in this economy.
A company in the economy is characterized by there state variables: amount of capital K
it has, capital productivity Xt , and interest payments on debt ct . Company’s production
technology has a constant return to scale, and instantaneous profits equal yt = Xt K per unit
of time. Company’s debt is perpetual, which means that the company only pays interest
expenses, but not the face value of debt. At each point in time, the company produces
26

Here and below “per unit of time” means that investors earn approximately r∆t within a short interval
of time ∆t
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cash flow yt and has to pay ct to its debtholders. If yt < ct , the company is in distress,
meaning that it does not have enough cash to pay interest expenses, and has to raise money
externally by either issuing debt or equity; if the company cannot get external financing or
chooses not to, it defaults.
The difference between the cash flow and interest payments (yt − ct ) is taxed at a constant
corporate tax rate τ . If the remainder is positive, the company may invest some of it,
in a way that is described in the following section. If there is still money left after taxes
and investments, it is paid to equityholders as dividends; that is, the company cannot save
money.
Debt allows companies to exploit benefits of tax-shield, but it also comes with cost, both
explicit and implicit. Higher leverage increases the probability of default, and makes further
debt issuance costlier. Moreover, firms with greater leverage invest less, as is shown below.
When choosing the optimal debt policies, companies trade off these costs and benefits.
Capital is traded on the external market, and its price depends on the productivity level:
price of a unit of capital with productivity X is XH, where H is a constant.27 Price of
capital directly affects the costs of investments, and also determines how much of the debt
value debtholders can recover in default.
There are two types of companies in the model, to which I refer as PE-backed, and non-PEbacked companies. The only difference between the two is the type of external financing
that is available to them. PE-backed companies have access to both debt and equity, and
they optimally choose which securities to issue and when. Companies without PE-ownership
cannot issue equity, and only have access to debt. While the assumption that companies
without PE-ownership cannot issue equity is rather extreme, the model would have similar
results if the assumption was instead that all forms of external financing become more
expensive when company’s leverage increases. This assumption is exogenous in the model,
but the following section explicitly discusses it by showing how it can be rationalized, and
27

Price of capital is proportional to X because, as is shown later, the value of the company that can
operate this capital is also proportional to X. In the data, the distribution of market-to-book ratios is
mostly stable, implying that the value of the company cannot diverge from the price of capital over time.
It is also natural to think that high-productive capital has a larger price than low-productive capital
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putting it in the context of available empirical evidence about equity issuance.
I start by describing the investment and financing policies of companies without PEownership. In order to derive the optimal policies, as well as the pricing of debt and
equity, one needs to first derive the processes for the three state variables: dXt , dKt , and
dct . It is assumed that Xt follows Geometric Brownian motion under Q:
dXt
= µdt + σdWt
Xt

(3.1)

The evolution of the other two state variables is endogenous.28 Kt will change because of
company’s investments. ct will change because the company will issue additional debt to finance investments that cannot be financed out of the cash flow, and to cover interest
expenses when the cash flow is not sufficient. Therefore, dKt , and dct should be endogenously determined in equilibrium. For instance, the process for dct is affected by company’s
current and future debt issuance, and, therefore, affects the pricing of debt, which in turn
affects company’s decision to invest, which in turn affects the pricing of debt and the process
for dct . Nevertheless, there is a closed-form equilibrium solution for both processes, which
makes the pricing of other securities easier.
3.5.1. Investments
In the model, companies invest when they have investment opportunities. Investment opportunities allow companies to acquire more capital. There are two types of investment opportunities that companies can have: small investment opportunities available constantly,
and large but infrequent investment opportunities. Loosely speaking, small investment opportunities can be thought of as CAPEX, and large investment opportunities can be thought
of as acquisitions.
Large investment opportunities arrive at a rate λ per unit of time.29 A large investment
28

Strictly speaking, the process for the productivity of company’s capital Xt is also partially endogenous.
The way investments are modeled, the productivity of the capital the company acquires is different from the
productivity of company’s existing capital, and so the overall productivity of company’s capital will depend
on the decision to invest.
29
Informally, it means that the probability to find an investment opportunity is λ∆t within a short interval
of time ∆t.

129

opportunity allows a company to buy at most Knew units of capital with low-productivity
Xlow and install this capital inside the company. There are no costs of investment aside from
the price of capital. Once the capital is installed, its productivity grows up to Xhigh > Xlow .
The fact that companies pay for low-productive capital, but are able to transform it into
high productive capital is what makes investment opportunities profitable (or, in other
words, NPV-positive).
Importantly, investment opportunities do not change the productivity of company’s existing
capital: by taking a large investment opportunity, a company gets a new capital stock with
its own productivity. A simple way to think about large investment opportunities is that
they allow a company to establish a new plant, which works independently of company’s
other plants. It would imply, however, that a pair (K, X) does not fully characterize a
company, as it shows company’s total amount of capital and productivity, while the company
may have several capital units after a number of investments. The following assumption
guarantees that capital and productivity can be aggregated:
Assumption 2 Consider a company at time t that has K units of capital with productivity
Xt that receives a large investment opportunity, which allows the company to buy Knew
units of capital with productivity Xlow and install them within the company with productivity
Xhigh . Then:
1. Size of the investment opportunity is proportional to the amount of capital the company
already has:
Knew = δ2 K

2. Productivity of capital that the company buys is the same as the productivity of capital
that the company already has:
Xlow = Xt

3. Productivity of capital once it is installed is proportional to the productivity of capital
the company buys:
Xhigh = (1 + γ)Xt
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4. After new capital is installed, its productivity will evolve according to the same equation (3.1) as the productivity of company’s old capital; in other words, there are no
additional idiosyncratic shocks to the productivity of new capital
The assumption guarantees that company’s different capital units can be aggregated into
one: there is only one process Xt that characterizes productivity of all capital units, and
production technology is constant return to scale. Note that company’s cash flow grows
proportionally when it takes a large investment opportunity:

Xt K → Xt K + (1 + γ)Xt δ2 K = 1 + δ2 (1 + γ) Xt K

yt → 1 + δ2 (1 + γ) yt

(3.2)

Small investment opportunities are modeled similarly, except that the size of small investment opportunities is proportional to dt. At any point in time, a company can buy δ1 Kdt
units of capital with productivity X, and install this capital within the company with productivity (1 + γ)X.30 To keep the aggregation intact, small investment opportunities also
satisfy the assumption.
While the mathematical definition of the two types of investment opportunities is similar,
they have a profoundly different effect on company’s financial policies, mainly because
companies can finance small investment opportunities out of the cash flow, but they have
to raise external financing to pay for large investment opportunities.
Similarly to equation (3.2), though informally, company’s cash flow grows proportionally
when the company takes a small investment opportunity:

Xt K → Xt K + (1 + γ)Xt δ1 Kdt = 1 + δ1 (1 + γ)dt Xt K

yt → 1 + (1 + γ)δ1 dt yt

(3.3)

dyt = δ1 (1 + γ)yt dt
Notice that the price that the company pays to take investment opportunities - both large
30

In principle, profitability of large and small investment opportunities γ might be different, but they are
assumed to be the same between the two types of investments; that is, there is just one parameter γ that
characterizes the profitability of both types of investments.
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and small - is also proportional to the cash flow (HXt δ1 Kdt = δ1 Hyt dt for small and
Hxt δ2 K = δ2 Hyt for large investment opportunities). I argue that this suggests that yt
alone is a sufficient state variable to substitute both Xt and Kt . It can be formally shown
through the “guess and verify” method.
By construction, investment opportunities are profitable for companies: companies buy
cheap low-productive capital, but install it as high-productive capital. Nevertheless, company’s leverage may prevent companies from taking some investment opportunities. First
of all, leverage may cause debt overhang problem: when an overlevered company takes an
investment opportunity, equityholders bear the full cost of the investment, but creditors
gain some benefits (because probability of default goes down). Second, debt is the only
source of external financing available to companies without PE-ownership, and price of
debt (i.e. costs to issue debt) increases with company’s leverage; therefore, highly-levered
companies will choose not to finance investment opportunities because costs do not justify
the benefits. Therefore, highly levered companies may optimally choose to forgo some of
their investment opportunities, even if all investment opportunities are ex-ante good.
Intuitively, there should be some threshold level of leverage, so that the company invests if
the leverage is below this value, and the company does not invest if the leverage is above
this value.31 In terms of the state variables c (interest expenses on company’s debt) and y
(company’s cash flow), the investment threshold can be summarized as a number zinv , such
that the company invests if c/y < zinv , and does not invest if c/y > zinv . To simplify the
discussion below, I assume that zinv < 1.
Since company’s investments are described by the threshold rule, the evolution of company’s
cash flow yt follows the process:









dyt
= µ + δ1 (1 + γ) dt + σdWt + δ2 (1 + γ)dNt
yt
dyt
ct
= µdt + σdWt if
> zinv
yt
yt

31

if

ct
< zinv
yt

(3.4)

Strictly speaking, there should be two investment thresholds - one for big investments, and another
for small investments. However, separating the two does not conceptually change the math, but makes it
messier, by adding an extra region to consider. Therefore, to simplify the description, I consider that the
two thresholds coincide, though I do have both thresholds when I solve the model.
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In order to fully characterize company’s equity and debt, one also needs to know the process
for dct . Company’s interest expenses will change every time the company increases the
amount of debt. There are two main reasons for the company to issue debt: to finance
investment opportunities, but also payments in distress, when company’s cash flow is not
sufficient to cover interest expenses.
3.5.2. Process for dc
Before discussing the process for dc, it can be useful to introduce three regions, on which dc
will have a different dynamic. Region I is c/y ∈ [0, zinv ], which characterizes company’s investments. In Region I, dc will change every time a large investment opportunity arrives and
requires the company to issue debt to finance the investment. Region III is c/y ∈ (1, zdef ],
which characterizes the distress region (with zdef being the ultimate default threshold). The
company no longer invests in this region, and its cash flow is not sufficient to cover interest
expenses (yt < c). Therefore, the company is forced to continuously issue debt to cover
interest expenses on previously issued debt. Such situation is obviously not sustainable for
a long period of time, and debtholders will stop providing money to the company if interest
expenses (relative to cash flow) become too high, which gives rise to the zdef boundary.
Region II is c/y ∈ (zinv , 1], and the company no longer invests in this region, but also has
sufficient resources to pay interest expenses without raising external financing. dc = 0 in
Region II. Figure 24 illustrates the three Regions.
Two things should be mentioned about the three Regions. First, it is possible that company’s cash flow will not be sufficient to both pay interest expenses and buy capital for small
investments in the Region I. Second, companies with very low value of c/y (i.e. low-levered
companies) may optimally prefer to issue debt to better exploit benefits of tax-shield. These
issues do not affect the derivations and are added later.
Let D(y, c) be the value of company’s debt; D(y, c) has a closed-form solution, but for now
we will express it as a general function. Assume c/y ∈ Region I, and the company receives
a large investment opportunity. The company needs to issue Hδ2 y of additional debt to
finance this investment. If newly issued debt has the same seniority as company’s old debt,
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the following equation implicitly defines what is the new level of interest expenses cnew the
company will have:
Hδ2 y = D(ynew , cnew ) − D(y, c)

(3.5)

where ynew = y(1 + δ2 (1 + γ)) is the new cash flow in case the investment is financed. What
equation (3.5) shows is that the company promises to increase future debt payments to a
new level cnew , but in return debtholders provide Hδ2 y, which the company uses to finance
the investment.
Investment opportunities arrive according to a Poisson process dNt , and every time an
investment opportunity arrives, the company takes it. By taking an investment opportunity,
the company increases its c to the level cnew explicitly defined in equation (3.5) Therefore:
dc = (cnew (y, c) − c)dNt

if

c
∈ Region I
y

(3.6)

In Region II the company does not issue debt, and so dc = 0. In Region III, the company
continuously issues debt because its cash flow is too small to fully cover interest expenses.
Let dD be the value of debt the company needs to issue to avoid default at the moment
when its cash flow is y and current interest expenses are c. The following formula connects
how interest expenses should change in order to issue dD:


c − y + (c − y)τ



dt = (c − y)(1 − τ )dt = dD = dc

∂D(y, c)
∂c

(3.7)

The very left-hand side of equation (3.7) is the difference between the required coupon
payment c, and the amount of money the firm has on hands - its profits y, and tax return
from the government τ (c − y). This difference is the shortfall that equityholders must but
can not pay to debtholders; this difference should equal to change in debt value dD, which
is in turn achieved by promising a higher coupon payment in the future. It is clear from
equation (3.7) that it is only possible to issue new debt if

∂D
∂c

> 0, that is, if value of debt

increases when the firm promises to pay more in the future. Equation (3.7) shows to derive
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the dynamics of dc in Region III:
dc =

(c − y)(1 − τ )
∂D
∂c

(3.8)

dt

Together, equations (3.4), (3.6), and (3.8) fully define the dynamic of company’s state
variables:





















dyt
= (µ + δ1 (1 + γ))dt + σdWt + δ2 dNt
yt

dct = cnew (yt , ct ) − ct dNt





















dct = 0

dyt
= µdt + σdWt
yt
dyt
= µdt + σdWt
yt
(1 − τ )(ct − yt )
dct =
∂D(y ,c )
t

if

c
∈ [0, zinv ]
y

if

c
∈ (zinv , 1]
y

if

c
∈ (1, zdef ]
y

(3.9)

t

∂c

3.5.3. Debt and default
We will show that D(y, c) satisfies the following system:


σ 2 y 2 00


rD(y, c) = c + µ + δ1 (1 + γ) yDy0 +
Dyy
2
σ 2 y 2 00


rD(y, c) = c + µyDy0 +
Dyy
2

if
if

ct
∈ [0, zinv ]
yt
ct
∈ (zinv , zdef ]
yt

(3.10)

The way to show this is to separately set up the HJB equations for D(y, c) on each of the
three Regions, and show that they coincide with the system (3.10). In order to set up the
HJB equations, one needs to figure out the immediate payments to debthlolders on each
Region.
Start with Region I. That’s the region, in which the company’s cash flow is enough to pay
interest expenses ct dt. Therefore, the correct HJB for the value of debt takes the following
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form in Region I:



σ 2 y 2 00
Dyy + λ D(ynew , cnew ) − D(y, c) − δ2 Hy (3.11)
rD(y, c) = c + µ + δ1 (1 + γ) yDy0 +
2

where ynew = y 1 + δ2 (1 + γ) is the cash flow the company gets after taking the large
investment opportunity. The last part of the equation (3.11) shows how the value of debt
changes when the company issues debt to finance a large investment opportunity - future
payments to debtholders increase to a new level cnew , but debtholders give money to the
company to finance the investment. Note, however, that this part equals zero, consistent
with the equation (3.5). Indeed, when debtholders provide money to the company to take
the investment, they do it on terms, which make them indifferent (because markets are
competitive), and so the value of debt does not change when the company takes a large
investment.32 Therefore, D(y, c) indeed satisfies system (3.10) in the Region I.
D(y, c) trivially satisfies system (3.10) in the Region II, since the second equation of the
system is literally the HJB equation for D(y, c) in that region.
Consider Region III now. In this regions, company’s cash flow is fully used to pay interest
expenses, and it is not enough. The immediate payment to debtholders in this region is
y + τ (c − y), which is company’s cash flow plus the return from the government. Therefore,
the correct HJB equation for D(y, c) should take the following form:
rD(y, c) = y + τ (c − y) +

(1 − τ )(c − y) 0
σ 2 y 2 00
0
D
+
µyD
+
Dyy
c
y
Dc0
2

(3.12)

which simplifies to
rD(y, c) = c + µyDy0 +

σ 2 y 2 00
Dyy
2

(3.13)

which again coincides with the second equation of the system (3.10) in the Region III.
Intuitively, what this shows is that debtholders are indifferent between the company paying
them the full amount cdt, or paying a smaller amount, but also increasing future interest
32

Notice, however, that the situation would be different, if the company had access to a alternative form
of external financing, say equity. In case the investment is financed by issuing equity, yt increases, without
debtholders contributing any money. Nevertheless, the equation for debt value will still have a closed form
solution, as is shown later for the case of the value of debt for companies with PE-ownership.
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Figure 23: Debt and marginal interest
rates
10

0.9

10
10
marginal
data1

interest rates (left axis)
7.5

debt
data2

value (right axis)
7.5
7.5

0.6
0.6
60%

5
55

0.3

30%
0.3

2.5

2.5
2.5

0
0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

debt value (green curve)

marginal interest rates (blue curve)

0.9
90%

0
1.2
00

00
00

0.2
0.2

0.4
0.4

0.6
0.6

0.8
0.8

11

1.2
1.2

interest expenses (!)
The graph shows the value of company’s debt (green curve, right axis), and marginal interest rates at which next
unit of debt can be raised (blue curve, left axis). Company’s cash flow yt is fixed at one, and values are shown as the
second state variable - interest expenses - changes (horizontal axis). Company’s debt value increases when interest
expenses become higher, but debt also becomes riskier. Therefore, both the value of debt and interest rates to issue
more debt increase with c. The company defaults when it can no longer issue more debt and is in distress; graphically,
it means that the blue curve converges to infinity, or green curve becomes completely flat.

payments by the level dc. This follows from how dc was modeled, which was to make
debtholders even. A different way of interpreting this results is to say that debt is issued
to a completely new debtholder, who gives the company (1 − τ )(c − y)dt that is used to
complement company’s cash flow to pay old debtholders cdt in full. As long as it happens
at every point in time, every company’s debtholder receives what it was promised to at the
time of debt issuance, as long as the company can raise additional debt.
The previous paragraph naturally leads to the conclusion that the company will default
once it is in distress and can no longer issue additional debt. Mathematically, the company
can issue additional debt as long as ∂D/∂c > 0, meaning the value of debt can be increased
by promising higher interest payments in the future. Therefore, the following condition
determines the default threshold for a company without PE-ownership33 :

∂D
ydef (c), c = 0
∂c
33

Notice that it is consistent with the default rule being c/y = zdef
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(3.14)

Figure 23 visualizes the default in the model. The green curve on the graph shows how the
value of company’s debt changes when the company offers a higher coupon payment to its
debtholders; the blue curve shows the marginal interest rates, at which the next dollar of
debt can be raised. Firm with no debt (c = 0) can issue the first dollar of debt at r = 6%,
which is used as the risk-free rate to solve the model. Marginal interest rates stay low
and close to the risk-free rate for companies that have sufficiently low interest payments.
However, as the coupon payment becomes sufficiently high, the green curve becomes flatter,
which means that the company has to promise to increase future interest payments by a lot
to raise an additional dollar of debt. As coupon-to-cash flow ratio approaches its default
value, the green curve becomes completely flat, which means that future promises of higher
coupon payments do not increase debt value, or, equivalently, next unit of debt can only be
issued at the infinite rate. At that point, the company cannot issue new debt, and cannot
pay interests on its debt out of the cash flow either, and so default happens.
Once we know that D(y, c) satisfies system (3.10), it is easy to solve for the value of debt,
since the system has a closed form solution of the following form:
c
+ B1 y β1 c1−β1 + B2 y β2 c1−β2
r
c
D(y, c) = + B3 y β3 c1−β3 + B4 y β4 c1−β4
r
D(y, c) =

if
if

c
≤ zinv
y
c
> zinv
y

(3.15)

where β1 and β2 are the negative and the positive roots of the following quadratic equation:

σ2
r = µ + δ1 (1 + γ) β + β(β − 1)
2

(3.16)

and β3 and β4 are the negative and the positive roots of the following quadratic equation:
r = µβ +

σ2
β(β − 1)
2

(3.17)

Coefficients B1 , B2 .B3 , B4 need to be determined through boundary conditions. It is easy
to argue that B2 = 0, since the value of debt cannot exceed c/r (the value of risk-free debt),
but y β2 c1−β2 converges to +∞ when y increases. Two boundary conditions are determined

138

by the value matching and smooth-pasting34 of D(y, c) along the boundary c/y = zinv .
c
c
+ B1 y β1 c1−β1 = + B3 y β3 c1−β3 + B4 y β4 c1−β4
r
r

(3.18)

1−β1
1−β3
1−β4
β1 B1 zinv
= β3 B3 zinv
+ β4 B4 zinv

(3.19)

The final boundary condition characterizes the value of debt in default. Absolute priority
rule applies, and debtholder get the value of company’s assets. It is assumed, however,
that there are some bankruptcy costs α, which are proportional to the value of assets, so
debtholders only recover (1 − α)(1 − τ )Hy. The value of debt in default, and the default
threshold (3.14) can be summarized as follows:
c
+ B3 y β3 c1−β3 + B4 y β4 c1−β4 = (1 − τ )(1 − α)Hy
r

(3.20)

1
−β3
−β4
+ (1 − β3 )B3 zdef
+ (1 − β4 )B4 zdef
=0
r

(3.21)

Equations (3.18) - (3.21) can be simplified to the following system:


−β1
−β3
−β4


B1 zinv
= B3 zinv
+ B4 zinv






β1 B1 z 1−β1 = β3 B3 z 1−β3 + β4 B4 z 1−β4
inv
inv
inv
zdef

1−β3
1−β4


+ B3 zdef
+ B4 zdef
= (1 − α)(1 − τ )H


r




 1 + (1 − β3 )B3 z −β1 + (1 − β4 )B4 z −β4 = 0
def
def
r

(3.22)

which is a system of four equations with four unknowns {B1 , B3 , B4 , zdef }, of which three
unknowns enter the system linearly.
34

Notice that equation (3.18) is written for the derivative to be taken with respect to y, but the system
would be equivalent to taking the derivative with respect to c.
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3.5.4. Equity value and investment policies
Denote E(y, c) the value of company’s equity. In contrast to D(y, c), there is no closed-form
solution for E(y, c). It should satisfy the following set of HJB equations:



rE(y, c) = (1 − τ )(y − c)−Hδ1 y + µ + δ1 (1 + γ) yEy0 +






σ 2 y 2 00


Eyy + λ E(ynew , cnew ) − E(y, c))

2
σ 2 y 2 00

rE(y, c) = (1 − τ )(y − c) + µyEy0 +
Eyy


2


2 2


(c − y)(1 − τ ) 0

0 + σ y E 00
rE(y, c) =
E
+
µyE
yy
c
y
Dc0
2

if
if
if

c
∈ [0, zinv ]
y
c
∈ (zinv , 1]
y
c
∈ (1, zdef ]
y
(3.23)

A useful simplification to solve this system is to notice that E(y, c) is homogenous of degree
one, and therefore can be expressed as E(y, c) = ye(c/y) = ye(z), and rewrite the system
(3.23) in terms of z. Function E(y, c) should satisfy some boundary conditions, which are
described in the Appendix D. The investment threshold is characterized by the following
equation:
E(ynew , cnew ) = E(y, c) ⇐⇒ (1 + δ2 (1 + γ))e(znew ) = e(zinv )

(3.24)

where znew satisfies the following equation:
 z
 znew
inv
1−β1
1−β3
1−β4
1 + δ2 (1 + γ)
+ B3 znew
+ B4 znew
=
+ B1 zinv
+ Hδ2
r
r

(3.25)

which is equivalent to D(ynew , cnew ) = D(y, c) + Hδ2 y
3.5.5. Issuance of debt to exploit benefits of tax-shield
Theoretically speaking, companies may choose to never let their leverage fall below a certain
value, in order to optimally exploit benefits of tax-shield. That is, if their leverage is too
low, companies may choose to issue additional debt even in the absence of large investment
opportunities. This is easy to incorporate into the model, and the only thing that changes is
that the first region becomes [zres , zinv ] instead of [0, zinv ], where zres is the optimal lowerboundary for debt issuance; that is, the company will issue additional debt every time its
c/y falls below the level of zres . Appendix A provides the optimality conditions for zres .
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be costlessly issued by increasing ct . This means that the company will be constantly issuing some trivial amount of debt every time there is a positive dWt shock to company’s
profitability Xt if the company is at the boundary. Second, most companies will optimally
choose to have zres = 0, implying that companies will never issue debt to pay dividends.
This could happen because the value that company’s equityholders can extract out of the
investment opportunities directly depends on the cost of issuing debt, which is necessary
to finance these investment opportunities. Therefore, by not issuing debt to pay dividends,
companies can have lower interest rates in the future, and, therefore, finance more large
investments.

3.6. Model Results
3.6.1. Parameter values
The results of the model depend on the parameter values that are used to solve the model.
Most of the parameters, however, are hard to estimate directly in the data, and there is a
substantial cross-heterogeneity. Another concern, particularly related to the subject of this

141

2

paper, is that PE firms do not choose buyout targets randomly. It is, therefore, possible
that parameter values that describe PE-backed companies in the data are different from
the parameter values that describe companies without PE-ownership. This paper does
not address the selection bias, but it is important to discuss two approaches that could
potentially alleviate it, and why the paper does not take them.
The first approach that could resolve the selection bias is to solve the model mathematically and find which companies PE firms prefer to acquire. Indeed, acquisitions of different
companies can bring different returns to the PE: companies that need external financing
the most would benefit the most from having a PE-sponsor, and, therefore, should be the
preferred targets for PE-buyouts. Therefore, one could solve, within the model, for the
optimal set of parameters that a company should have to maximize the return of a PE in
case the PE invests in this company. The problem with this approach is that the maximization problem might be unbounded - that is, the expected return might be monotonically
increasing in one or several parameters (for instance, in δ2 - size of large investments that
require external financing). The parameter space would then need to be restricted based
on the type of companies that are available for buyouts in the data, and this is outside of
the scope of this paper.
The second approach that could resolve the selection bias, and which is also not taken in this
paper, is to structurally estimate the model, based on the data for companies that do and
do not have PE-ownership. The problem with this approach is that PE-backed companies
report data differently from companies without PE-ownership. Both types of companies
might have similar items on their income statement and the balance sheet, but the meaning
of those numbers is different. Shareholder loans is one such example: they are treated as
debt on the balance sheet, but are, in fact, equity that is structured as debt. There are
some other problems, unrelated to the structure of PE-buyouts, but still making the data
hard to compare: for instance, the assets value of PE-backed companies likely better reflects
their market value than assets of other companies, which is due to the fact that company’s
assets are reevaluated to reflect the acquisition price at the time of the buyout.35
35

Therefore, if one was computing the market-to-book ratio for PE-backed companies, for instance, they
would find a value below but close to one, while most public companies have market-to-book ratio above
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Table 23: Parameter values
Company-specific parameters
unconditional growth rate
size of small inv. opportunities
size of large inv. opportunities
intensity of arrivals of large inv. opportunities
intensity of PE-exits
bankruptcy costs
idiosyncratic volatility
systematic volatility
total volatility

Economy-wide parameters
µ
δ1
δ2
λ
λP E
α
σID
σs
σ

-1%
2%
10%
0.4
0.15
10%
22%
12%
25%

risk-free rate
risk premium
corporate tax rate
price of capital

rf
rp
τ
H

6%
4%
20%
13.5

It is important to note that the previous paragraph does not imply that it is completely
impossible to run a structural estimation to analyze the underlying difference between
companies with and without PE-ownership. However, doing so would require a lot of efforts
to adjust the data that is reported by both types of companies. This paper takes a first
step in that direction by adjusting debt-related values, but data for the moments that could
identify other parameters also needs to be collected.
In short, the paper does not address the selection bias, and instead explains to what extent
the observed financing policies and performance of PE-backed companies can be explained
by the presence of a PE-sponsor. Table 23 summarizes the parameter values used to solve
the model, and all parameters are assumed to be identical between companies that do and
do not have PE-ownership.
The unconditional growth rate of company’s productivity under the risk-neutral probability measure µ is −1% - that is, on average, company’s productivity falls if the company
does not invest. Company’s growth rate should increase when moving from the risk-neutral
probability measure to the actual probability measure, and so risk-premium36 4% is added
to the company’s growth rate when the model is simulated, therefore, increasing the unconditional growth rate up to 3%. By adding small investments, the company can increase the
one.
36
Risk-premium is probably a confusing name for a variable, since I later speak about risk-premium on
the market portfolio and the PE-portfolio. In the context of the current paragraph, risk-premium is the
difference in the growth rate of company’s productivity under the actual probability measure and the riskneutral probability measure. Since market portfolio is a levered claim on company’s asset, 4% difference
in the growth rate becomes the 5.6% market excess return, which is roughly consistent with the data.
This paper does not take a stance on where the 4% risk-premium comes from, which might be from the
risk-aversion of the representative agent, or some other unrelated market factors.
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growth rate up to µ + δ1 (1 + γ), which becomes 5.2% annually (under the actual probability
measure). The growth rate can further be increased by taking large investment opportunities: the growth rate of a company that takes all large investment opportunities is, on
average, µ + δ1 (1 + γ) + λδ2 (1 + γ), which is 9.6%.
Price of capital H has a significant influence on the results of the model, since it controls the
profitability of company’s investments (to the same extent that γ does), and also the value
of debt in default, since the model assumes that debtholders in default recover company’s
assets at their market price after bankruptcy costs are accounted for. The value of H in the
model is 13.5, and two moments discipline it. First, a company without PE-ownership and
zero leverage has market-to-book ratio of one, this way linking the price of capital to the
value of a company that operates this capital. Second, the recovery rate of debt in default
(relative to the face value) is 47%, which is roughly consistent with the recovery rate on
rated debt.37
Estimates of bankruptcy costs α, which in this paper is 10%, vary from very low to very
high. For example, Gruber and Warner (1977) finds that direct bankruptcy costs are about
1% of the assets value, and Andrade and Kaplan (1998) report the value of about 20%.
Some authors used a structural estimation approach to infer the bankruptcy costs from
companies observed decisions. In particular, Davydenko, Strebulaev and Zhao (2012) find
that default costs are in the range of 10% and 30%, Hennessy and Whited (2007) report
values between 8.4% and 15.1%, and Glover (2016) finds the value of about 45%. Glovers
estimates are well-above estimates of other authors, but as argued by Reindl, Stoughton,
and Zechner (2017), it is because Glover assumes that all companies follow optimal leverage
policy, while it is not necessarily the case in the data. The authors estimate a similar
model without imposing optimal capital structure and using stock prices instead, and find
substantially lower values of bankruptcy costs (20%).
Intensity of PE-exit is assumed to be λP E = 0.15, implying that the PE usually controls a
37
For full disclosure, the range of recovery rates in the data is wide: 14% on junior subordinated bonds,
to 75% on first lien bank loan. The recovery rate in the model should roughly aggregate the recovery rate
on different types of debt that companies in the data have. In this sense, 47% recovery rate in the model is
similar to 54% average recovery rate of the first lien bonds and 46% average recovery rate of the unsecured
bank loans https://www.researchpool.com/download/?report_id=1751185&show_pdf_data=true.
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company for six and a half years. It is slightly higher than the average number of annual
reports that I observe for companies in my sample (5.6), but the number of annual reports
underestimates the length of a PE-investments.
3.6.2. Capital structure and financial policies
The solution of the model shows that companies without PE-ownership only issue debt
when they have large investment opportunities, and do not issue debt to pay dividends. In
other words, companies optimally choose to maintain low leverage even though some debt
could be issued at almost the risk-free rate while giving the company tax-shield advantage.
Companies avoid leverage because greater leverage increases the rates at which additional
debt can be raised in the future and, therefore, makes future investment opportunities less
profitable. Moreover, companies with high leverage suffer from the debt overhang problem:
equityholders control company’s investments, but parts of the benefits of the investments
go to debtholders. If a big enough share of benefits of an investment goes to debtholders,
but equityholders pay the full price, they will optimally choose to forgo the investment.
The debt overhang problem that affect companies without PE-ownership deserves some
special discussion. The way large investments are modeled, they are always financed by
issuing debt. Therefore, independent of company’s leverage, debtholders do not get benefits
from large investments. Equation (3.5) shows this mathematically. Intuitively, it follows
from the assumption that debt markets are competitive: if a company does not raise debt to
finance a large investment opportunity, company’s debt value will not change. Therefore, the
current value of debt becomes the outside option for company’s debtholders, and they will
provide debt on terms that make them indifferent to the outside option. Therefore, whenever
a company takes a large investment opportunity, the benefits fully go to equityholders,
eliminating the debt overhang problem. Note, however, that companies with high leverage
will still forgo large investments because debt issuance costs are high.38 In contrast, small
38
In this sense, otherwise profitable investment opportunities become ex-post not profitable to both equityholders and debtholders. This happens because an investment opportunity, if is taken and financed
by issuing debt, increases company’s leverage, therefore, increasing the default probability. Note that this
problem could not be solved by debt renegotiation if the money still had to come from debtholders - issuing
debt at terms that leave debtholders indifferent is already the best outcome that debt renegotiation could
achieve. The only solution, in which the investment could be taken, while still increasing the value of at
least one party and not hurting the other, would be to let the company issue equity. However, if equity
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investment opportunities that the company can finance out of the operating cash flow can
become a subject to debt overhang problem, and therefore companies have incentives to
keep the leverage low.
Companies without PE-ownership take large investment opportunities as long as their leverage is below 41.5%, which corresponds to the inverse coverage ratio of z = 0.4. At that
point, the marginal interest rate to issue more debt is 9.1%. The threshold is different
for small investments: a company takes them as long as the cash flow is sufficient to both
pay interest expenses and invest. The cutoff leverage for small investment opportunities is
67.4%, which corresponds to the inverse coverage ratio of of z = 0.73. If the company was
to take small investment opportunities after that point, it would have to issue at least some
amount of debt, since the cash flow alone would not be sufficient to cover both interest
expenses and investments, but the marginal interest rate to issue more debt is 17.8% at
that point. As long as company’s inverse coverage ratio is between 0.73 and 1, the company
does not take any investment opportunities - small or large - but also does not need to
raise external financing to cover debt payments since the cash flow is still above the level
of interest expenses. Once the inverse coverage ratio exceeds one, the company constantly
issues debt to pay interest expenses, at the marginal interest rate that constantly grows.
The default happens if the inverse coverage ratio exceeds 1.23.
The solution looks very different for companies with PE-ownership. To start with, these
companies issue significant amount of debt even when they do not need debt to finance
investment opportunities. Therefore, the buyout leverage is 48.9%, which is very close to
the empirical estimates. This leverage corresponds to the inverse coverage ratio of z = 0.45.
Two factors explain the high leverage of PE-backed companies in the model. First, and
most important, high leverage does not prevent PE-backed companies from investments.
In case debt financing is too expensive, the PE-backed company can always get an equity
injection from the PE-sponsor to pay for the investment. It does not mean that PEownership completely eliminates the debt overhang problem - companies with very high
value of leverage still do not invest - but PE-ownership does significantly alleviate it.
issuance costs increase with leverage, as is the case in the data, there is no solution.
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Figure 25: Leverage in a PE buyout
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Second, PE-ownership makes company’s debt less risky: in distress, when company’s cash
flow is not sufficient to cover interest expenses, a PE-backed company does not need to
continuously issue more debt at exponentially increasing rates to cover interest expenses on
previously issued debt, and instead can get money from the PE-sponsor. This effectively
cuts the debt spiral that companies without PE-ownership are prone to in distress, and,
therefore, reduces the probability of default for PE-backed companies.
Figure 25 analyses to what extent the capital structure in a buyout is affected by direct
and indirect costs of debt issuance. Bankruptcy costs α control the direct costs of debt
issuance, as they change the recovery rates for debtholders in default. Profitability of
company’s future investment opportunities γ controls the indirect costs of debt issuance, as
highly levered companies will have to forgo some of the future investments. As follows from
the figure, the buyout leverage is much more sensitive to the indirect costs of debt issuance.
Furthermore, PE-backed companies issue additional debt to pay dividends when their leverage falls below 17.3%, which corresponds to the inverse coverage ratio of z = 0.16; every
time this happens, PE-backed companies bring the leverage back to its optimal level of
48.9% (z = 0.45). PE-backed companies take all investment opportunities - large and small
- as long as the leverage stays below 78.5% (or z = 0.94). Investment opportunities are
paid for by issuing debt if company’s leverage is below the optimum level of 48.9%, and
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by receiving money from the PE-sponsor if the leverage is above that value. As long as
company’s inverse coverage ratio stays between 1 and 1.8, the company continuously issues
equity to pay interest expenses, and default happens when the inverse coverage ratio exceeds
the 1.8 threshold.
3.6.3. Cross-sectional distributions
The previous subsection describes optimal financial and capital structure choices. However,
the actual distribution of leverage and/or investments can look very different, as the result
of idiosyncratic shocks and companies’ responses to them. Therefore, I simulate a crosssection of companies to study how it compares to the data.
In order to run a simulation, I generate a group of 500 companies with PE-ownership, and
another group of 500 companies without PE-ownership. All 1000 companies start with the
same cash flow y0 = 1, and are optimally levered (i.e. companies without PE-ownership
have no debt, and companies with PE-ownership have 48.9% leverage).Throughout the simulation, companies make decision about investments and debt issuance consistent with the
solution to the model. Every period, each company receives a Brownian shock that affects
its cash flow and inverse coverage ratio. Furthermore, all companies have a small investment opportunity, and some companies, in addition, receive a large investment opportunity.
Companies optimally choose if they want to invest, and how to finance the investment. Companies without PE-ownership that are in distress issue debt to pay interest expenses that
are not covered by the cash flow. At the end of each period, some companies may default, in
which case they are replaced by newly born optimally levered companies of the same type,
with the productivity of the defaulted companies, but only (1 − α) fraction of the assets.
In addition, companies with PE-ownership sometimes are sold to the market, in which case
they are also replaced by another optimally levered company with the same productivity
and same value of assets. Companies with PE-ownership may issue additional debt if their
leverage falls to a very low value as the result of a sequence of several positive shocks, in
which case their leverage is reset to the 48.9% level. Each period of a simulation is 1/36 of
a year, and the simulation is run for 3600 periods (600 years).
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Figure 26: Steady-state distribution
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Graphs are based on the result of model simulation. The simulation has 500 companies with PE-ownership, and
500 companies without PE-ownership, and runs for 600*36 periods (600 years), with each period being 1/36th of a
year. When a company defaults or is sold (in case of PE-backed companies) during a simulation, it is replaced by
another company with the same productivity, thus, maintaining a balanced sample. Distributions are based on the
company-period observations from the final 300 years of the simulation. Inverse coverage ratio is the ratio of interest
expenses to company’s cash flow.

Figure 26 shows the cross-sectional distribution of leverage and inverse coverage ratios of
companies with and without PE-ownership. These cross-sections distributions are based
on the observations from the last 1800 periods of the simulation. The average and median
leverage of companies without PE-ownership is 26.6% and 24.4% correspondingly. These
numbers seems to be consistent with leverage values in the data, though there are different
opinions on how leverage should be measured, or what is the appropriate comparable group
of companies. For instance, Rajan and Zingales (1995) report that the average and median
values of book leverage in the US are 31% and 27%, but when assets are adjusted for the
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Figure 27: Divergence of profitability
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Graphs are based on the results of model simulations. Each simulation has 500 companies with PE-ownership, and
500 companies without PE-ownership, and runs for 100*36 periods (100 years), with each period being 1/36th of a
year. All 100 companies start simulations with the same log(yt ) = 0, but yt , changes during the simulation as the
result of company’s investments, and also idiosyncratic shocks. If a company defaults or is sold (in case of PE-backed
companies) during the simulation, it is replaced by another company with the same productivity, thus, maintaining
a balanced sample. Average log(yt ) is measured for both groups of companies in the final period of 24th, 49th, and
99th year of the simulation. Simulation is repeated 400 times, and distributions of average productivity is shown on
the graph.

market value of equity, the values change to 24% and 20%. Numbers for the UK in their
paper are smaller: they find that the average and median book leverage in the UK are
21% and 18%, but average and median market leverage are 14% and 16%. Faulkender and
Petersen (2005) argue that many companies have low leverage because they do not have
access to debt capital markets, and so they restrict the sample of companies to those with
S&P credit rating; they find that the average and median book leverage values in the US
are 37% and 35%, and average and median values of the market leverage are 28% and 26%.
The average and median inverse coverage ratios of companies without PE-ownership in the
model is 0.25 and 0.22. The inverse of that - the coverage ratio39 - has mean 6.27 and
median 4.57.40 Rajan and Zingales (1995) report that the median interest coverage ratio in
the US is between 2.41 and 4.05, and median interest coverage ratio in the UK is between
4.79 and 6.44.
The average and median values of leverage are both 0.4 for companies with PE-ownership
in the model. The leverage falls from 48.9% in the acquisition year because companies,
39
Note that this paper uses the inverse coverage ratio rather than the coverage ratio variable because
coverage ratio is not defined for companies with no debt. Also, all function in the modelcan be rewrtten in
terms of the inverse coverage ratio, but not the coverage ratio - again, because the value for companies with
no debt would not be defined: E(y, c) = ye(c/y), which could not be rewritten to E(y, c) = ce(y/x)
40
Difference between 6.27 and 1/0.25 is due to Jensen’s inequality.
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on average, increase the value of their assets. It is hard to find the data counterpart for
the average value of leverage in a cross-section of PE-backed companies, mainly because
there is no good way of measuring company’s leverage after the buyout in the data. The
market value of assets is not observed, and the book value of assets is misleading. One
way to compare would be to look at the value of the leverage of the company when the PE
sells it, in the data and in the model. As Table 14 shows, the average and median values
of leverage of a company at exit are 26% and 18%. Comparable numbers in the model
are 33% and 34%, implying that the leverage distribution for PE-backed companies is
skewed to the right. There might, however, be another reason why the model overestimates
company’s leverage at exit. As the next subsection shows, the model does not fully explain
the outperformance of PE-backed companies, likely because there are other reasons how PE
firms increase the value of their portfolio companies. Market timing might be one of such
factor - PE firms might be able to find undervalued private companies and sell them later,
therefore, increasing the value of the company by more than what the model explains (as
all companies are fairly valued in the model). This could explain the discrepancy of the
exit leverage in the model and in the data.
Turning to investments, almost all companies take small investment opportunities. Among
companies without PE-ownership, 99.5% take a small investment opportunity every period,
and the number is 99.8% for companies with PE-ownership. The same fraction of PEbacked companies take large investment opportunities when they arrive, but only 84.6%
of companies without PE-ownership do so. Companies without PE-ownership finance all
large investments by issuing debt, which is simply the results of the model assumption. PEbacked companies, in contrast, can choose whether they want to finance large investment
opportunities by issuing debt or equity. The simulation shows, that the debt is issued
in 72.8% of cases, and only 27.2% of large investments are financed by money from the
PE-sponsor.
As PE-backed companies take large investment opportunities more frequently, they also
grow faster. To show this, I simulate the model 400 times, and measure the average productivity of companies with and without PE-ownership after 25, 50, and 100 years of simu-
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lation. Figure 27 shows that indeed average productivity diverges. This is consistent with
the empirical results. PE-backed companies on average have CAPEX and acquisitions of
the same size as companies without PE-ownership, but the acquisition frequency is higher.
As the result, PE-backed companies grow faster than the rest of the economy.
3.6.4. Performance
I next turn to the question to what extent the model can explain the outperformance of
PE-backed companies vs. the rest of the market. Note, however, that companies with PEownership should grow faster than the market, since they are more levered and, therefore,
more exposed to the aggregate shocks. A more interesting question is whether companies
with PE-ownership outperform the market after accounting for risk.
To answer this question, I consider an index of companies with and without PE-ownership.
The indices show how the wealth of an investor would change over time if she invested her
wealth into a value-weighted portfolio of companies with and without PE-ownership that
have the same productivity, and whose leverage is distributed according to the steady state
distribution from Figure 26. Indices account for default, difference in average growth rate
between companies with and without PE-ownership, and the fact that PE firms sometimes
sell and buy their portfolio companies. Appendix D explains the construction in details. I
repeat simulation 400 times.
Table 24 shows the relative performance of PE and non-PE indices across 400 simulations.
“PE-equity” shows the performance of the PE firms itself (or investors in the PE), and “PE:
equity+debt” shows the evolution of wealth of an investor who invests in both equity and
debt of companies with PE-ownership. Hypothetical counterparts to the “market” would
be S&P 500 index, to the “PE: equity” would S&P if all companies in S&P 500 were fully
owned by PE firms, and to“PE: equity + debt” would be a portfolio that combined shares
and debt of companies in S&P 500 if they were all owned by the PE.
One issue with comparing returns on the market and PE industry in the data is is that
returns are measured differently. Asset pricing literature usually measures average returns
that the market (or portfolios) produce. In contrast, there is no way of studying immediate
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Table 24: Performance

total return =
risk-free rate +
risk-premium +
alpha:
alpha due to tax-shield benefits
alpha due to greater investments
IRR
beta
volatility

market

PE: equity

PE: equity + debt

11.55%
6%
5.55%

19.28%
6%
6.57%
6.71%
1.04%
5.67%
16.9%
1.19
19.7%

13.36%
6%
4.13%
3.23%
0.57%
2.66%

10.3%
1
16.6%

0.76
12.4%

returns of PE funds since the value of their investments is not known before their investments
are realized. Therefore, usually IRRs of PE industry is computed. Nevertheless, comparing
IRRs of PE-industry with average returns on the market is misleading because of Jensen’s
inequality. The simplest way to see that is to notice that while the average return on the
S&P 500 between 1960 and 2015 was 11.24% a year, the IRR on the market over the same
time period was only 9.83%.
Fortunately, these issues can be addresses within the model, as the model shows both IRR
and average returns on any type of investment. As Table 24 shows, the model explain the
market performance well: the average annual return is 11.6%, which corresponds to the
market IRR of 10.3%. The average risk-premia is 5.6% that arises because of the levered
difference in the growth rate under the actual and risk-neutral probability probability measures. Average returns on the PE:equity index are greater than average market returns,
which is partially explained by a greater exposure to the systematic risks of PE-backed
companies (they are more levered, and so volatility and beta with respect to the market
are greater for PE-backed companies). Nevertheless, even accounting for risk-exposure,
PE:equity index produces 6.7% alpha.
This is how the model explains outperformance. Company’s future cash flows increase
when it is acquired by a PE, because the company will invest more, and because it will have
greater tax-shield benefits. Nevertheless, the PE pays the price that all other investors
on the market assign to the company. The price that is paid by the PE - and, therefore,
observed by an econometrician - is smaller than the value of future cash flows discounted
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Figure 28: PE index and non-PE index
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Indices show the log of the value of a dollar over time if this dollar is invested in a group of companies without PEownership (left graph) or with PE-ownership (right graph), according to weights that correspond to the steady-state
distribution of these companies (refer to Figure 26 for the cross-sectional distribution). Indexes were computed by
simulating the model 400 times, and the grey area shows the area within which 95% of the indices fall. Red line on
the left graph and blue line on the right graph show indices from one of the simulations.

at the appropriate rate. As the result, future realized returns will, on average, be higher
than expected returns.
Going deeper, what happens is that company’s ownership determines its future cash flows,
and, therefore, its value. An important assumption is that the buyout happens at the lower
price that the market assigns to the company and not the price that the PE assigns, which
is rationalized by the fact that the PE industry is small relative to the rest of the market.
That is, there is a large number of public investors who are indifferent between buying and
selling a company at a low price, and a small number of big investors (PE), for whom the
value of the company is bigger.
At first sight, the arguments in the previous is at odds with theoretical models, such as
Grossman and Hart (1980), that say that corporate takeovers should not happen in equilibrium even if the value of the company could be greater under a different ownership. In
the model of Grossman and Hart, a company is owned by a group of atomistic investors,
and an outsider can increase company’s value if she acquires the majority control of the
company. Nevertheless, takeover does not happen in equilibrium - and the value of the
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company remains low - because there is no price at which the majority of current investors
would agree to sell their shares; investors do not internalize their actions, and, therefore, no
one wants to sell their share at a price below the post-takeover price. This argument would
not work for PE-buyouts because they are structured differently: PE leaves no shares to
outside investors (other than company’s managements). Therefore, company’s old investors
do not have an option to hold their shares hoping that the buyout would go forward anyway,
and their share price would go up.
As discussed above, the model explains alpha of PE:equity index through greater taxshield benefits and greater investments (or faster growth that comes as the result of bigger
investments). To what extent is alpha attributed to each of these factors? There is no
definitive answer to this question, since the two channels interact with each other and with
other factors;41 for instance, because companies with PE-ownership invest more, they grow
faster, and, therefore, issue debt more often, which in turn means they exploit greater
benefits of tax-shield, and pay less taxes. Appendix D shows how the two effects are
disentangled. I find that of the total alpha of 6.7%, greater investments explain 5.7%,
and tax-shield benefits explain 1%. In other words, greater tax-shield benefits and greater
investments explain 15% and 85% of the outperformance that this paper can explain.
Average return of 19.3% of the PE:equity index corresponds to 16.9% IRR. This value seems
similar to the IRR that other researchers computed based on the LP data: 14-17% in Ang,
et.al (2018), 15% Driessen, et.al (2012), and Franzoni, et.al (2012). One should remember,
however, that returns based on the LP data are computed after accounting for the PE fees,
and, therefore, the actual returns that the PE earns should be higher. Axelson, et.al (2014)
claim that gross excess return over the market is 8.3% - 8.6%, implying gross total IRR of
roughly 20%.
Another way to study whether the model fully exploits the outperformance of PE is to study
withing the model the IRR on the whole company, that is company’s debt and equity, and
compare it to the results in Section 3. The third column of Table 24 shows that the IRR of
41
The main additional factor, whose effect multiples the effect of tax-shield benefits and greater investments, is the difference in growth rate under the actual and risk-neutral probability measure.
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the PE: equity+debt index is 13.36%, which is significantly lower than 32% in the Section
2. A number of factors can justify that. First, as already discussed, empirical results do
not account for any transaction costs, which are high in the case of buyouts. Second, valueweighted returns rather than equal-weighted returns should be studied, and average returns
on big companies are smaller than smaller companies.
Nevertheless, it seems that the model does not fully account for the alpha generated by PEfirms in the data, whether one uses returns based on the data from LPs, or IRRs inferred
from the values of the company at the time of the buyout and sale. This difference in return
is, therefore, accounted by factors outside of the model. The main such factor is likely the
market timing. The model assumes that PE randomly choose companies that they acquire,
while PE-firms likely carefully choose in which companies to invest. This implies that PE
can find companies that are undervalued relative to their fundamentals, which can explain
the difference between the observed outperformance, and outperformance predicted by the
model.

3.7. Conclusion
This paper empirically analyzes a sample of companies with PE-ownership, specifically
studying their capital structure, investment policies, and performance. This analysis contributes to the literature for three main reasons. First, the paper analyzes a representative
sample of PE-backed companies, which mitigates the selection bias concerns that are frequent in other studies of PE-backed companies. Second, the paper identifies the owner of
every single security that is issued to finance the buyout, and separates external debt from
shareholder loans - securities that are recorded as debt but are paid for and held by the private equity owner. Third, the paper separates paper transactions that happen between the
company and the company’s investors (the PE and external debtholders) from transactions
that involve the actual exchange of money.
The results of the analysis defy many of the common stereotypes about private equity
business. It turns out that the leverage of companies with private equity ownership is
significantly lower than traditionally considered, with many buyouts financed with either
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no or just a small amount of debt. Neither private equity owners show any evidence of overextraction. An almost equal number of PE-backed companies pay dividends and receive
money in follow-on equity injections from the PE-owner. If anything, private equity owners
relax the financial constraints of their portfolio companies and allow them to invest when
internal cash flow is low. The ability to receive equity injection from the private equity
owner is particularly crucial for financially-distressed companies: as the analysis in this
paper shows, such companies do not reduce their investments.
The theoretical model then explores the role of financial distress in explaining the behavior
of companies with and without PE-ownership. Financial distress happens rarely, but it
represents an event in which the company desperately needs external financing. For companies without PE-ownership, however, external financing is very expensive in distress, and
so they risk falling in a continuous debt spiral every time financial distress happens. In
contrast, PE-owners act as deep-pocket investors, and can rescue their portfolio companies
from the financial distress.
Quantitative results of the model show the importance of the ability of PE-firms to relax the
financial constraints of their portfolio companies in distress. The model abstracts away from
all other potential benefits that private equity firms provide to their portfolio companies
and/or their ability to select specific companies. Nevertheless, the model quantitatively
reconciles the empirically-observed difference in the capital structure of companies with and
without PE-ownership, and explains a large portion of the abnormal returns that private
equity firms demonstrate in the data.
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